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Abstract 
 
The current growth in interest in risk management is well documented in 
management and governance literature alike, reflecting the increasing needs 
of organisations to protect people, assets and shareholder funds. There are 
many reasons cited for the growth in risk management and this research 
work addresses three drivers in particular, which it is argued, have given rise 
to a need to revisit the basic building blocks of understanding for how people 
address business risk.  
 
A significant work cited in this research and the element that contributes to 
its title is the increased pace of life, which in an industrialized context was 
labelled ‗Clockspeed‘ by the MIT Professor Charles Fine in his 1998 book. In 
an organisational context, letters taking days have been replaced by email 
attachments taking seconds. Production lines of people crafting product parts 
have in many areas been replaced by fast complex machines turning out 
much more than the workforce ever could for the same cost. The time from 
design to product has reduced, even for complex products. Charles Fine 
recognised two qualities in this increasing Clockspeed world that he 
described in his work. Competitive advantage is transitory; nobody can afford 
to stand still and secondly, that the slower Clockspeed industries could learn 
from the faster ones. 
 
Collectively, the drivers of increased complexity, reduced resource levels and 
increased Clockspeed have led to a unique situation of requiring good risk 
judgement, delivered around complex decisions, with incomplete information 
and often within a limited time constraint. 
 
While the concept of risk has a long history, it has only been since the 1960‘s 
that significant research into how people react to risk has taken place. 
Seminal work from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s into the psychology of 
humans still holds good and has relevance today to explain the behaviour of 
people called to manage risk in the workplace. With this research work, we 
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go back to this work as the starting point and pick up on equally relevant 
work since that time to bring greater understanding to a very modern 
problem in risk management. The justification for this approach is in 
recognition that often people are able to manage risk very effectively and the 
scenarios of driving cars on today‘s busy roads are used to illustrate this very 
point. This apparent success in real time risk management is in contrast to 
the development of risk management as a discipline, characterised in this 
work through the recently published standards, which describe a process 
which assumes time is on the side of the decision maker. As part of the 
problem description, this fallacy is raised and the argument posed that the 
drivers of complexity, falling resource availability and increasing Industrial 
Clockspeed means that more than ever, people will need to rely on ‗Affective‘ 
(using the psychological meaning) based risk management to support their 
decision making. 
 
By revisiting the vast body of psychological, organisational management and 
risk management literature that now exists, two models were drawn to reflect 
the two modes of managing risk that align to the two dominant modes for 
decision making known as the ‗Dual Processing‘ theories.  
 
While these models can stand on the body of literature, the application and 
thinking that emerged as ‗Risk Clockspeed‘ depends on a greater 
understanding of how people use these two modes of decision making. For 
this reason a Mixed Method approach was used, consisting of simulation, a 
case study and a survey to unpick the basic elements of Risk Clockspeed 
thinking. The validity of the models was also tested around the three 
perspectives that appeared to be important in supporting the decision making 
process. The three elements tested being Experience, Competency and 
Expectation which it is argued need to be considered and fostered if a good 
‗affective‘ response to risk is to be used as a legitimate tool of management 
 
In conclusion, findings suggest that affective decision making can be a valid 
and effective method of risk management in many situations. It was also 
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found that the ‗mental models‘ that people use both on their own and 
collectively as a team are important and the three perspectives of 
Experience, Competency and Expectation are widely used by a range of 
people in different roles when making real time risk carrying decisions. 
 
The value of the models is explored as a tool of management, but the scope 
of the work was not extended to testing the models within the workplace, 
although this is now happening in practice as the work is both published and 
cited. 
 
In closing, it is recognised that this is not the final word on ‗Risk Clockspeed‘ 
and the thesis raises further questions that need to be picked up and 
addressed if ‗Risk Clockspeed‘ is to become a main stream approach in Risk 
Management. The author of this work plans to continue to research and 
publish in this field and it is hoped that other researchers will also take up 
this domain for their research.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
For something that is so widely encountered (Hillson, 2006, pp. 74-115), Risk 
is a strange entity to comprehend. Even its definition is a bone of contention 
that is still disputed in current literature (Aven & Renn, 2010). When we look 
at risk, it has no tangible form, yet its impact often has very tangible, even 
tragic consequences which engage society and indeed academics in broad 
debate (Weessies, 2007). It has no universal dedicated measure and in most 
cases a single impact quantity is insufficient to capture the full scope of a 
risk‘s perceived impact leading some to consider sophisticated ways of 
evaluating risk such as multi-dimensional analysis (Cagno, Caron, & Mancini, 
2007, pp. 1-18) and Fischhoff et al‘s Psychometric model of risk (Fischhoff, 
Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978, pp. 127-152) to give just two 
examples.  
 
Being characterised by a future event, a risk relates to something that may 
never transpire and when the prospective outcome of the same ‗risk‘ is 
viewed by another person or group; it can take on a completely different 
nature (Slovic, 2000, p. 267). Within the literature, we see such marked 
differences in perception being attributed largely to cultural issues by notable 
academics Adams, Dake, Douglas, Raynor; see Boholm for fuller list 
(Boholm, 2003, pp. 161,162) . Indeed, if it wasn‘t the fact that risk is 
inseparable from all the gain and tragedy we experience in every part of our 
lives it would be easy to imagine few would even try to comprehend or 
manage risk at all.  
 
Moreover, there seems to be a misconception that risk is well managed in 
organisations; indeed many organisations claim mastery, only for them to be 
revealed as novices by a change in the economic winds (Hubbard, 2009, p. 
4). If the loud crash of the 2007 banking crisis and its recurring echo does 
not stand as its own warning sound, then a recent AICPA and North Carolina 
State University report of the state of Enterprise Risk articulates the point 
with statistical clarity. In looking at the state of ERM, the report says 48.75% 
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of respondents admit their risk management systems are immature or 
minimally mature. (Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 2010, p. 4)  
 
Lagadec (Lagadec, 2009, p. 12) adds a yet another perspective to this 
introductory picture from his work on crisis by arguing that the strategic 
landscape has in fact mutated. Citing Hamilton (Kean & Hamilton, 2007, p. 
12) who says government departments do not have the time to step back 
and consider the ‗big picture‘, Lagadec extends that view to include private 
sector. So, we should perhaps not condemn or lament the state of ERM in 
organisations for what they are yet do, but sympathise with their needs and 
seek to broaden and deepen the tools available for use in this ‗mutated‘ 
world? Indeed Lagadec, reflecting on the industrial response to the 
management of crisis, says industry has simply responded with more of the 
same old responses. More plans, more communication and more powerful 
tools [that follow the same strategy] where in fact the problem has evolved, 
implicitly posing the question, is there something new or different we can do? 
Lagadec is so convinced by this case and strong in his feeling that he titled 
the section that followed in his paper  
 
„Risks and crisis back to the “Wilderness”‟ 
 
Lagadec 2009 
 
In a paper published earlier than Lagadec‘s, Raz and Hillson (Raz & Hillson, 
2005, p. 53) also comment on the changed landscape for risk management; 
however they do not summarise the changes as a mutation as Lagadec 
does. In their paper which has the comparison of some popular standards 
which predate the ISO31000:2009 standard as their focus, by way of 
introduction, they cite; 
 
 the shift away from dangerous physical work towards knowledge-
intensive work; 
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 an expanded view of the organisation in the context of its various 
stakeholders; 
 the growing importance of projects as the framework for planning and 
executing work in organisations; 
 the central role of technology, and its inherent uncertainty; 
 ever-increasing competitive pressures to shorten lead times, causing 
organisations to start planning and executing their activities with 
incomplete information; 
 increasing turbulence in the business environment; 
 the rapid increase in the degree of complexity embodied in business 
and projects; 
 the continuing trend towards globalisation, and the resulting emphasis 
on virtual business and teams; and 
 the increasing burden of regulation with which businesses must 
comply 
Raz and Hillson 2005 
   
With a documented context such as this, we can see that risk management 
remains a rich field for researchers to work in and an area where the results 
of fresh research could perhaps add to both the existing body of academic 
knowledge and deliver a practical advancement for the risk management 
profession in line with the aims and goals of the Doctor of Business 
Administration qualification. Consequently this work is presented as just one 
of the many threads that exist for research in risk management. 
  
 Page 19 
 
The State of the Art through the lens of Standards 
 
One of the obvious starting points that can be taken up to consider the 
management of risk in organisations more deeply, is through the benchmark 
documents of industry; Standards. We are fortunate in this area, for this 
review is timely, as there has recently been both a UK British Standard and 
an International standard published providing an up to date view of how to 
manage risk. 
 
Current recognised best practice within industry is illustrated through the 
latest standards such as ISO31000 ("ISO 31000: Risk management - 
Principles and guidelines," 2009) , BS 31100 ("BS 31100:2008 Risk 
management. Code of practice " 2008) or ASNZ 4630 ("AS/NZ 4360:2004 
Risk Management Standard," 2004) . Each expresses organisational risk 
management, as a straightforward process, defining terms and setting an 
order to the process. More specifically and with relevance to this work, these 
standards lay down a structured approach in terms of how risks are: 
 
 Identified in context with the scope of activity being undertaken by the 
organisation 
 Evaluated in terms of the impact (upside and downside impacts are 
valid) that the realisation of the risk might have on organisational 
objectives 
 To be addressed with plans of action to maintain the likelihood and/or 
impact of those risks within a range of acceptability (often known as 
risk appetite (Segal, 2006, pp. 17-19)) 
 To be managed and monitored, as a method of assurance that the 
plans are progressing, sufficient and of wide enough scope to include 
the shifting landscape of risk that exists.   
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However close examination suggests that the formal documented form of 
this risk management process, illustrated in each of these standards, is 
orientated almost exclusively for risks that lend themselves to early 
identification and time extended decomposition based practice of risk 
management. That is to say where there is a presumption of sufficient time 
for rational cognitive reflective evaluation and where the information to 
directly manage the risk is available already or is easily obtained. 
Furthermore this presumption of time availability also implicitly embodies a 
secondary assumption that the information necessary to manage those risks 
is also discoverable in good time and hence is available to be built into the 
plans before the risk becomes due. Following the argument that the ISO 
recognised standard definition of risk makes no such allowances for time in 
this context we can see neither the presumption nor the assumption is 
actually justified. 
 
Consider for example the following extracts from ISO31000:2009 
 
2.8 Risk management process 
Systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to 
the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing the context, and 
identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring (2.28) and reviewing 
the risk. 
 
ISO31000:2009 
 
Without the information being available to directly manage the risk ahead of 
the risk impact, one can only address the context in which the actors (the 
term we will use for people involved with the risk) will make their risk 
management choices. This is a significant step towards recognising the 
different management style that must be applied for such risks. The actors 
can be trained for when they must act when the risk hits, you can provide the 
actors with policies, procedures, boundaries and practices to help them 
through decision making process at the time; but without the information 
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about the risk being available, you cannot necessarily fully evaluate or treat 
‗the risk‘ appropriately. 
 
2.23 Level of risk 
Magnitude of a risk (2.1) or combination of risks, expressed in terms of the 
combination of consequences (2.18) and their likelihood (2.19) 
 
ISO31000:2009 
 
In a situation where the information necessary to manage the risk emerges 
almost concurrently with the risk as it manifests; the magnitude of the risk 
and the consequences of the risk are by definition part of that emergent 
process. Furthermore, the likelihood (in particular the post mitigation 
likelihood) in such circumstances and the full extent of impacts being felt are 
in part a function of the behaviour of the actors at the time, as their behaviour 
dynamically changes the situation and hence is not pre-determinable ahead 
of the actual event. For example, the severity of impact in a car accident, or 
even whether the impact takes place, is highly dependent on the car drivers 
concerned recognising the accident situation and the timeliness of them 
applying the brakes. Consequently it may be argued that the nominal level of 
risk is not truly available for this class of risk before the event and anything 
recorded for the consequences and likelihood in a risk register is no more 
than a range or possibly even just placeholders for the real time event 
values. 
Perhaps a further example will help clarify the full consequence of the 
argument being proposed here? 
 
Consider for example, the risk of a car accident occurring as a car navigates 
at a road junction. The risk level to be managed is inherently bound up with 
the road conditions and the behaviour of other road users present at the 
time. In poor conditions of lighting weather and given heavy road use, the 
risk of accident may be considered to be substantially higher than for the 
same junction, in good conditions with a lighter traffic load. It is not within 
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anyone‘s gift to know the exact conditions at that junction in advance of a car 
driver‘s actual arrival and indeed, the conditions may improve or degrade 
even in the very short time interval the driver spends at the junction. No, in 
such cases, we must rely on the skill of the driver and the collective skills of 
those others, also present at the junction at that same time and not on a 
process that demands foreknowledge of those risk defining parameters. 
  
On the other hand, we can turn to accident statistics for that particular 
junction to make some projections, but in doing so, we are getting nothing 
more than an average indicator of what the risk may through an indicator and 
not an actual measure of the risk our driver may encounter at the time. 
 
This presumption/assumption couplet, we suggest, manifests as limitations 
on our ability to manage risk and ultimately they are in conflict with the wholly 
inclusive definition used by the ISO31000 standard for risk: 
 
 „effect of uncertainty on objectives‟  
 
ISO31100:2009 (supporting notes omitted) 
 
A definition we note, which exercises no boundaries or limitations due to the 
nature or availability issues of the information felt necessary to manage 
those risks.  
 
Risk situations such as in this example that develop too quickly for the 
standard process described above are often still managed (by the driver in 
the example), but not with a formal risk management process designed for 
this purpose as described in a ‗standard‘. Indeed they are often not even 
seen as risks and their management is not seen as risk management with 
various alternative labels being assigned ‗Business as usual‘, ‗the day job‘, 
‗the nature of the work we do‘ all of which are expressions used for the 
process of managing risks that are seen to fall outside the organisations 
formal risk management process. John Adams terms these risks a ‗Directly 
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Discernable‘ (Adams, 1999, p. 11) but this is simply a classification which 
may hide the importance of their management towards the objectives of the 
organisation? 
 
Through this thesis we argue that this boundary between the formal process 
and the informal management of risk is artificial, a weakness and an 
omission from the required organisational risk management agenda. Without 
consistent management this weakness is seen by the researcher as a 
missed opportunity for better performance and a reason why many 
substantive organisational failures arise from risks that were never even on 
the organisations rise register. The recent joint Corporate Board Member and 
PwC report called What Directors Think 2009  (Kerstetter & Bromilow, 2009, 
p. 8) reported that 59% of Directors expect risks to emerge over the coming 
year that are currently unforeseen. This thesis is written from research and 
critical evaluation underpinned by a belief that the management of risk 
should include frameworks, tools and techniques for managing the complete 
spectrum of risks that an organisation may face.  
 
This is not to suggest the same frameworks, methods or processes that are 
already in widespread use should not be used. Nor to suggest that there is 
nothing in place to address the class of risks described. These standard 
processes clearly have a purpose and may even provide a partial solution, 
but it is acknowledged that the different nature of real time or close to real 
events means other methods may also be required and it is this that we want 
to research. 
 
To address that which is seen as an omission which often leaves 
organisations exposed to substantive risk, inspiration is drawn from the 1996 
work of Charles Fine and his concept of Industrial Clockspeed (Fine, 1998). 
Risk Clockspeed (Smith & Borodzicz, 2008) is an alternative lens that looks 
at the timing and rate of revelation of the information necessary to manage 
risks. Through this lens all risks are seen along a ‗rate line‘ rather than a 
timeline and this distinction is best illustrated with an example.  
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Again by way of example, when driving a car on the public highway we are 
called upon to exercise considerable risk management and we engage in 
what we may term as ‗real time risk adjusted decision making‘. That is to say 
we do not come to an abrupt halt as soon as we see a potential hazard; we 
assess the potential hazard and adjust our driving to suit with close to real 
time processing.  
 
Again a further example from everyday experience may help to clarify. 
Consider for example the common hazard situation of children standing or 
moving close to the kerb edge of a roadway. Within the blink of an eye, any 
one of those children could shift the short distance necessary to move them 
out of the moderate safety of the pavement and into the danger zone of the 
roadway itself. The information necessary to manage that hazard and the 
related risks (the actions and indications given by the children and the 
activities taking place in the surrounding area) are also changing quickly, 
these events are undoubtedly unfolding in real time. In such moments, as 
road users and drivers of vehicles and lorries, we are obliged to rely on our 
experience to read the indicators, actions and motion of the children in real 
time and use this to infer whether we can pass by safely or should stop in 
anticipation of a foolish action.  
 
Consider now an alternative, transport situation such as shipping cargo by 
road, rail or sea. Planning the transportation of the goods is a situation where 
we can manage most of the substantial risks in good time, as the information 
necessary is itself available in good time. We have good knowledge of the 
items to transport and science can be used to determine the appropriate 
response (‗Discernable by Science‘ in Adams classification system (Adams, 
1999)). The nature of this second example, from the risk perspective is 
substantially different and it lends itself well to the Standards based process. 
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Unpicking the problem 
 
From the standards viewpoint, we have started to uncover some limitations 
in the methods documented and this is an appropriate point to introduce a 
new term to describe the timing dimension that we feel may be important. 
Risk Clockspeed was coined in 2006 (Smith & Borodzicz, 2008) to describe 
this time availability dimension of the information considered useful to 
manage risks. Two classes of risk are recognised; Slow Clockspeed Risks fit 
the standards type process without an issue as the information necessary to 
manage those risks emerges in good time. Fast Clockspeed Risks are those 
risks where the information necessary to manage the risk emerges at, or 
close too, real time along with the risk as it matures. We will address Risk 
Clockspeed in more detail later in this thesis, but at this stage it is important 
to note that there is no firm boundary between these two classes. Risk 
Clockspeed is a continuum, characterised by two types. 
 
From a Risk Clockspeed perspective, we argue risks from both of the 
examples described above have their place in risk management and we cite 
the definition found in ISO31000 to support the proposed view that inclusivity 
of these risks into the boundary of risk management is justified. Again, 
ISO31000:2009 defines risk as: 
 
[The] „effect of uncertainty on objectives‟ 
 
ISO 31000:2009, BS31100:2008 and Guide 73:2009 
 
And this is the definition of risk we shall formally adopt for this research work. 
 
So to summarise this exploration of risk from the current standards based 
practice perspective; the shipping of goods example fits the published 
process very well. Identification, evaluation, planning and management can 
all take place over an extended time period. Information becomes available 
in good time; there is time for plans and the management of those plans to 
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be refined so that the impact and consequences of the risks may be 
controlled. With these car driving examples, the process as described is 
somewhat ineffective and inappropriate for the circumstances drivers finds 
themselves in. Before the event, no driver can even fully speculate where on 
the journey substantive risks may be encountered, let alone plan for how 
they may be managed. And of course it is unreasonable to speculate in that 
way, as there are an infinite number of scenarios that could give rise to 
substantive risk on any journey.  
 
Though these differences in risk type and acknowledging how they need to 
be handled differently, we can see the situation with the existing process is 
not completely lost. The concept of Scope, Identification, Assessment, 
Evaluation and Management is a useful model and maybe all that is required 
is adaption and an alternative application approach; after all there are things 
that can be done to prepare people for situations such as car driving. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Relevant Literature: Historical perspective 
 
One can only wonder if ‗risk management‘ actually originated as a discipline 
of study centuries ago, when humans started to play games of chance with 
odd shaped animal bones as discussed by Bell (Bell, 1979)? Notwithstanding 
games, history tells us these ancient ancestors were forced to face more 
important risks on a daily basis, as their very survival depended on them 
addressing risks to water and food sources along with risks to personal 
security. So as a study or life skill, risk is not a new concept in itself, one 
might ask whether our approach to risk and its management ever really 
changed? 
 
For a large part of history, humans have been making life and death 
decisions in the face of uncertainty. However, more recently, we could thank 
mathematicians such as Pascal who worked on the issue of probability in the 
17th century for the first scientific approaches to risk assessment (Ore, 1960, 
pp. 409-419) (Bernstein, 1996, pp. 47-51) an essential development for risk 
management to progress in the modern world. Many theorists cite the origins 
of modern risk management, as emerging out of insurance, a thread that 
may be traced back at least to the 17th century through works on probability 
such as the 1865 book by Isaac Todhunter (Todhunter, 1865). Specifically 
Todhunter in chapter V, comments on the work of John Graunt who began to 
look at mortality issues in order to gain greater understanding of the risk of 
death, an activity still undertaken for life insurance today (Dickson, Hardy, 
Waters, & Waters, 2009). However, while starting to take a mathematical 
approach, in the treatment of risk related data, rather than simply attaching 
these chance events to ‗Acts of God‘ we should not forget Todhunter‘s world 
was still one heavily laced with superstition and a strong concept of ‗one‘s 
luck. Bernstein richly describes this turning point as: 
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„when the human imagination broke loose from the constraints of the past 
and exposed long-held fundamental beliefs to inquiry and challenge. It was a 
time of religious turmoil, budding capitalism, and an unbridled enthusiasm for 
science and the future‟ 
 
(Bernstein 1996) 
 
This substantial attribution to luck and fortune, which remains with people 
today in a weakened form, undoubtedly contributed to a very culturally 
embedded sense of risk in Todhunter‘s time. This contrasts with the cognitive 
scientific view of risk so prevalent today, born out of our greater 
understanding of science, where Acts of God are more readily interpreted as 
the uncontrollable acts of nature and consequences of human society 
(Patton et al., 2009). 
 
From this early start of people showing an interest in risk and the simple view 
of how the subject started to change in recent centuries, further academic 
interest started to stir in the late 1950‘s into manifestations and perceptions 
of by humans (Bernstein, 1996) (Simon, 1982). This effort was the beginning 
of a new productive phase in research that would lay down the core 
fundamentals of modern risk management which would grow in prominence, 
as a business topic to the point where it is now seen as a board level issue 
(Brodeur & Pergler, 2010). As a discipline, irrespective of its true origins, risk 
management has been changed forever by this post war work. But to 
understand the journey of risk management behind this thesis, we must also 
consider developments in other disciplines such as ‗Systems Thinking‘ and 
general human Psychology. 
Modern research into risk and its management 
 
A good example of the general study of risk, undertaken during this post war 
productive period is the paper on the balance between technological 
development and acceptable risk by Chauncey Starr (Starr, 1969, pp. 1232-
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1238). In his research, Starr looked at how society valued safety examining 
transportation, electricity generation and war. He tried to find a relationship 
between fatality due to disease, risk taken voluntarily and risk imposed by 
society. Setting aside his intriguing findings for a while, this work is 
substantially a look at the human condition when faced with uncertainty and 
limited information. This reference to ‗Limited Information‘ is important as 
while as a society we have the capacity to generate more data; Starr is 
recognising that this does not necessarily mean decision making with more 
information.  
 
Furthermore, it is clear from Starr‘s work that there was recognition that 
organisational practices had changed reflecting the delivery of more effective 
organisations with developments in management science. This is a very 
important additional factor in the development of risk within organisations as 
a discipline for protecting and developing value, which is a theme that has 
more recently been picked up through changes in Corporate Governance 
rather than by improved management style. 
 
Taking more from Starr‘s work, he reasoned that risk was playing an 
important role in deciding how society reacted to the fruits of increased 
production and consumption. Early in his paper he writes: 
 
„Our ability to organise resources of money, men and materials to focus on 
new technological programs has reduced the diffusion-exploitation time by 
roughly an order of magnitude in the past century‟ 
 
(Chauncey Starr. 1969) 
 
As Starr had noted, organisational management research had already led to 
advances, but Starr could not have anticipated the growth in these fields that 
was still to come.  
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The transformation of management owes much to academic research in 
organisational management finding its way directly into many respected 
organisations through the reading habits of ambitious managers. This 
popularisation of research has led by growth in readable books and thought 
leadership articles from World Class writers such as Mintzberg (Mintzberg & 
Ghoshal, 2003)  on core strategy, Porter on the competitive forces (Porter & 
Millar, 1999), Hamel and Prahalad who urged organisations to compete for 
their futures (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994) and Kanter who wanted to teach 
organisational agility allowing ‗Giants to Dance‘ (Kanter, 1990). Much of this 
material found its voice through the Harvard Business Review which has 
established self as such a popular management journal; it may be picked up 
from the shelves of news retailers at airports and railway stations.  
 
In yet another thread during these productive years Taichi Ono‘s Lean 
Manufacturing ideas, which originated from the 1950‘s, started to have 
worldwide impact with the publication of Masaaki Imai‘s book ‗The Key to 
Japan's Management Success‘.  (Imai, 1986). Central to lean movement is 
the idea of removing waste (termed ‗muda‘ after the Japanese word for 
waste) and initially inventories were considered as waste. Moreover, over 
resourcing with people also became considered as a waste of corporate 
funds and lean thinking has led to many people having less decision making 
time, less uncommitted time for researching factors in the decision making 
process and more personal responsibility for the decisions taken by them in 
an organisation. 
 
„In short, lean thinking is lean because it provides a way to do more and 
more with less and less, less human effort, less equipment, less time, and 
less space‟ 
 
(J. P. Womack, Jones, Simon, & Schuster, 1996, p. 15) 
 
Reflecting back on this period, when organisations applied lean methods to 
drive out inefficiency Womack, in a later article, refers to this period as the 
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‗Tool Age‘ (Womack, 2007) as organisations were applying ‗the tools‘ in 
great numbers. 
 
Collectively as management techniques improved and lean thinking started 
to bite, organisations were transformed from simple, high labour, 
independent structures into more efficient, more productive, less resourced, 
highly networked systems, supported by substantial investment in connected 
IT infrastructure. What we have today, particularly but not exclusively in 
manufacturing and commercial organisations are more complex, networked 
organisations (Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002, p. 7). Slack continues to be 
driven out, resources were used more efficiently, industry worked faster and 
the world got a lot more complex.   
 
It is doubtful that Chauncey Starr could have fully envisaged these changes 
as he described the 1969 position as ‗Highly developed‘, but it was clear he 
was looking in the right areas, so it is fair to describe his work as remarkably 
insightful. Consequently, rather than making Starr‘s work obsolete, these 
further developments in organisational management and indeed computer 
science with its increasing use of ‗Systems Analysis‘ (Wallerstein, 2004) 
added to the urgency of an appropriate risk management response. In 1992, 
this theme of society and risk was visited again in a more philosophical work 
by Ulrich Beck through his popular and often cited book The Risk Society 
(Beck, 1992). Again, the topic of risk and society proved to be a catalyst for 
risk research, only now business failures had led to a new dimension to the 
work in support of new moves in audit and corporate governance, but once 
again, there was comment on yet more complexity entering the system. 
 
„..if you distinguish between calculable and non calculable threats, under the 
surface of risk calculation new kinds of industrialised, decision produced 
incalculabilities and threats are spreading within the globalisation of high risk 
industries, whether for warfare or welfare purposes.‟ 
 
Ulrich Beck: Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity 1992:p22 
 Page 32 
 
 
To unpick and understand this symbiotic developmental history of modern 
risk and importantly to analyse where the real leverage points are; we must 
acknowledge risk and its management is a complex problem. For this 
reason, this literature review employs a series of viewpoints, a technique 
familiar to anyone who practices systems thinking.  
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Scoping the body of modern literature for this research 
Two Schools of Thought 
 
Among the many notable landmarks in the productive period since the 
1970‘s we have also witnessed the emergence of two distinct and powerfully 
argued concepts of risk. On the one side, there is the Psychometric School, 
characterised by Starr (Starr, 1969) and supported by Fischhoff (Fischhoff et 
al., 1978) among others who see risk as a science, where objective 
measurement and controlled circumstances (variables in ones research) are 
achievable. On the other hand there is the Cultural Response School who 
contend that risk is an artificial social construction (Hood & Jones, 1996) 
(Boholm, 2003) in which case risk, they argue, is a study that must be 
undertaken in situ, as the assessment in a laboratory setting removes 
essential essence from the study. Supporting the case of both camps has 
been the work carried out by Psychologists who since 1900 have been 
unpicking the way people think and act (see (Butler-Bowdon, 2007) for a 
general text). Of particular interest to this research is the work on Affect by 
writers such as Slovic, Finucane (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2004) and Zajonc from the 1980‘s (Zajonc, 1980) (Zajonc & Markus, 1982) 
(Zajonc, 1984) as these writers address the underlying reactions of people 
immersed in risky situations.  
Bounded Rationality 
 
To address the complexity of the debate, which is seen as a significant driver 
to the need for this research, we also need to consider the limitations of the 
human mind such as Simon‘s work on Bounded Rationality, (Simon, 1982) 
where he commented on our limited abilities in processing multiple sources 
of data. Similarly, we need to consider the limitations of memory and 
consider works such as Broadbent‘s work on ‗Recency‘  (Broadbent, Vines, 
& Broadbent, 1978), where he and his colleagues investigated the limitations 
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and distortions of memory exercised with multiple stimulus in quick 
succession. 
The essential issues resulting from this work cited above is that risk can be 
seen as a socially shared concept, in that people may discuss and debate 
both the form and impact of a risk resulting in an agreed position which may 
differ from any one persons view. In undertaking this process, which Mary 
Douglas labelled ‗Social Construction‘ there are both limitations and biases 
to consider. In particular, while Simon and Broadbent address issues of 
scope and recency, they do not consider the perspective of information 
which may emerge as the risk situation unfolds. This is one of the gaps that 
this research aims to at least partially address. 
Psychology of Decision Making 
 
Considering the Psychological perspective and given the close proximity 
between risk and decision making; it is perhaps no surprise that much of the 
work on understanding how people make decisions has also provided a 
substantial body of reading material for this research. Work by Epstein 
(Epstein, 1994), Loewenstein (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) 
and others focused on the idea that people have more than one way to solve 
a mental challenge. The dominant theory underlying this early work, was for 
two thinking modes as outlined by Sloman (Sloman, 1996)  and called 
System 1 and System 2 by Stanovich and West (Stanovich & West, 1998). 
System 1 in Sloman‘s original work, is associative, it operates from similarity, 
is sourced from personal knowledge and is intuitive. System 2 on the other 
hand is vested in language, culture and formal systems. It underpins 
deliberation, explanation and formal analysis. In simple terms, System 1 
thinking is fast, intuitive and our feeling mode. System 2 on the other hand is 
our slower cognitive, thinking mode.  
 
In relation to the management of risk, this ‗Dual Process theory‘ as it came to 
be known (Evans, 2006) (Evans, 2007) thinking has greatly influenced this 
 Page 35 
 
work as it reaches to the very heart of why this research is a useful approach 
to risk management.  
Heuristics and Bias 
 
Of major importance to this work and indeed such a significant body of work 
that has contributed much to risk and decision making is the work by Tversky 
(Tversky, 2004) on choice and Tversky and Kahnaman in the role of 
heuristics and bias. From the mid 1970‘s with key works in 1979 (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979, pp. 263-292) and the collection of works in this area 
published in 1982 (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), these writers 
opened up a new perspective on how people make assessments quickly. 
This research makes use of this important work to explain how substantive 
mistakes can be made in fast decision making situations. This original and 
groundbreaking work inspired many such as the more recent work by Gerd 
Gigerenzer and the ABC Research Group (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). In 
developing the Risk Clockspeed models, this body of work around heuristics, 
covering their use and development, has been useful in justifying the 
prominence given to this characteristic of decision making. In this research 
work, we are not trying to develop any greater insight into individual 
heuristics, for this work the abstract level of heuristics as a set of human 
behaviours is considered sufficient. 
Reliance on Statistical Modelling 
 
Since this productive pre 2000 period on risk, there has been a new branch 
added to the tree of risk management research. Losses in the 1990‘s due to 
the inappropriate use of internal controls (Orange County 1994, 
Metallgesellschaft 1994, Barings 1995 and Daiwa 1995) led to growth in the 
use of a method developed initially by JP Morgan in 1993 called Value at 
Risk (VaR). (Krause, 2003). Since that time, much research has gone into 
this measure, which has since been somewhat discredited since the banking 
crisis as being too narrow (Anderson, 2009, p. 28) .  
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At face value this area of work on VaR may seem irrelevant, but it is 
important as it typifies the attempts to systemise and embody complex risk 
matters into nothing more than an algorithmic process. Particularly the recent 
paper by Anderson and a magazine article by Rowe (Rowe, 2009) point to 
the weakness of such approaches and in doing so highlight the weaknesses 
in literature, theoretical development and practice which this thesis seeks to 
partially address. 
Corporate Governance 
 
The new growth in Finance specific risk measures has not help to unify risk 
management which continues to have major sub areas. This has left work on 
Corporate Governance to struggle with a somewhat fractured landscape of 
risk management which Christopher Hood originally described as ‗An 
Archipelago‘ back in 1996 (Hood & Jones, 1996, pp. 3-6). Evidence that 
these fractures persist can be found in the 2010 rewrite of the UK 
Governance Code (formally the combined code) in which the terms ‗Risk 
Appetite‘ and ‗Risk Tolerance‘ were dropped from the last draft as there was 
no common agreement between the finance and strategic camps on how 
these terms should be interpreted, only to be replaced by terms which the 
FRC believes mean much the same (see Clauses C1 and C2) (FRC, 2010, 
pp. 18-19). To say that there is no cross domain literature would be wrong as 
there are many examples particularly in pre 2000 work, but with the industrial 
articles cited, it is clear that cross domain practices are still in demand. The 
rate at which risk information presents itself, relative to the risk event itself is 
fundamental quality that can be assessed for any risk and so is a concept 
and cross domain practice. Through this window, we can see this research 
addresses, in a small way, part of that unified practice and theory gap.  
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Enterprise Risk Management 
 
There are has however been continued work on Governance and risk 
unification under the headings ‗Enterprise Risk Management‘ (ERM) and 
‗Governance Risk and Compliance‘ (GRC) which have become vogue since 
2000.  Fogel, Morck and Yeung for example (Fogel, Morck, & Yeung, 2008) 
have continued written recently and extensively about risk and corporate 
governance and more recently there has been talk of the need to address 
the now aged 1992 COSO Enterprise Risk Management model. (Leech, 
2010b) 
 
(The COSO work is covered later in this literature review. Here, it is sufficient 
to note it was a powerful US consortium who together with PWC, published a 
model and application guidelines in an attempt to produce a common 
Enterprise Risk Management approach. One of the driving factors behind the 
COSO approach was the US Securities and Exchange Commission, who 
regulate firms in the US, cited COSO‟s work as a route to compliance under 
the Sarbannes-Oxley act on Corporate Reporting 2002) 
 
This work on ERM, GRC and Governance in general is relevant to this 
research as the need for compliance is the driving force for the business 
case that makes this research timely and important. As the need to improve 
Governance grows, the understanding of real time decision making is also 
expected to grow and in this respect, the concepts to be researched 
addresses a gap in ERM literature and practice for usable, universal real 
time risk management approaches. 
The Increase in Industrial Clockspeed 
 
Outside the discipline of risk and the closely related domain of decision 
making under uncertainty we must look at societal changes to understand 
what drivers have changed the course of risk research. Not insignificant in 
society terms is the ever increasing pace with which we run our productive 
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lives. Charles Fine (Fine, 1998) labelled this perception of pace ‗Clockspeed‘ 
taking the term from the computer industry of the 1980s and 1990s. His 
clarity of insight into this particular societal undercurrent does add context to 
risk research for the future. Indeed, Charles Fine‘s use of the term 
Clockspeed was the inspiration behind Risk Clockspeed, when it was noted 
that risk also appears to have a variable ‗rate‘ quality, although not in the 
same way as Fine‘s industrial sectors.  
 
As a key driver of relevance and with Charles Fine‘s work being an 
inspiration for Risk Clockspeed, it is reasonable to consider the work of Fine 
in greater detail. As a researcher from the Sloan School of Management at 
MIT, working in the 1990‘s, Fine was predominantly interested in the 
management theory aspects of his work on industrial Clockspeed and 
specifically the competitive advantage that could result. The sub title of the 
cited book ―Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage‖ 
not only underlines this focus, but gives insight into the key findings of his 
work. Fine starts his book with a Genetics thread and recounts the ‗Fruit Fly‘ 
experiments undertaken by many ‗A‘ level students as an introduction to 
Genetics. Fine then introduces the concept of Clockspeed based on the 
short life cycle of the Fruit fly as compared to other living creatures relating 
this to fast changing industries such as telecommunications. On page 19, 
Fine comments on Clockspeed and Decision Making at the macro level 
considering Boeing and Airbus as both manufacturers consider the market 
for a super sized jet liner. This is a parallel in some ways to Risk Clockspeed, 
but it is very much from the market force perspective and nothing is said 
about individuals or the psychology of the individual decision making 
process. 
 
Having concluded that technology and market forces are the drivers behind 
the increasing rate of industrial Clockspeed, Fine turns his attention to the 
nature of competitive advantage and in doing so makes one of the major 
claims to emerge from this work. Fine concluded that Competitive Advantage 
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is always temporary and the period with which it may be held is itself a 
function of that ‗industrial sectors‘ Clockspeed. 
 
The latter part of Fine‘s book and indeed the conclusions drawn from Fine‘s 
work, remains with the biological analogy from Fruit Flies and Genetics as it 
works towards practical solutions and lessons learned. The first practical 
suggestion is that one industry can learn from another if that second industry 
has a faster Clockspeed in the same way that ‗A level‘ students can learn 
from studying the short lifecycle of Fruit flies. The second major practical 
suggestion is aimed at the supply chain, as Fine recognises the prolific use 
of Extended Enterprises to deliver World class products. The suggestion he 
makes is that by introducing new ‗Genes‘ (as metaphors for new thinking), 
industries can adapt their ‗fit‘ to customer needs and with these ‗genes‘ 
develop the next round of competitive advantage necessary to replace the 
impending loss of the current competitive advantage. With of course this 
need for renewal being underpinned by the first principle of industrial 
Clockspeed, that advantage is always temporary. In simple terms, Charles 
Fine argues for the need to keep thinking within an organisation fresh with 
the injection of new thinking in order to maintain the development stream 
necessary for renewing competitive advantage. 
Reflecting back on this detailed account of Fine‘s work, as well taking 
inspiration from the increasing Clockspeed metaphor, we can see the gap 
that we wish to research emerging through the macro approach taken to the 
Decision Making section in Fine‘s book. Speed and cycle time is indeed 
important and the drivers of technology and market forces relate well to the 
drivers emerging behind this work. The gap in this work from the critical 
perspective though, appears in that Fine considers the decision making 
process very much from the single perspective of the slow cognitive System 
2 method of analysis, which we argue is the prevailing thought for all 
decision making in business and the weakness we have set out to examine. 
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Increasing complexity and systems thinking 
 
While Fine pointed to technology and market forces, we can generalise these 
as sub elements of our society which has increasingly become a more 
complex affair as noted by Jackson and his colleagues (Jackson, Allum, & 
Gaskell, 2005). To this end various frameworks have emerged from a 
discipline for dealing with complexity under the banner of ‗Systems‘. There 
are several branches of Systems work to consider and each adds a different 
perspective to this research work. Soft Systems, introduced to the world by 
Peter Checkland (P. Checkland, 1981) deals with the human as part of the 
system. This is important as decisions are made by people and having made 
their decision, the environment is itself becomes changed emphasising the 
point that people cannot be excluded from the design of systems that in turn 
will serve the people. Peter Checkland was very aware of this fact and even 
drew the analyst into the Rich Pictures he created in recognition that even 
the analyst changed the environment. Other important systems work comes 
from what was originally called Industrial Dynamics (Forrester, 1958) and 
has since become ‗System Dynamics‘ (Forrester, 1991). This important 
development recognises the powerful forces of delay and feedback in 
systems, including human systems. Reflecting on how this work impacts Risk 
Clockspeed is a key aspect of positioning Risk Clockspeed into the existing 
body of literature. 
Complexification 
 
In a 1994 Casti and Casti writing about chaos theory, published a book 
called ‗Complexification‘ (Casti & Casti, 1994). This appears to be one of the 
earliest uses of the term ‗complexification‘, although the term now appears to 
be linked to many aspects of complexity, including a branch of mathematics. 
In 2005, in a paper on risk in cyberspace, a group of LSE academics 
(Jackson et al., 2005) used the term in a different context; that of the 
increasing complexity of the risk landscape. They cited the increase of 
complexity they saw in societal systems, production, consumption, 
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governance and technology as the root and justification for using this term. 
This issue of increased social and technological complexity seems to be so 
widely known these days, that it has ceased to be a controversy. Many 
people, academics and non academics in all walks of life regularly comment 
on the increasing complexity of society and its impact on our working lives, 
private pursuits and indeed our health. Adding a further dimension to the 
complexity debate, in the same paper, the authors argued that implicit in the 
issue of complexification is the view that more knowledge leads to more risk, 
something they defend by citing Douglas and Wildavsky (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982 p. 3) 
 
„The advance of science increases human understanding of the natural 
world. By opening up new realms of knowledge, however, science 
simultaneously can increase the gap between what is known and what it is 
desirable to know‟. 
 
Douglas & Wildavsky 1982 
 
This is perhaps more contentious than the simple idea of increasing 
complexification, and yet significant to risk in the ‗Enterprise of the Future‘ 
concept propagated by writers such as Murray and Greens (Murray & 
Greenes, 2006) as this future will require better and easier methods for risk 
management. 
However, we should not lose sight of the fact that this is exactly the same 
point Starr was making in 1969 (Starr, 1969) and highly relevant to the points 
Lagadec raised in his 2009 paper, which was discussed in the introduction 
(Lagadec, 2009). 
 
In contemplating this ‗complexification‘ term as used by Jackson and his 
colleagues, it seems more than coincidence that this arose over the same 
time period as the developments in managerial, production and 
psychological understanding referenced earlier in this review? However, 
according to Jackson and his colleagues it is not a coincidence that this 
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‗complexification‘ has given rise to the greater interest in risk that we see 
emerging from society. Indeed, with better management, leaner systems and 
resourcing optimised, it is no surprise that improved risk management is not 
only required, but an emerging source of competitive advantage. 
 
In response to complexification and the empowerment of individuals, we 
have seen risk research take a different direction since this original core work 
on risk and its origins as outlined above. Cultural and soft systems thinking 
as documented in the 2006 paper by (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006), is 
growing, while audit, the process of confirmation, has also grown into ‗an 
expanding institutional domain for auditor judgement, beyond mere 
verification towards questions of propriety and effectiveness‘  (Power, 1999, 
p. 40). In addition, beyond cultural issues, we can see further development of 
process thinking and project management theory running in parallel with the 
work in management and psychology documented above.  
Risk Research for Project Management 
 
In the UK, a particularly influential work in the development of a practical risk 
management process, originally implemented in the Aerospace and Defence 
sector, arose from an industrial Risk Management Special Interest Group 
(Risk SIG) within The Association of Project Managers (APM). Under the 
Chairmanship of the leading academic, Professor Chris Chapman, this was 
one of the first comprehensive applied risk works available for project 
professionals. As well as overseeing the development of the first guide, 
Chapman also wrote extensively on project risk management and the 
methods developed under this initiative publishing a number of practical 
papers on its use (Chapman, 1997) and with Ward (Chapman & Ward, 
2002). 
 
Called the Project Risk Analysis and Management guide (PRAM Guide) (P. 
Simon, Hillson, & Newland, 1997) this work provided a workable process and 
information on the application of, a simple but effective approach for 
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capturing, recording and treating risks. This PRAM work predates all the 
currently recognised standards in this area including the very popular ASNZ 
4360:2004 standard ("AS/NZ 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard," 2004) 
which has a number of similarities with the PRAM approach. In engineering 
and project circles the PRAM technique has proved popular and the guide is 
still recommended by and available from the APM. 
 
In terms of its relevance to this work, the PRAM Guide is largely historical, 
but notably it does not make any special reference to the time availability of 
risk information and it supports the process approach reflected in the 
standards already reviewed. This however takes nothing away from the 
importance and timing of this work for the practice of Risk Management. 
Cultural Theorists 
 
Karl Dake who authored ‗Myths of Nature‘ (Dake, 1992) considered the early 
thinking on risk as a probability centric view, where ones ‗luck‘ and cultural 
background played a significant part in ones perception of risk, outcome and 
likelihood. This view is quite understandable; given management science did 
not have the centre stage it enjoys today and people saw their fortune as a 
reflection of their spirituality. However through work in the 1970‘s and 80‘s 
from people like the social anthropologist Mary Douglas and the political 
theorist, Aaron Wildavski, a more scientific and yet still socially centric view 
of risk had emerged termed the ‗social construction of risk‘ (Dake, 1992, p. 
27).  
 
Karl Dake developed this theme further with this ‗Myths of Nature‘ paper 
which went a step further taking the debate out of the purely scientific to 
focus more on the context in which these risks are framed. Together, these 
writers formed the backbone of what we now see as cultural theory and while 
the Group/Grid concept has been criticised by some (see the testing of 
Cultural Theory as an example (Marris, Langford, & O'Riordan, 1998)) and 
strongly challenged by others (Sjoberg, 2000) cultural theory has been for 
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some theorists (such as Adams (Adams, 1995) ) a significant influence on 
the understanding and development of a modern view of risk. 
 
Important for this research is the view of ‗social construction of risk‘ as within 
an organisational setting, risk is rarely identified or quantified by an 
individual, so this research must consider the way groups work to identify 
and assign risk.  
 
An additional possible complexification of our own in this area comes from 
the work of Kasperson et al (Kasperson et al., 1988). In this work, evidence 
and a framework is proposed for something they termed the ‗Social 
Amplification of Risk‘, which they argue, is where cultural factors cause 
members of the public to evaluate downside risk to be of a much higher 
value than experts working in the domain of interest. While this work 
specifically addresses differences between experts and lay people, we know 
from the work by Douglas and Wiladavsky that experts too must engage in 
social construction, indicating that while variance may be higher with the 
general public, variance within expert groups also has an impact. 
Risk, Disasters and Isomorphism 
 
In reading the literature and in particular a review of regularly cited work it is 
possible to see that current risk management thinking has a particularly 
strong root in disaster and safety research. In part this can be attributed to 
the outrage of society when such a tragic event occurs as it results in public 
money being made available for an enquiry. Such detailed and expertly 
collected evidence allows researchers to develop a detailed picture of the 
events beyond that possible on a research grant alone. 
 
Few writers have contributed more to the bedrock of thinking and 
understanding of manmade disasters than Perrow‘s ‗Normal Accidents‘ 
(Perrow, 1984) and Turner‘s ‗Man Made Disasters‘ (Turner, 1978) whose 
work we will consider in more detail later. As well as contributing to the 
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subject, these writers also provide two different styles for research and for 
the presentation of case studies providing a rich understanding of the issues 
that give rise to human initiated failure. 
 
In undertaking a Public Enquiry, many needs are met, not least for those who 
need to understand what went on when they lost people they cared for. 
Some would argue that it is the lesson‘s learnt that is of primary importance, 
but from the research of Turner, Perrow and the reoccurring disasters that 
demonstrated the same pattern; it is dubious as to whether the core lessons 
are ever really fully learnt.  
 
(As an example: The report into the 2005 Buncefield Petrol depot explosion, 
21 years after Perrow published, found defective gauges, issues with 
maintenance and an over reliance on the human operators. In addition, 
safety equipment, bunds (trenches in the ground) in the Buncefield case, 
failed to contain the problem and this was not spotted and addressed in a 
timely manner. All of these are similar to issues that had been found in 
previous industrial disasters on which Perrow and Turner had based their 
work) (Major Industrial Incident Board, 2008)  
 
Also working from the perspective of disaster, but mainly through simulation, 
Dörner with such works as ‗The Logic of Failure: Recognising and Avoiding 
Error in Complex Situations‘ (Dörner, 1997), explored other aspects of how 
humans make their own ‗luck‘ in many circumstances. His simulation work 
based on ‗Town Management‘ showed how human interaction can lead to 
catastrophic failure and interestingly, how those involved in the disaster were 
able to justify their actions afterwards.  
 
It is all well and good to highlight these works based on inquiry information, 
but it is important to provide a more generalised view of risk, particularly if 
this research is to have impact in major organisations. An important 
mechanism for transferring thinking developed in one domain into a wider 
context has been called ‗Isomorphic Learning‘, popularised in risk studies by 
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Toft and Reynolds (Toft & Reynolds, 1997). Isomorphic Learning is where 
there is sufficient similarity between two or more problem spaces that 
findings in one area may, through logical extension, be applied to another. 
The value in risk of this kind of thinking, particularly for insurance actuarial 
work is that where there may be several low incident numbers for particular 
events, Isomorphic connections mean the data can be combined to give a 
larger data set with more meaning.  
 
It is important to recognise that Isomorphic Learning has been used 
successfully in the past, as this technique will be important to generalise 
what can be learned from the experiments carried out, particularly if these 
experiments can demonstrate connections between the data collected, to 
allow for a more robust case to be constructed. In addition, as the data is 
drawn from different areas, the Isomorphic approach also broadens the 
sources of research information, which in some areas is spread across 
multiple disciplines, which again helps with generalisation. This is important 
for this research as risk management is such a broad discipline, there are 
good learning points to be found in many areas. 
 
The significance of Isomorphism to this work is perhaps obvious, in that there 
exists a large body of Risk Research material available from across many 
research disciplines (Weessies, 2007). This research effort contributes to 
that body of knowledge, but through Isomorphism, the body of existing 
research can add much more to this work, in that where appropriate we can 
use and combine much of the existing work to develop and support this new 
thinking. Consequently, wherever possible, this work will use isomorphic 
comparisons to increase the robustness of the conclusions. 
What can we learn from studies of Human Behaviour? 
 
From the point of view of this research, the literature on human behaviour is 
of particular interest as the unique contribution to management science from 
this work relies on a good understanding of how people behave. Specifically, 
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there is a need to understand how people make decisions, when time is in 
abundance and when time is restricted. There is a need to understand how 
people are biased by historical, current and their perception of future events. 
There is a need to understand how emotional states may adapt the logic that 
is assumed to apply to decisions. And finally there is a need to understand 
the short cut methods people use to save time and effort in making 
assessments. 
Issues of Stepwise Thought 
 
To understand the background to this research, it is important to consider 
how we as humans think and act in situations where there is uncertainty. The 
starting point for this journey must be to consider how we think and some 
very early work seems relevant here as it sets out the basic elements of how 
we move forward with ideas. 
 
John Dewey (Dewey, 1997) gave consideration to the process of thought. 
With experiment and careful observation he determined that thought is 
undertaken as a series of steps, where each subsequent step is guided by 
the information and cues available from our current thoughts. Such a view of 
thought may perhaps be visualised as a walk through a forest, where each 
step is quite literally taken from the current position. Put together, the walk of 
many steps traces a particular path through our visualised forest. We may 
chose to walk slowly and examine the rich living picture of information 
around us before deciding in which direction our next step should take us, or 
we may rush through our walk and examine little in detail. Equally, we may 
take a couple of steps and then return back to our original point in order to 
investigate an alternative path. But just as our memories fail us, after many 
steps in our forest, we do not expect to be able to accurately recall our path.  
 
The implications of this simple finding by Dewey and illustrated with a forest 
walk are substantial in terms of risk management, as it means we do not 
explore all the possibilities in complex situations just as in the forest walk, 
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there are many aspects of the forest we do not see. If our thoughts do not 
exhaustively explore the situation, we are making decisions on incomplete 
information. Furthermore we may end up with a less than optimised view of 
the facts and others may conclude an alternative position based on their 
particular path and their own observations. What Dewey‘s work tells us is 
that two people can be presented with the same scenarios, but conclude 
different outcomes based on what they perceive. In managing and training 
therefore, particularly in scenario based training, we must give due allowance 
that people may see things differently to each other? 
The Use of Mental Modelling 
 
Beyond stepwise thought, which is a simple view on how humans see 
situations, there is literature in Cognitive Psychology covering higher order 
and more complex constructions used in team based shared thinking to 
consider. 
 
The concept of the Shared Mental Model is attributed to Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas and Converse (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 2001) by Rouse 
and Morris (Rouse, Morris, & Georgia Inst Of Tech Atlanta Center For 
Human-Machine Systems, 1985, p. 360) and is described by them as 
 
„..a mechanism whereby humans generate descriptions of system purpose 
and form, explanations of system functioning and observed system states, 
and predictions of future system states‟ 
 
Rouse and Morris 1985  
 
When dealing with risk we are by definition dealing with future events. As 
such, any cognitive process that lets us consider a risk event is by reasoned 
logic based on our expectation of how the situation will unfold and not actual 
experience of the event. At the centre of this cognitive process for looking 
forward, according to the literature, appears to be the modern notion of the 
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Mental Model. Having a working knowledge of this process is important to 
this work as Risk Clockspeed is offered as an additional evaluation process 
for risk management. Understanding the cognitive processes people use is 
important to understand the value and impact the Risk Clockspeed 
perspective may bring.  
 
Johnson-Laird (Johnson-Laird, 1980) suggests the notion of mental models 
in its modern form started with the work of Wittgenstien‘s concept of ‗mental 
prototyping‘ (Wittgenstein, 1953).  
 
Starting with Syllogisms, which simply consist of two premises and a 
conclusion, which Johnson-Laird illustrates as follows: 
 
All prudent men shun hyenas 
All bankers are prudent men 
All bankers shun hyenas 
 
Johnson-Laird illustrating Syllogisms quoting Lewis Carroll 1980 
 
Johnson-Laird‘s early work goes on to describe how Mental Models, built 
from many of these simple syllogism objects provide a basis for rational 
inference, meaning and ultimately provide the basis for mental imagery. 
From this early work, we can identify a potential problem in that any shared 
mental model is clearly dependent on the language used for these 
Syllogisms, stated, implied or imagined. Since people use language in 
different ways and assign different meaning to words, there is potential for 
differences in any mental model being shared with others. 
 
Lim and Klein (Lim & Klein, 2006) built on this concept and the concept of the 
Shared Mental Model (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1990) (Cannon-
Bowers et al., 2001) by considering accuracy of decision making and 
similarity of model, which is key to the role mental models may play in 
situations of uncertainty and risk. The conclusion of this relatively recent 
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work is that the quality of the shared model, in terms of accuracy and 
similarity is an important factor in team performance. This is an important 
result that may have significant implications for team performance under Fast 
Clockspeed conditions, where the time to revalidate understanding or correct 
errors on the part of one team member is limited. 
The Importance of Culture in Risk Management 
 
Having considered the works of the ‗Cultural Theorists‘ such as Douglas, 
Wildavsky and Dake, who took an interest in how people behaved, it should 
be no surprise that most risk practitioners these days acknowledge the 
important role of Organisation and Safety Culture in achieving a good risk 
management performance ("ISO 31000: Risk management - Principles and 
guidelines," 2009) ("AS/NZ 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard," 2004; 
"BS 31100:2008 Risk management. Code of practice " 2008). So in 
considering relevant literature around risk and its management, we are 
justified in considering attempts to surface and understand how 
Organisational Culture affects the management of risk. 
 
[Note: It is important to distinguish between Culture as embodied in Values, 
Beliefs and Shared stories highlighted by researchers such Lundberg 
(Lundberg, 1990), Safety and Organisational Culture as discussed by (Höpfl, 
1994), both of which we are addressing with these comments as distinct from 
Cultural Theory as developed by Douglas et al, out of an appreciation of 
organisations as societies] 
 
Goffee and Jones undertook work from the perspective of solidarity and 
sociability between workers (Goffee & Jones, 1998). This is an interesting 
approach as it sees culture from the perspective of the individual embedded 
in a culture defined by solidarity how well individuals stand together and 
sociability how well they get on as people outside the required framework of 
the work environment. Goffee and Jones use these two axis of separation to 
define four types of very different organisation and presented in this form, the 
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differences are quite stark. Humans are social creatures and we need to feel 
attached and at home in the organisations we are members of and this work 
provides explanation for why one person may thrive in one culture and yet 
fail to perform in another. However, Goffee and Jones work is very much 
about the organisation rather than the individual who is seen to fit in or fall 
out. A risk management culture, where risk is considered important and its 
management important to individuals as well as the organisation do not sit 
well with the double S model Goffee and Jones developed as a member of 
the organisation could be at home in the organisation, but at odds with the 
risk management perspective of that culture. A risk Management culture 
appears to be something different, but equally important for an organisations 
survival.  
 
Lundberg on the other hand (Lundberg, 1990) may help us by providing a 
conceptual framework and workshop based method for surfacing an 
organisations culture. Lundberg has been singled out, from what is a 
substantial body of research on culture because his workshop approach, 
explained through examples of organisational situations lends itself well to 
the practical nature of this work. In the cited paper, Lundberg also reflects on 
the increasing complex business environment, which he sees as 
‗environmental complexity, interdependence and turbulence‘. By unpacking 
culture as a Manifest level, a Strategic level and a Core level, Lundberg 
provides us with a way to break down the concept of culture, which may help 
in the application of management methods later on. 
 
Taking a different approach to culture, if we consider it an important factor in 
risk management, we may need to identify means by which can it be 
influenced? This is dangerous territory as some may see attempts to 
manage an organisations culture as a rather manipulative act. We need to 
ensure that we do not fall into the ethical trap of manipulation where 
members of the organisation feel ethically challenged with the actions of 
management, or the consequences of those actions. David Young (Young, 
2000) helps here by providing a clear ‗Six Lever‘ model based on the 
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successful 7 S model from Waterman, Peters and Phillips (Waterman Jr, 
Peters, & Phillips, 1980). This Six Lever model identifies with Schein‘s 1992 
definition of culture which is equally useful for this work in risk management 
where Young‘s expression of that definition is: 
 
„A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the [organisation] learned as it 
solved its problems of external adaption and internal integration, that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems.‟ 
 
Young citing Edgar Schein with annotation 1992. 
 
Not only does this provide us with a clear working definition but Schein‘s 
identification of Artefacts, Shared Values and Basic Assumption will also be 
useful when we come to consider the models necessary for this risk 
management work. Moreover, revisiting the fit between the model of culture 
and risk management, where Goffee and Jones work was helpful for the 
organisational context but unhelpful for the individual context, the work on 
7S, Six Levers and Schein‘s definitions provides a much better framework for 
understanding how a risk management culture fits for the individual within an 
organisation.  
High Reliability Organisations and Rare Events 
 
The term High Reliability Organisation is thought to have originated from 
work at the Berkley campus of the University of California in the 1980s 
(Hopkins, 2007). Andrew Hopkins work though goes on to suggest that there 
is actually an issue in defining what a High Reliability Organisation actually 
is, however early writers on the topic such as Weick and Reason did not let 
such matters bother them and they focussed more on identification of the 
issues involved in generating reliable performance. 
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High Reliability Organisations has of course become linked to high risk 
technologies such as space exploration, nuclear power plants and chemical 
plants (see Perrow and Turner work for examples). 
 
In the 1990‘s there was a important piece of work conducted in the area of 
High Reliability Organisations and indeed human reliability, by James 
Reason summarised in his book ‗Human Error‘ (Reason, 1997). This work is 
considered important because of the unique perspective Reason took 
towards the ‗human in the system‘ and the approach he used to classify the 
different types of error we make. His interesting combination of psychology 
and systems thinking, as seen over extended periods of operational time, 
adds value when considering the dynamics of failure and leads usefully 
towards methods for understanding both organisational resilience and the 
controversial concept of Accident Prone Organisations which is simply the 
other side of the same coin. One of the features that Reason is well known 
for is his ‗Swiss Cheese‘ description of established reliability in that each 
level of protection put in place by an organisation may be thought of as a 
slice of Swiss Cheese. Each part may have holes in it, but providing the 
holes do not coincide (allowing the metaphorical error to pass through them) 
then the system remains safe. Reason also wrote practical texts on reliability 
in industrial situations such as Managing the Risks in Organisational 
Accidents (Reason, 1997) where for example, he highlighted the flawed 
practice of ‗Writing another procedure‘ (p49) where the common response to 
try and ‗process out the problem‘ simply leads to a more complex problem. 
 
Modern writers however have begun to question Reason‘s Swiss Cheese 
model labelling it as linear and consequentially too simplistic (Crichton, 
Ramsay, & Kelly, 2009, p. 26). These writers favour an ‗organisational 
learning‘ approach and indeed the paper sets out some key cases and the 
lessons that may be learned from them. This learning based response to 
generating reliability is also a theme found in a paper by Silvia Jordan 
(Jordan, 2010) which seeks to encourage the practice of participation and 
guided reflection as a means to build up robust and reliable expertise  
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(Jordan calls this process ‗reflective practice‘ ) and she holds it up as a way 
to maximise the learning value out of each situation. Jordan‘s paper rests on 
observations made in the field of medicine, where the complexity of the field 
and the need for nursing staff to be adaptable, as well as reliable, is 
recognised as important for people‘s safety. 
 
Another recent paper in the field, which adds another perspective to the work 
on High Reliability, is the paper by Colin Lalouette (Lalouette, 2008). He 
argues that organisational reliability can be improved by allowing loose 
coupling and encouraging collaborative processes to foster  ‗self 
organisation‘ and consequentially cross organisational learning, which is an 
important factor in a world where Extended Enterprises have become 
recognised as an efficient means to generate high quality products and 
services (Qin, Zhao, Yao, & Xu, 2008) .  
 
Within this research, High Reliability takes on a new dimension. How can 
reliability be sustained when the information necessary to manage a risk 
(and let‘s consider that risk as a threat for arguments sake) only truly 
becomes available as the risk itself manifests? James Reason‘s early work 
may give us the labels and the mechanisms, but it is the more recent work 
that may provide in part some of the answers. Jordan‘s paper for example 
(Jordan, 2010) is clearly an approach designed to enhance experience and 
competencies, which are thought to be important elements in dealing with 
emergent issues. 
Rare Events 
 
A particularly difficult scenario arises when the risks faced are associated 
with rare events. Lampel, Shamsie and Shaperia define ‗rare events‘ as 
events that are considered unusual from the perspective of the observer and 
rightly point out that in a different organisational context, what one person 
considers a rare event may be considered common place in another 
(Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009, p. 836). For example a house fire is 
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hopefully a rare event for any one household, but unfortunately a house fire 
may be considered a regular event for the fire brigade. Accepting that ‗rare 
events‘ is a somewhat subjectively defined class, none the less it remains a 
class of event worth study, as from the perspective of the observer (or 
victim), the rarity of the event brings a new experience and a new opportunity 
to learn. 
 
Since this research work is primarily interested in emergent risks, we start 
this review of the rare event literature from the perspective of attention to 
weak signals which may give warning of the onset of an unusual event. 
Claus Rerup (Rerup, 2009) builds on a definition of ‗Organizational Attention‘ 
from Salvato and others (Salvato, 2009) to make a case for three dimensions 
of attention: Stability, Vividness and Coherence and goes on to suggest that 
by triangulating weak signals between these three elements it is possible to 
sense these dimensions ‗with greater clarity and depth‘ (Rerup, 2009, p. 
878). Amplification is clearly important when trying to spot the onset of rare 
events, but amplification does not necessarily provide recognition if the event 
was never recognised as possible in the first place. So from a risk context, 
rare events are necessarily linked to risk identification. Rerup then 
demonstrates his case with various examples and then argues that a 
‗Structural Response‘ is possible, citing Novo Nordisks response to a 
problem with Insulin production as his selected case study. This is an 
interesting development because not only does this directly relate Rare 
Events to risk, its early identification and possibly most strongly with High 
Reliability Organisations, but this also fits well with this proposed research 
into emergent information. Another work undertaken by Roberts, Yu Desai 
and Madsen on Adaptive Restructuring as a decision aid (Roberts, Yu, 
Desai, & Madsen, 2008).Roberts et al, looks at three cases of organisations 
operating in crisis prone environments and conclude that in each case, 
‗organizational structures and group mental models were adapted to facilitate 
effective decision making in the high-risk incidents‘ (Roberts et al., 2008, p. 
4). Again, this is of interest as this literature is pointing to a structural 
response, but there is a gap here in understanding how an organisation may 
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improve its resilience ahead of the emergent risk case as no model of the 
individual relating to the organisation is provided. On the other hand given 
this research is predominantly looking at individual decision making, the idea 
that structural changes and changes to a group held ‗Mental Model‘ may be 
an effective decision making tool is interesting as discussed earlier in this 
literature review. What will need to be determined however, and a further gap 
in the cited literature is how will this change when the information necessary 
to manage the risk is emergent with the risk itself? Will the lack of time and 
opportunity for cognitive shared exchange (System 2 thinking) invalidate the 
benefits of this approach? 
 
Continuing with this theme of High Reliability combined with the difficulties of 
addressing Rare Events, work by Bernardino Provera et al (Provera, 
Montefusco, & Canato, 2008) consider the importance of a ‗No Blame‘ 
culture in collecting information and enhancing organisational learning. Using 
two case studies where High Reliability is important and thankfully negative 
events are rare, one in commercial airlines and one in hospital intensive care 
units, Provera et al ‗contextualise the no blame practices in the everyday 
dynamics of organisations‘ (Provera et al., 2008, p. 1064) . They do this by 
tabulating the practices of these two organisations and use a deductive 
approach to contextualise the activities in terms of commercial pressures, 
cognitive costs, cultural constraints and regulatory constraints. The 
conclusion they come to is despite the many costs and consequences of the 
‗No Blame‘ activities, it remains a valuable way of designing an organisation 
for ‗variability‘ as they put it, or perhaps ‗building resilience‘ if considered 
from an alternative perspective. This is an interesting finding and one that 
generic enough for us to claim the value concept of the ‗no blame‘ culture 
includes the case of managing the emergent risk. 
 
Before leaving this general area of High Reliability and Organisational 
Learning from Rare Events, it is right to give due consideration to the scope 
in which this learning can occur. The literature cited so far makes use of 
learning from success, but when data is in short supply or when the learning 
 Page 57 
 
is critical and must be maximised, it is natural to look at every source of data. 
Madsen and Desai for example (Madsen & Desai, 2010) and Desai (Desai, 
2010) suggest learning from failures is a rich source of data that can be 
exploited for organisational learning. In fact they conclude that the learning 
from failure is greater than it is from successes and the depreciation of the 
lessons learned with time is slower. For examples of learning from failure, we 
can look at changes to football stadiums as a result of the Bradford City 
Stadium fire on 11th May 1985. With TV cameras onsite to record the 
football, the nation was shocked to see how rapidly the fire took hold. As a 
result of that incident and the following inquiry by Popplewell (Popperwell, 
1986), many enhancements such as reversible turnstiles and materials used 
in construction were changed. 
 
On the other hand, this general idea of learning from failure however is not 
new and both Turner and Perrow used the rich source of data resulting from 
inquiries as a source of their substantial contributions to the field of risk. (See 
other areas of this literature review for work by Turner and Perrow). 
However, Turner and Perrow appear to conclude that people do not even 
learn that well from failure, which is why we will continue to have substantial 
catastrophes which are later attributed to human behaviour. 
 
Rather than pointing to this extensive body of literature on Rare Events and 
in some ways the literature on high reliability that precedes it, for the gaps it 
holds in this quest for understanding as to the importance of timing in 
information availability, we cite the value of this literature in the isomorphic 
comparison that can be drawn. A ‗No Blame‘ approach and culture 
‗conditions‘ and enriches people‘s experiences and competencies as does 
the ability to triangulate from small signals and indeed the early work on 
understanding how people make errors in the first place. Combining this with 
learning from failure as well as success is simply a process by which we can 
enrich this reflective learning paradigm, considered so important by Jordan 
(Jordan, 2010).  This is a valid interpretation of the collective body of 
literature cited above. In this respect, the literature provides support for these 
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elements of experience and competency being included in the theoretical 
models presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis and provides some insight into 
the kind of positive culture necessary to foster good performance.  
Systems Thinking Systems Practice 
 
The title of this section is taken from the groundbreaking book by Peter 
Checkland first published in 1981 (P. Checkland, 1981). After many years of 
computer systems being developed on the back of hard systems design and 
the consequential rejection and failure of a good number; Checkland 
proposed a method of systems analysis that firmly put the human back in the 
loop. At first such a development may seem remote from the management of 
risk, but risk analysis often revolves around the evaluation of a complex 
scenario, particularly Strategic Risk. The analysis of scenarios and human 
interaction is at the heart of ‗soft systems analysis‘ as Checkland called it. 
The application of Soft Systems thinking is therefore very relevant to the 
understanding of risk as to understand the risks that relate to objectives, one 
must understand the context ("ISO 31000: Risk management - Principles and 
guidelines," 2009). 
 
In particular, approaches Checkland along with Scholes describe in their joint 
book (P. Checkland & Scholes, 1990) such as the ‗Stream of Cultural 
Enquiry‘ and the extensive use of ‗Rich Pictures‘ to capture interactive 
human systems has great potential for understanding the sources and 
availability windows of risk information. 
This work has been singled out for inclusion into the literature review for two 
good reasons. Systems theory as argued by Checkland demands that a 
problem of any type should be analysed from multiple perspectives. Risk 
Clockspeed (the time availability of information) would be one of those 
perspectives and this work can rest on the Systems Theory argument to say 
that it should never be the only perspective. The second reason for citing 
Checkland is in recognition of the unique cultural perspective he gives to 
Systems Problems. In looking at Checkland‘s work, it is clear Risk and its 
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management is a systems problem with a significant cultural dimension. 
Notably, Checkland wrote in his first book (Checkland 1981) that he always 
drew himself in his Rich Pictures in recognition that the Systems Analyst was 
an influence on the problem being analysed. For the researcher, this is a 
factor in considering the experimental part of this work and the impact the 
researcher may have on the results. 
Systems Dynamics 
 
A section on systems techniques and risk would not be complete without 
covering the work started by Jay Forrester back in the late 1950‘s when he 
first started promoting what was then ‗Industrial Dynamics‘ (Forrester, 1958, 
pp. 37-66) . Industrial Dynamics has developed now into the discipline of 
‗Systems Dynamics‘ which has become a popular although somewhat 
expensive way of making models of systems that are rich in feedback and 
delays. With such a title, it would be easy to write off Systems Dynamics as a 
technical discipline, but this would be such a disservice to the discipline, 
which has been applied in financial, political, engineering and safety 
applications with success (Forrester, 1991). 
 
Systems Dynamics has been successful in unpicking some areas of 
complexity. In particular Diehl and Sterman carried out work looking at 
complexity in feedback and delay. (Diehl & Sterman, 1995) through a stock 
management simulation. What they found was that even when there is 
opportunity to learn, complex feedback with variable delays causes problems 
for people and performance is generally sub optimal. For this research work 
this must be considered an important result as it suggests there will be 
situations where attention needs to focus on the quality of information and 
the variability inherent in that information and not just the time availability or 
risk management information. 
 
However, with System Dynamic analysis the focus is on the system, not on 
the rate of information availability where this rate is an essential part of Risk 
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Clockspeed analysis. Bakken for example, in looking at the art of improving 
dynamic decision making (Bakken, 2008), notes that research by Forrester 
showed that an introductory level systems course did not help with dynamic 
decision making and Bakken goes on to suggest as that a new form of 
training is required that takes into consideration the multiple process 
cognitive theory; a position that is in line with the approach taken by this 
research and a reason why Risk Clockspeed is considered important. 
Indeed, in his closing thoughts, Bakken suggests that more research in 
training methods is required.  
 
Before leaving the topic of Systems Dynamics, it is perhaps worth 
highlighting why we see this work as separate to Systems Dynamics. One 
distinct difference, which separates out Risk Clockspeed as a new 
contribution to this field, is that Risk Clockspeed does not rely on the need to 
build the delay and feedback into a model which is at the centre of System 
Dynamic analysis approach and the aspect which Bakken identifies as the 
key issue. On the other hand, it is right to identify a System Dynamic model 
as a source of information if considering a situation from the Risk 
Clockspeed perspective as delays and feedback loops could be behind the 
time availability of risk information. Again, justification for the multi mode 
approach to risk that Systems Theory calls for. 
The Rise of Corporate Governance 
 
On the commercial and investment side of industry we have been able to 
witness the substantial and documented rise of Corporate Governance in 
control research (Netter, Poulsen, & Stegemoller, 2009). This has been 
combined with a shift in Internal Audit practice as organisations adjust to 
changes in the corporate climate brought about by notable business failures. 
Changes for example towards Risk Based Auditing, documented by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (Selim & McNamee, 
1999). Changes which it must be said, have not always proved successfully 
according to some academics (Weil, 2004).  
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There have been some interesting developments in the commercial sector 
around Corporate Governance. Key milestones for which are considered to 
be: 
 
 Cadbury report 1992. Roles, auditing practices, issues of 
accountability and reporting (Cadbury, 1992) 
 Greenbury report on remuneration 1995 (Greenbury, 1995) 
 Hempel and the first Combined Code 1998 (Hempel, 1998) 
 Smith Guidance on Audit Committees 2003 (R. Smith, 2004) 
 Sarbanes Oxley 1984 and 2002. (Sarbanes & Oxley, 2002) 
 The Turnbull Code 1999 and 2005 (Flint review) (Turnbull, 1999) 
 COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission) (COSO, 2004b) 
 
In consideration of context, it is widely accepted that we live in an increasing 
complex and fast moving world. While ‗systems thinking‘ gives us tools to 
understand complexity, systems thinking does not allow us to understand the 
impact this pace of change may have on organisations. Charles Fine (Fine, 
1998) with Clockspeed on the other hand, wrote exclusively about the impact 
of this increasing pace of change, which he observed through the decreasing 
cycle time for new product design and specifically, Fine tried to engage with 
the problems brought about by variations in his vision of industrial 
clockspeed. 
 
Also in terms of context, not all organisations are the same and any one 
person may thrive in one organisation and struggle in another. There is a 
large volume of work in this area, but of particular interest is the work of 
Goffee and Jones (Goffee & Jones, 1998) as their work provides a useful 
framework for assessing the whole culture of the organisation. 
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Taken together with the other cultural sections of this literature review, it is 
clear that culture does indeed play a large part in all aspects of risk 
identification, assessment and management. In this research work therefore, 
we should try and understand and comment on how Risk Clockspeed 
interacts with organisational culture where possible, but equally recognise 
that the size of this topic could easily start to overwhelm the realistic scope of 
this research project. 
What can we learn from Governance? 
 
In 1996 Hood and Jones (Hood & Jones, 1996, pp. 3-6) described the 
domain of risk management as an ‗Archipelago‘, which is a very good 
presentation of the diversity and apparent disconnectedness that has led to 
different aspects of risks being addressed by different professions and 
organisationally in different departments. With the diversity in risk 
categorisation we see advocated by influential organisations such as COSO 
and CIMA (COSO, 2004a) (Collier & Agyei-Ampomah, 2007), with this one 
can comfortably argue that Hood‘s observation is as true today as it was in 
1996.  
 
In Hood‘s archipelago of risk there are many islands and their individual 
natures are quite diverse. On the one hand, this is quite an understandable 
as risk is a broad subject which permeates every aspect of human existence 
("AS/NZ 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard," 2004), from our very 
survival to our methods of deriving pleasure in this world. On the other hand, 
for business purposes, this archipelago has become a navigational problem, 
with many islands not yet fully mapped. 
 
The 2004 Enterprise Risk Management guide from COSO is a high level 
‗goal stating‘ document which does not meet a practitioners daily need. 
Although, the framework Application Guide, published as Volume 2 in 
support of the COSO model, is far more practical in its approach, providing 
guidance and examples for each layer in the COSO model (COSO, 2004a).  
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This was seen as an influential and partially unifying work which was 
supported by a large number of participants listed in the document, although 
now it is starting to show its age and the discussion is emerging about its 
possible successor (Leech, 2010a). In part, its success can be attributed to 
the powerhouse of people the ‗Treadway Commission‘, who sat behind this 
guide. One particularly useful illustration which emerged from this work was 
the COSO cube. Even people who do not fully subscribe to the COSO 
documentation, sometimes use the COSO cube model as it is one of the few 
widely publicised models that describes (rightly or wrongly) how risk 
management fits within an organisation. 
 
 
Figure 1: The popular COSO Cube 
 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (Sarbanes & Oxley, 2002), has been interpreted as 
a restrictive, ‗process tight‘ approach that has been shown to be costly to 
implement (Zhang, 2007). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
has since taken steps to reinterpret the act in a more business friendly way 1 
Whereas application of the Combined Code has not progressed much 
beyond the boiler plating statements in the final accounts, according to the 
Grant Thornton survey (Grant Thornton, 2007). Having said that, the Grant 
Thornton report does acknowledge there is anecdotal evidence to suggest 
                                            
1
 This review was undertaken in January 2010 
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the tightening of rules around audit committees and the role clarification for 
non executive directors, following Smith and Higgs has been more of a 
success. Like the United States Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
UK‘s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is currently undertaking a review of 
the Combined Code which will see several changes in risk, possibly the 
introduction of rules around risk appetite and indeed a renaming of the whole 
document to be the UK Corporate Governance Code 2  
 
While it may be argued that regulators and executives have little room to 
manoeuvre and must take a regulatory compliance approach to risk, we 
should note this approach does not help improve organisation performance. 
See Sternberg (Borodzicz citing Sternberg, 1998, p110) (Borodzicz, 2005, p. 
9): 
 
„Regulation is inflexible. In formalising and clarifying unwritten guidelines, it 
also typically lowers standards; compliance no longer requires a margin of 
safety, but can be obtained by satisfying the letter of the law.‟ 
 
Sternberg, 1998: Corporate Governance: Accountability in the Market Place. 
Institute of Economic Affairs, London. 
 
However, one should not be too critical as this reliance on regulation is a 
reflection of society and hence a reflection on ourselves. The ‗hard science‘ 
attitude inherent in regulatory and compliance frameworks are of course 
driven in part by social changes in modern society that mean it is ok to take 
risk, but unacceptable to expose others to it. This was an observation made 
by Douglas some time ago (Douglas, 1994, p. 15) and now we see the result 
of that societal change with the development of the ‗no win no fee‘ market, 
which has become an entire industry for the legal profession. 
 
                                            
2
 The review was launched in December 2009 and the new code was published end of May 
2010 
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“How to explain the new concern with risk? It is partly a public backlash 
against the great corporations. A generalised concern for fairness has 
started us on a new cultural phase. The political pressure is not explicitly 
against taking risks, but against exposing others to risks.” 
 
(Douglas 1994: p. 15) 
 
In addition to this lowering of standards, we must recognise that regulation 
may also be considered as a ‗slow clockspeed‘ industry in that it takes time 
for both the regulations to change and for the regulators to learn how to 
efficiently apply the new regulations. We can see this process clearly in the 
adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley act, which has been increasingly criticised 
for its negative impact on American business interests (Zhang, 2007) and 
which has subsequently been reviewed. Consequently, the methods and 
thinking underpinning the regulatory approach will be hard pressed to keep 
pace with some of the higher clockspeed organisations it is trying to regulate. 
 
So in summary, in commercial circles we have regulatory systems, designed 
to raise standards and limit risk taking; which essentially raises costs, lowers 
standards and generally leads towards a protective compliance approach to 
risk and control rather than a true performance based risk managed 
approach. Even though it can be argued that a risk based system will deliver 
compliance as a natural by product, much as people say a good Quality 
Management system can deliver ISO 9000 compliance. 
 
To understand the mechanisms at work that leads us to this counter intuitive 
position, we must turn to more widely recognised academic work to peel 
away the layers of organisations and how they function. 
 
Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), addresses the conflicts of interest 
between different parties with interests in common assets. Agency Theory 
goes some way to explain why directors may move to acquire businesses or 
move into markets which are not in the best interests of shareholders. The 
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2007/2008 banking crisis highlighted this kind of perverse activity where 
bank bosses, appointed by the shareholders to manage the business for 
them; left those businesses with hefty payouts and pensions, despite the 
ruined balance sheets they left behind. 
 
(Accusations levelled at Sir Fred Goodwin as he left RBS, which had to 
become so racked with losses, it had to be bailed out by the UK 
Government) 
 
It can be said that Corporate Governance legislation, much of which is cited 
earlier in this thesis, aims to counter the worst effects of Agency Theory by 
strengthening the hand of shareholders in dealing with the people they have 
appointed to run the business for them. For example, a key element in all the 
respected Corporate Governance codes is the separation of the roles of 
Chairman and Chief Executive in the belief that the separation will lead to a 
degree of control at the top. This common thread may be found in any of the 
codes that have popular backing such as the UK‘s Combined Code (FRC, 
2003). This is a clear result of a firm belief in Agency Theory by regulators. 
Although it must be said that there is a school of thought under ‗Stewardship 
Theory‘ (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) that suggests this particular tenet of 
regulation is wrong. Not surprisingly then in the wake of the 2007/8 banking 
crisis, it is little wonder that many questions are being asked about regulation 
and the Corporate Governance environment. Many such papers 
recommending stronger, tighter and more interventionist control in the future. 
Although, far sighted papers, recognising the role of culture, go beyond the 
obvious and suggest improved management and monitoring of risk maturity 
(Anderson, 2009, p. 29).  
 
With an equally telling, but distinctly different take, Bromiley‘s work in 
investigating performance and his Behavioural Theory of the Firm (Bromiley, 
1991, pp. 37-59), seem to be born out alongside work to show different 
factors for Income risk from Management risk (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999, pp. 
1037-1062). What they address, Bromiley in particular, is that given poor 
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performance, there is a tendency to take more risk, but since performance is 
poor for good reasons other than risk taking, the returns on that higher risk 
taking are poor.  
 
Bromiley‘s work on the downside of poor performance may be contrasted 
and reinforced by what can be achieved if risk and control is made a 
performance driving issue. Work by Brown and Caylor (Brown & Caylor, 
2004) on Governance measures, suggests that there is something to be 
gained from the application of governance. They undertook a survey of 2,327 
firms looking at 51 factors that they had identified around the issue of 
Governance. They then used these measures to group the firms into a 
governance performance league and then looked at the financial 
performance of these organisations. What they found was that the highest 
governance performers were also the best performers by margin and return. 
What is more, the top groups showed a substantial lead over the average 
and the poorest performers in the governance measures fell well short of the 
average.  
 
To peel away another layer and looking directly at the motivational drivers 
within the people, we need to consider Expected Utility Theory (EUT) (Von 
Neumann, 1944) or, with a little more precision, by Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, pp. 263-292). These theories, though not exact 
in their predictions, suggest that people are motivated by maximum gain and 
minimised losses. Prospect theory of course being more refined and 
reminding us that people are more driven to avoid loss than to seek gain. 
 
So the picture that is painted is quite interesting as it is one of human nature, 
driven towards gains, but avoiding losses at the personal level; translating 
into an organisational model that at times of poor performance, (loss when 
measured against sector leaders) takes more risk. Alongside this we have a 
compliance orientated culture; yet if the focus is switched to performance in 
Governance, financial performance can improve? In summary, all of the 
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material reviewed so far points towards the validity of a culture centric 
approach to the risk. 
Dual Process Theories 
 
There are several principles underpinning this research. One major principle 
is the multiple decision making modes that people employ in their everyday 
lives. This is best summed up by Epstein (Epstein, 1994, p. 710) in the 
following passage: 
 
„There is no dearth of evidence in every day life that people apprehend 
reality in two fundamentally different ways, one variously labelled intuitive, 
automatic, natural, non-verbal, narrative and experiential, and the other 
analytical, deliberative, verbal and rational‟ 
 
(Seymour Epstein, 1994. P. 710) 
 
Dual, or more recently Multiple Process Theories have been an active area 
of research for some time, however there appears to be some disagreement 
among the research communities on the detail of process theories. Jonathan 
Evans, a Psychologist based in Plymouth produced a good summary paper 
covering the issues (Evans, 2006). While it would be useful for Risk 
Clockspeed research for this area of human behaviour to be fully 
understood, the controversies that exist are not that consequential to Risk 
Clockspeed. This is because it is sufficient to recognise the two highest level 
of Dual Process Theories which are not disputed, as outlined by Sloman 
(Sloman, 1996) and named as System 1 and System 2 by Stanovich and 
West (Stanovich & West, 1998) 
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) 
 
As well as the formal method of assessing options in order to make a 
decision, there has been some work in the area of how people make 
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decisions in a natural, informal way (hence the term Naturalistic Decision 
Making). This too is considered within the scope of relevant research as we 
expect the naturalistic mode to be prevalent in Fast Clockspeed situations as 
the formal method takes time to collect and analyse the data. 
 
According to Gary Klein who writes extensively on the topic, Naturalistic 
Decision Making (NDM) originated around 1989 (Klein, 2008). This topic is of 
interest as it centres on much of the same information that has arisen in this 
risk centric work; that is to say, experience and human factors around 
decision making. The emphasis in NDM is on the role of experience which is 
captured in a technique called ‗Recognition Primed Decision Making‘ which 
is a model of recognition, decision, review and progression. That is to say, 
the person involved must first recognise the nature and form of the problem 
that has been presented. A decision on how to act is made and enacted. The 
next stage is to review the effect of that action and based on what has been 
observed, the person moves on. 
 
Of real importance to the Risk Clockspeed research is the issue of 
recognition, as one promising approach to identifying the time critical 
information is to approach the problem from the basis of the clue availability. 
In this respect, a NDM approach appears to be a valid basis for 
understanding the context in which risk may be taken, but NDM does not 
specifically address the evaluation of the risk issue that is central to risk 
management. 
 
What we draw from the NDM concept in particular the Recognition Primed 
Model is the concept of Clues as events, artefacts or indicators that point us 
in a particular direction and Cues, the point at which we have sufficient clues 
to warrant action. This could be a powerful analytical tool for the 
decomposition of risk laden scenarios as we can analyse the situations 
before they occur to identify Clues and Cues which may be important? 
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The Edge of Consciousness and ‘The Feeling of Knowing’ 
 
Leading on from the concept of Dual Process Theories and a different 
perspective on the issue of recognition as covered by NDM, is an area that 
could lead to substantial additional research in the area of Risk Clockspeed. 
The Feeling of Knowing effect is where the subject believes they know the 
desired information, but it seems mentally just out of reach. When faced with 
a decision, that elusive piece of information may be important. 
 
Koriat (Koriat, 2000) (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001) took decision research in 
an interesting direction by looking at the ‗Feeling of Knowing‘ effect. This is 
where people struggle to recall facts, but have a sense that they do know the 
information that they are struggling to recall. Given the concept of Clues and 
Cues, where individuals make decisions based on the clues they perceive 
and take action when they feel ‗Cued‘, the next natural step for this research 
is to investigate the role of this Feeling of Knowing dimension.  
 
We all experience Feeling of Knowing from time to time and it is most 
prevalent when we try and recall names for people who we think we 
recognise. One of the features of Affective decision making (System 1) as 
described in Dual Process Theory models, is the fact that people cannot 
recall how they actually made the decision (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2007), which is also a feature of the ‗Feeling of Knowing‘ effect 
(Koriat, 2000, p. 150). Equally, Affective judgement seems to rely on a form 
of mental image, triggered by our senses (Zajonc, 1984, p. 122)  providing a 
loose connection to the Feeling of Knowing effect. From an enquiry point of 
view, these similarities could be more than a coincidence so the role of the 
Feeling of Knowing could be an interesting area to develop for Risk 
Clockspeed.     
  
 Page 71 
 
The Irrational Human 
 
We cannot look at risk without recognising how irrational human behaviour 
can be as this would prevent us from understanding some aspects of 
decision making. As a general background text, the book written in a popular 
style by Stuart Sutherland (Sutherland, 1992), which has survived many 
reprints due to its success, characterises irrationality quite well. Within the 
pages there are many messages for researchers, lest we think we are 
immune to the kind of irrationality Sutherland comments upon.  
 
„..people try to prove their current hypothesis is correct – they test it by 
picking only examples that will confirm it and do not look for ones that would 
disconfirm it‟ 
 
Sutherland 1992, 2007 reprint p. 99.  
 
This researcher acknowledges this inbuilt human weakness as it is both an 
aspect of the research and an aspect which can affect the research. 
 
Setting aside for one moment the obvious lesson for the researcher, such 
misbehaviour with evidence is an important consideration within the concept 
of Risk Clockspeed.  Amid everything else that could interfere with sound 
decision making, wilful distortion of or ignoring the facts could override every 
other consideration. So this section of this literature review begins by 
recognising that the findings of the literature and indeed the research can 
only ever be a guiding principle for management and not a formula for risk 
management success. 
  
Before leaving the observations of Dr Sutherland, it seems important to 
acknowledge other human traits which he introduces and address them with 
rigour: 
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Primacy: (p18-22) The tendency to give preference to that which is heard 
first. 
Recency: (p 25,27) The  tendency to give preference to that which is heard 
last. 
Groups: (p 44-540) And the impact they may affect our decision making 
behaviour 
Connections: (p 113-123) And our tendency to see them when they are not 
there, or miss them when they are. 
What can we learn from Disasters? 
 
Turner‘s framework from ‗Man Made Disasters‘ (Turner, 1978) is in many 
people‘s view a seminal work. His six stage model can still be seen in the 
training given within the fire service, but outside this crisis and disaster 
service, his work appears to be quite understated. This limited use of 
Turner‘s model in the commercial world is considered unfortunate, as is 
argued that Turner‘s model has broad application. Similarly Perrow‘s 
observation was that humans tend to map complex systems in very linear 
ways with little thought of secondary and tertiary interactions, has broad 
application. These findings came from the study of disasters and the names 
of these authors most acclaimed books (Perrow: Normal Accidents and 
Turner: Man Made Disasters) are very well chosen as they point to their 
respective findings that accidents are inevitable in complex systems and that 
often, people are at the centre of the disasters that befall us. In contrast, 
LaPorte and Consolini took the view that rather than using the study of 
disaster and failure, perhaps there is more to be learnt from studying 
success and the avoidance of disaster in situations where disaster was 
perhaps only moments away. An important work in context of this research is 
the work they carried out on US navy aircraft carriers (LaPorte & Consolini, 
1991). Labelled as High Reliability work, it is reviewed here in preference for 
its rejection of the learning from disasters paradigm. The findings of the work, 
which has importance for this research is the observance of different modes 
of operation. LaPorte and Consolini found that when the situation was calm, 
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regular reporting was expected. As the situation developed ‗up tempo‘ in the 
paper authors language, the working mode changed and reporting was more 
by exception. When maximum performance was required, the mode of 
operation changed once more. LaPorte and Consolini had observed an 
organisation adapting to align behaviour to the changing ‗Clockspeed‘ (in the 
language of this research) of the situation. 
 
To understand the problem space for this research, the simple demonstration 
with Playing Cards described earlier was used. One factor in that game was 
the hesitation that came when the first re-coloured cards were dealt. Perrow 
and Turner both explain this as a feature of human behaviour. When faced 
with a situation, humans build mental models of what is happening. When 
activities start to deviate from the standard model, the first normal human 
reaction is to try and fit or explain that deviation in terms of the existing 
model and it is only when the information of deviation becomes undeniable, 
do people re-evaluate the model.  
 
An interesting variation on the theme and a consideration for triangulating 
this research is the approach taken by Dörner, who supplemented his case 
study work with a simulation study (Dörner, 1996). 
 
Within the proposed research, isomorphic comparisons, widely used by Toft 
will be considered and applied to the wider application of both Turners model 
and Perrow‘s criteria for disaster will need to be examined. If validity can be 
demonstrated within the wider business context, then management activity to 
build risk resilience and to avoid the pitfalls of disaster becomes possible. 
Reason‘s more recent work on High Reliability (Reason, 1997) will also be 
important in this area.  
Risk Homeostasis 
 
With Risk Homeostasis (Wilde, 1982b), Gerald Wilde caused a stir within the 
current thinking at the time. Shortly after publication he was forced to publish 
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a response to some high profile critics including Slovic and Fishhoff (Slovic & 
Fischhoff, 1982) (see Critical Issues in Risk Homeostasis for rebuttal (Wilde, 
1982a)) but has later received support for his ideas from other academics 
such as Adams (Adams, 1995) and his Risk Thermostat work. 
 
The simplest explanation of the risk homeostasis model is that humans act to 
maintain risk at a certain level and if external factors change, such that the 
perceived risk has dropped, then the human action is to increase risk taking. 
This was effectively illustrated in literature by Adams with his model of the 
room thermostat. The desired room temperature is set on a dial. If the room 
gets too cold, the thermostat switches on the heat. If the room is too hot, 
then the thermostat turns off the heat and allows the room to cool naturally. 
In respect to Risk Intelligence, these theories are particularly interesting as 
they may go some way to explaining the mechanisms behind ‗corporate risk 
appetite‘. In terms of Risk Clockspeed, the theory is of interest as it may lead 
people to unnecessarily increase the Risk Clockspeed by putting off 
appropriate risk mitigation when time is in abundance? However, while 
interesting there are aspects of risk homeostasis which are likely to be 
beyond the scope of this research works experiments, suggesting the 
connections between Risk Clockspeed and Risk Homeostasis may be left for 
further work in this field? 
Prospect Theory 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is an example of good ground 
level research that can be engaged to explain people‘s behaviour to risk. 
Kahneman and Tversky used students in Israel and the United States to test 
Expected Utility Theory in circumstances where they could meaningfully 
measure desire win over desire to lose. With a simple experiment based on 
gambling options and a moderate sample size, they produced a refinement 
to EUT. Kahneman and Tversky were able to show people object to loss with 
greater passion than they have for acquiring gain. Showing how this fits 
within risk intelligent thinking is important for predicting behaviour, as indeed 
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is game theory. From a Risk Clockspeed perspective, Prospect Theory has 
implications around expected outcome following decisions made during the 
event as it unfolds. Again however, this level of detail may be outside the 
scope of the experiments being undertaken for this early work in Risk 
Clockspeed.  
John Adams Risk Framework 
 
John Adams (Adams, 1999), produced a most useful framework, as where 
the others mainly seek to explain or control human behaviour Adams sought 
to explain a method to characterise risks that can usefully inform how we 
should respond to risks. 
 
Adams proposes a three class classification system for risks: Directly 
discernable, Visible through science and virtual. On the face of it, this system 
seems too simplistic to be helpful, but in using it to separate out the list of 
risks we face, we can subjectively evaluate what source of information we 
should be looking for. In addition and most importantly, we can also judge 
which risks may be left with competent staff to deal with on their own, without 
being overbearing in our management style, which is a criticism of Sarbanes 
Oxley (Zhang, 2007). 
 
Adams framework seems to be a natural complement to Risk Clockspeed, 
providing a different perspective, but similar in as much as it applies to all 
risks and not just risks that fit a particular process. The other similarity of 
course and the strength which makes Adams work so popular is that the 
classification given gives insight into the management method that should be 
employed.  
Game Theory  
 
Game theory, the study of competitive games originated by John Van 
Nuemann and the lesser known Drama theory which has become relevant to 
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disaster management in recent years (Levy, Hipel, & Howard, 2009), where 
humans can override logical choice for gain, provide context within the scope 
of this research. This is because risk intelligent behaviour requires 
understanding on how people might behave in a risk laden situation; even if 
this cannot be predicted with total reliability. Related to EUT, game theory 
expects players to make the decision that may lead to the best outcome for 
themselves or that for which they hold dear (Méro, 1998). Drama theory on 
the other hand recognises the impulse of human nature to sometimes spite 
ones opponent, even when the outcome has some drawbacks for the actor 
to get back at a perpetrator who is seen to run against social norms or the 
perception of morality (Howard, 1994). Specifically, game theory allows 
complex situations to be reduced into a set of finite outcomes from which the 
optimum and therefore most likely outcome is made clearer. While there is 
no evidence that untrained people apply anything more than simple 
heuristics when making judgement under risk conditions (according to the 
HSE) (Waring, 2000, p. 22), the assumption of self interest is a reasonable 
starting point for ones best efforts. Using game theory is just a method that 
simplifies the analysis. When contemplating the risk intelligent organisation, 
game and drama theories may provide a framework for strategy and tactical 
planning.  
Summary of the current state of knowledge 
 
In summary of this literature review, it is clear that we already have a vast 
body of knowledge about the process of decision making. Dual Process 
Models of decision making clearly lies at the heart of this and many other 
areas of research such as Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM), which is a 
discipline we should recognise as a close relative to Risk Clockspeed. 
Equally, on the model and analysis side, there are many existing methods to 
look at how people behave and make decisions. System Dynamics, NDM 
and Systems Analysis methods all compete to provide a basis for sound 
decision making under both certain and uncertain conditions.  
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By analysing disasters, research has determined many mechanisms for how 
disasters build and unfold on unsuspecting victims. Turner‘s six stage model 
shows there is a recurring pattern to these events and that many of the 
issues that will cause problems are already built into the system well before 
they give rise to the disaster. In addition, this disaster literature has given 
researchers a good understanding of the concept of the mental model, which 
people use to guide their behaviour. Exploring this concept will certainly help 
with the construction of management models in this work. Moreover, 
understanding how people stick to the model, even when it has been shown 
to be invalid (as seen in the Card demonstration described later) 
 
The literature reviewed provides a basis for general acceptance of the 
benefits of a ‗no blame‘ culture across risk management and this includes the 
situation of managing emergent risk issues that is examined as a special 
case within this research 
 
But it is when we look at the increased complexity of our socio-technological 
world, that we really start to see the critical problem of Clockspeed. Charles 
Fine threw a spotlight on the issue and Laporte and Consolini had shown us 
that people and human systems are able to adapt to quite a large extent 
(LaPorte & Consolini, 1991).  
 
System Dynamics, with its delay and feedback emphasis may help analyse 
the situation, but does not inform the risk management process as such and 
certainly does not help determine an adequate risk response. Rich Pictures 
and the ‗Stream of Cultural Enquiry‘ from Checkland and Scholes (P. 
Checkland & Scholes, 1990) again can help illuminate a situation and in a 
Systems environment it is common to look at the same situation from a 
series of directions, but neither methods provides a perspective which can 
address the rate at which the information about a risk is presented.  
 
In addition, we have seen within the reviewed literature many aspects of 
human behaviour, we have identified many different perspectives on risk and 
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its management, but we have not found any usable models that may be used 
in practice by an organisation keen to develop resilience in the face of 
emergent risks. 
 
In conclusion, it does appear that there is a gap here in the literature related 
to the time dimension of risk information in relation to the onset of the risk 
(Risk Clockspeed) and in the provision of a suitable analysis approach. A 
gap through which the rate at which the information presents itself is largely 
ignored, even though with dual process theories, we know has significant 
implications in respect to the decision making process that will be used. It 
appears that models may be constructed based on the literature, but that 
such models are currently missing from the body of knowledge in this 
domain. 
 
The significance of this work is also indicated through the nature of this gap. 
If a new practical response to this issue of information rate can be 
successfully implemented in organisations, this should provide for 
improvement in Governance and given the efficiency of heuristic based 
decision making, potentially important gains in competitive through effective 
risk management. In other words, addressing this gap in understanding and 
literature may give rise to a practical method of analysis that can be a used 
in a practical way. 
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Chapter 3: Risk Clockspeed Concepts and Models 
Explaining Risk Clockspeed Concepts 
 
The last chapter identified gaps in the literature in dealing with risks for which 
the detailed information necessary to manage those risks emerges close to 
the risk event and we have already used the term Risk Clockspeed as a way 
to focus on this dimension. 
 
In this chapter, Risk Clockspeed will be explained in more detail; some 
models derived from existing literature are proposed and some potentially 
practical applications for the concept are introduced. Later on with research, 
the validity of key elements of these models are tested and real life scenarios 
explored by simulation. 
 
From a standards viewpoint, which are documents aimed at risk 
practitioners, one can uncover some limitations in the methods documented 
and specifically it is noted the standards have no term for the rate at which 
the information emerges. Risk Clockspeed was coined in 2006 (Smith & 
Borodzicz, 2008) to recognise and highlight this information time availability 
dimension for the management of risks. 
 
Two classes of risk are recognised as part of this concept: Slow Clockspeed 
Risks fit the Standards type process without any issue as the information 
necessary to manage those risks emerges in good time and is considered to 
be available for cognitive, rational decision making. Fast Clockspeed Risks 
on the other hand are those risks where the information necessary to 
manage the risk emerges at, or close too, real time along with the risk itself 
as it matures. Consequently the management process for this second class 
of ‗Fast Clockspeed‘ risks is generally dominated by actions driven from 
reactive feelings. At this stage it is important to note that there is no firm, 
externally measurable time boundary between these two classes. Risk 
Clockspeed is a continuum, characterised by two types and the boundary 
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between the two is influenced by the risk and the context around the risk, but 
is in reality, the boundary is governed by the transition between System 1 
and System 2 processing mode of the people involved. At first, this lack of 
determination may seem a barrier and a weakness, but in practical terms it is 
not considered a problem as the two classes are actually easily separated 
when the facts of the specific situation are known. Examples at this point 
may help to clarify. 
 
Consider for example the common hazard situation of children standing or 
moving close to the kerb edge of a busy roadway. Within the blink of an eye, 
any one of those children could shift the short distance necessary to move 
them out of the moderate safety of the pavement into the danger zone of the 
roadway itself. The information necessary to manage that hazard and the 
related risks are also changing quickly, these events are undoubtedly 
unfolding in real time. In such moments, as road users and drivers of 
vehicles, people are obliged to rely on their experience to read the indicators, 
actions and motion of the children in real time and use that information to 
infer whether as drivers they can pass by safely or should stop in anticipation 
of a foolish act. Clearly a Fast Risk Clockspeed situation is posed to drivers 
who cannot plan their reactions ahead of the journey. 
 
Consider now an alternative, transport situation such as shipping cargo by 
road, rail or sea. Planning the transportation of the goods is a situation where 
we can manage most of the substantial risks in good time, as the information 
necessary is in itself available in good time. We have good knowledge of the 
items to transport and science can be used to determine the appropriate 
response (‗Discernable by Science‘ in Adams classification system (Adams, 
1999)). The nature of this second example, from the risk perspective is 
substantially different and it lends itself well to the Standards based process. 
The information is known in good time, so this may be considered a Slow 
Risk Clockspeed example. 
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From a Risk Clockspeed perspective, it is argued, risks from both of the 
examples described above have their place in risk management and  the 
definition found in ISO31000 is cited to support this position that inclusivity of 
these risks into the boundary of risk management is justified. Again, 
ISO31000:2009 defines risk as: 
 
[The] „effect of uncertainty on objectives‟ 
 
ISO 31000:2009, BS31100:2008 and Guide 73:2009 
 
And this is the definition of risk we shall formally adopt for this research work. 
 
So to summarise this exploration of risk from the current standards based 
practice perspective each with their own variation of: Scope, Identify, Assess, 
Evaluate, Plan and Manage cycle; ("ISO 31000: Risk management - 
Principles and guidelines," 2009) ("AS/NZ 4360:2004 Risk Management 
Standard," 2004) ("BS 31100:2008 Risk management. Code of practice " 
2008) the shipping of goods example fits the published process very well. 
Identification, evaluation, planning and management can all take place over 
an extended time period. Information becomes available in good time; there 
is time for plans and the management of those plans to be refined so that the 
impact and consequences of the risks may be controlled. With the car driving 
example, the process as described is rendered somewhat ineffective as a 
driver passing children could not hope to process all of these cognitive steps 
in real time and as it stands, it is therefore inappropriate for the 
circumstances drivers may find themselves in. Before the event, no driver 
can even speculate on the detail of how and where on the journey 
substantive risks such as the example given may be encountered, let alone 
plan for how they may be managed to a successful outcome.  
 
With nothing more than simple logic applied to situations that arise in real 
life, it is clear we must acknowledge that these risk types are, and need to be 
handled differently. The standards based model cited in the paragraph 
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above, however is a useful model and maybe all that is required is adaption 
and pre-processing; after all there are things that can be done to prepare 
people for situations such as driving vehicles. 
All risks included: Risk Clockspeed 
 
The introductory paragraphs to this chapter addresses two examples of 
situations which give rise to two different classes of risk which it is argued 
should be managed. With one class, risk management practices fit very well 
and we can expect the process to help us manage these risks. With the 
other, the current best practice process does not fit very well and that 
perhaps explains why it would be unusual to find people holding a completed 
‗journey based risk register‘ in their vehicle glove box?  
 
This research work introduces and develops the concept of Risk Clockspeed, 
as a lens focussed on the rate at which information to manage the risk 
arises. One simple observation through this lens and a point worth noting is it 
can comfortably accommodate all the risk situations so far described. As a 
continuum it is all inclusive, there is not the feeling of inappropriate 
management that arises as ‗the process‘ becomes unusable, such as if we 
consider starting each car journey with a review of our ‗journey risk register‘ 
around what risks we may or may not encounter on that journey.  
 
(It is noted that in some cases, a risk register may be appropriate such as for 
abnormal loads and the examples considered here are describing a normal 
journey as undertaken by the general population in the course of a normal 
day, rather than any specialised movement of goods or VIP‟s that may 
indeed warrant a risk register approach) 
 
The questions that begin to emerge and indeed the research domain that 
underpins this Risk Clockspeed research, form when contemplating the 
problem of managing these Fast Clockspeed risks. What common 
characteristics can exist between risks that allow a unified lens to exist? That 
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is to say, what characteristics of a risk are universal for all risks? What 
structures are there to be found and what methods can be employed to 
reconcile this gap in practical risk management, such that all risks may be 
unified in the discipline of risk management? How practical is it to apply 
recognised risk management methods to Fast Clockspeed risks, as nobody 
would be willing to apply the standards defined processes each time they 
make a car journey? And most of all is there some real social or business 
benefit in taking such an approach to risk and its management? 
 
To address these issues, the work steps back to some more fundamental 
questions such as how do we conceive and perceive ‗risk‘ in the first place 
and how does the nature of an identified risk impact on the decisions made? 
 
Starting with existing literature from the field of risk management, psychology 
and business management practice we build a picture of how people engage 
and manage risk at the moment. We show how Risk Clockspeed and 
Systems Thinking can be applied to unify risks of different Clockspeed into a 
risk management view that provides a more comprehensive response to risk. 
  
We look at management techniques that have emerged to meet the modern 
need for Risk Management and we consider what differences the lens of 
Risk Clockspeed may bring to allow these methods to be employed more 
effectively. We also look at other management methods which may be re-
purposed to help in the management of risk. And finally, this work aims to 
provide a range of methods that management teams may employ to 
satisfactorily broaden the clockspeed of risks the organisation can address, 
something we term the ‗Risk Clockspeed Window‘. 
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The problem space analysed 
 
It is quite an impact statement for a public standard when ASNZ 4360 
("AS/NZ 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard," 2004) claims ‗Risk is in 
everything we do‘.  
 
It is not the intention to prove or disprove this bold statement but the mere 
fact that the statement made it to the pages of a recognised standard at all 
suggests there is a strong and widespread belief that risk is pervasive. 
 
In research terms, this is a social research problem which must recognise 
the many factors that emerge when people within a society seek to deal with 
the risks they perceive. Indeed, it is these very human factors, expressed as 
beliefs, values, artefacts, expectations and constraints that shape the 
problem space we are seeking to research. With this perspective in mind, we 
now describe that problem space in greater and richer detail using further 
exploratory scenarios, to allow the research to be both scoped and defined 
through the factors that emerge and by the obvious consequences the 
described risks can have. 
 
This approach using scenarios has been adopted as the intent of this work is 
to challenge and change current thinking and scenarios have been identified 
as a good vehicle for this purpose by Wright (Wright, 2005, p. 90) citing 
works by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1991), van der Heijden (Heijden & Schlange, 
1997)  and Ringland (Schwartz & Ringland, 1998) in support of his case. 
 
Scenario: Risk Influenced Behaviours 
 
From the time we get up in the morning to the time we climb the stairs back 
to our beds we are confronted with risks to manage. Most of the time, we are 
managing risks without even thinking about them or at least, not necessarily 
thinking deeply about them as ‗risks‘ and how we should manage them. Few 
of us stand at the top of the stairs each morning to rationally and cognitively 
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contemplate on a plan for how we will negotiate this obvious hazard, 
although sadly there are some people whose infirmity means they must take 
such detailed care. Yet, even for those of us who are fit and stable on our 
feet, if we do tumble from the top of a flight of stairs, we can expect serious 
harm or even death to result from the fall. On the other hand when dealing 
with children who are fit and healthy, but who are yet to appreciate the 
hazard, we who are parents are much more concerned with the hazard. That 
is not to say we have not suddenly rediscovered the risk, but with small 
children involved, it is as if we transfer the risk back into a rational cognitive 
level to consider it more deeply on their behalf. Having reassessed the risk, 
many of us then go on to adapt our homes with gates to reduce the risk of 
our children from having such a fall. Children do not change our capacity to 
think, we are not completely blind to the hazard, but for ourselves, we have 
found very effective risk management strategies for dealing with stairs. In 
fact our ‗management strategy‘ is generally so effective; it can even cope 
with crowded stairs, with multiple random moving people, much as we may 
find at Underground stations in the London rush hour. More importantly, it 
appears that once learned and embedded, this skill of stair navigation can be 
parked at the edge of our consciousness; individuals are aware, but not 
deeply engaged with the management of this activity as it shifts its place in 
our ‗mindfulness‘. (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006) 
 
Scenario: Frequently Encountered Risks 
 
So the likelihood of falling on stairs is not insignificant, equally the 
consequence, while in most cases minor, in some cases it may be more 
serious. Yet in a normal day, for a fit person, using stairs does not require 
significant cognitive attention from us? In business and other enterprises too, 
we deal with many ‗regularly faced‘ risks which compare to the example in 
terms of complexity, regularity and style of management. Frequently, these 
risks do not require special methods or complex technology to assess the 
risk. Typically, such risks are managed through our senses and our 
experience. Adams defines these kinds of risks as ‗Directly Discernable‘ 
 Page 86 
 
(Adams, 1999, p. 17 fig.5), but in doing so acknowledge a grey area exists 
where some risks may be classified by others as ‗Discernable by Science‘ for 
which expertise and or technology and method may be required. Many 
organisational ‗Directly Discernable‘ risks could have serious consequences 
although perhaps more in terms of financial and reputational loss rather than 
loss of life, but again they are usually managed in a matter of fact way? 
Securing business premises and preventing fires, are two examples where, 
at times, rational cognitive attention is required, but on a regular basis these 
are routinely managed as part of our daily lives according to Adams (Adams, 
1999). 
 
In the majority of cases, this ‗risk management method‘ can be considered 
an effective way of dealing with risk as the time taken from ‗requiring action 
to acting‘ is short and it places a minimal load on our limited mental 
processing abilities, so in the main, we can engage in our activities such as 
talking to another person. The alternative, a formal documented risk 
management process, will invariably take longer to implement and will cost 
more to administer. Indeed one might speculate that this kind of regular, 
simply managed risk, woven throughout the day, would soon become 
impossible to manage if we tried to apply a typical formal risk management 
process to each risk we had to address in a single day. 
 
Scenario: The complexity of emergent risks 
 
Returning to the useful example of stair navigation, when stair climbing 
activity is picked apart for its detail; it is in fact quite a complex affair of 
balance, judgement and sometimes real time management of social 
etiquette. It is in some ways a complex risk with potential for injury or causing 
social offence, despite this, most people have learned to manage very well. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman et al., 1982), with work that is covered in 
the literature review, started to address aspects of this behaviour with their 
ground breaking work on heuristics. Heuristics is the term given to these, 
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mental shortcuts and rules of thumb that are learnt which help humans 
manage everyday risks so effectively. However, it isn‘t just problems related 
to potential accidents or for that matter just movement where the 
development and use heuristics is important. As the socio-technical world, 
the term Socio-technical being coined by Turner (Turner, 1978), gets more 
complex and interactive, as observed by us all, but captured in academic 
work by writers such as Lagadec (Lagadec, 2009) , Perrow (Perrow, 1984) 
and Douglas (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), we increasingly use heuristics to 
manage a wider range of tasks and associated risks in our working lives too.  
 
Examination of the existing body of knowledge shows that while many of the 
underlying processes are recognised and documented (Reason (Reason, 
1997), Turner (Turner, 1978), Perrow (Perrow, 1984), Dőrner (Dörner, 1997), 
little has been done to translate this knowledge into an applied response to 
commercial and business risk management.  Put another way, if heuristics 
are increasingly used to manage problems of increasing complexity, as 
postulated here, how are organisations to exercise leadership, development 
and indeed improved control, over this increasingly important risk 
management activity? Indeed, how much of this kind of risk management, is 
even recognised as ‗Risk Management‘? The lack of formal control is, we 
suggest, an increasing gap in the governance of organisations. Moreover it is 
an increasing gap at a time where the comprehensive cover of governance is 
considered increasingly important. (As part of this work, we chart the rise of 
Corporate Governance in the literature review and with the recent banking 
crisis many (90% of population surveyed) are predicting an increase in 
regulation and governance measures (Kerstetter & Bromilow, 2009, p. 7) 
Addressing the Emergent Challenge 
 
The reality is that while heuristics have a research history dating back at 
least to the 1970‘s, their formal recognition in risk management as a day to 
day discipline practiced in organisations, appears to be lacking (see risk 
management standards). There is a degree of implicit inclusion through 
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respect paid to the ‗risk management culture‘ of an organisation, but this 
cannot be considered due to the full recognition of the role heuristic 
processing covers. In truth, little has been done to really integrate what we 
know about heuristic processing into the formal recognised discipline of risk 
management. On the other hand the standards, including the recently 
published ISO 31000:2009(E) makes no such omission for risks managed by 
heuristics, defining a risk as ‗effect of uncertainty on objectives‘ (Clause 2.1). 
The obvious question therefore is why heuristic methods, researched from 
the behavioural perspective, have been so sidelined as a formal part of risk 
management? Is it because the problem of integrating heuristic based 
processing has not been so important in the past and so the work hasn‘t 
been required? Possibly? 
 
One of the influential books that prompted this research, which has already 
been cited in the introduction, is clearly Charles Fine‘s Clockspeed  (Fine, 
1998) to the extent that this same descriptive term has found its way into the 
title of this work. The full relevance of this work in covered in the literature 
review and in other places in this thesis, but it is further referenced here for 
its role in helping to define the problem space that this work set out to 
address. The rise in what Turner calls socio-technical complexity is certainly 
one dimension to this work, but Charles Fine‘s 1998 work on industrial 
clockspeed, spotlights a universal and critically important consideration of 
‗decreasing thinking time for decision makers‘. Together, and against a 
backdrop of efficiency brought about in part by lean thinking, which reduces 
the availability of uncommitted resources in its drive to remove waste 
provides an interesting set of societal pressures which we will assume will 
get even greater as time moves forward. It is this complex and unfortunate 
triplet of pressures that make this work both interesting from an 
organisational perspective and timely. In some ways, this work may be seen 
as a response to Lagadec‘s call for a new intelligence attitude and practice  
(Lagadec, 2009, p. 5).  
 Page 89 
 
Problem Exploration by Demonstration 
 
Steinle (Steinle, 1997) outlined two types of experiment. The formal 
experiment where there is a theoretical framework to be tested and the 
‗exploratory experiment‘ of which he comments: 
[the exploratory experiment] „Of particular importance is the idea of 
elaborating “pure” or “simple” cases. 
 
Steinle 1997 
 
Given we have used simple and in some ways idealised examples to 
investigate the problem space in this research, it seemed wise to engage in 
an ‗exploratory experiment‘ to understand more about out problem. In this 
case, the experiment took the form of a demonstration.  
 
In discussing the nature of this research with other people it became clear 
that a simple demonstration would help clarify the issues. Observing the 
reaction of people on the other hand helped develop the understanding of 
the problem, so this demonstration became an ‗exploratory experiment‘ in 
Steinle‘s language. 
The Demonstration Explained 
 
Within the problem space of this work, the assumptions made by people 
were seen to be a particularly important source of risk in a fast moving 
situation. As a way to understand and indeed demonstrate the problems 
around heuristic processing, the faces of eight standard playing cards from a 
normal deck were modified. The Ace cards in each suit were modified in 
colour only, Red Diamonds and Hearts were coloured Black; Black Spades 
and Clubs were coloured Red. In addition to these simple modifications, four 
other cards from the pack were modified more overtly to have a mixture of 
suit identifier symbols (Club, Heart, Diamond and Spade) on the same card, 
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meaning they did not fit into any of the standard four suits anymore as they 
were hybrids.  
 
 
 
 
 
The demonstration starts with the modified cards at the bottom of the pack 
arranged with the colour changed cards at the very bottom.  
 
The game is explained to the participant as a game of pace in that the 
demonstrator would deal from the pack of cards face up and invite the 
participant to turn the cards over (face down) and stack them in suit, face 
down with a reasonable pace of activity. Care was taken not to mention the 
number of suits as four, so there was no deception used. Of course the 
situation was such that the participant was very likely to assume there would 
Figure 2: Modified Playing Cards Used in Demonstration 
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be four suits based on their previous experiences and well established 
expectations of what a set of ‗Playing Cards‘ are. 
  
As the cards are dealt, the normal unmodified cards are dealt from the top 
and the demonstrator deals the cards with increasing speed until the 
participant is focused on the game. When stability of flow with the cards 
being dealt is achieved, the modified cards are introduced to the game by 
dealing from the bottom of the pack, with the re-coloured Aces being the first 
modified cards to be dealt. In nearly every case where this demonstration 
has been run, there is a small, but perceptible hesitation before the modified 
card is committed to one of the four stacks, but generally the re-coloured 
cards are committed to a stack. Indeed in most cases, all the Aces are dealt 
and stacked and it is only when the mixed cards are dealt, does the 
participant realise, the game rules do not match the assumptions they have 
made about the game. In some cases, even the first mixed cards get 
committed to one of the four stacks, but in most cases the game stops 
abruptly as the participant realises that they do not have sufficient agreed 
rules to continue with the game.  
 
The demonstration is very effective at showing people how dependent they 
are on the assumptions they made and how readily they were prepared to 
bring forward assumptions about ‗a pack of cards‘ simply on the production 
of a set of cards that in most respects looked like a standard pack. The 
hesitation with the re-coloured card is interesting because it shows there is a 
change in perception, but it appears that the ‗standard model‘ that there is 
only four suits is strong enough to overcome that hesitation and the card is 
committed. 
 
In addition, it is surprising how people suddenly constrain themselves with 
the assumption that there should only be four stacks and this is why the 
game ends so abruptly. The game does not have a pre stated rule that more 
stacks of similar mixed suits should not be created, so it is a viable strategy 
to continue the game within the stated rules be to start mixed stacks for the 
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modified cards. However to create that common understanding would take a 
rational cognitive thinking period, including perhaps negotiation to establish 
this as a legitimate way of playing the game. That important time window 
though, was simply not available as the game was in session and the cards 
were continuing to be dealt in quick succession. 
 
The demonstration, which has been undertaken with many people over the 
years, has always ended with nowhere to go. Nobody has been able to adapt 
during the game to cope with the surprise brought about by the breaking of 
assumption of the need to have only four stacks, although there have been 
two good attempts to modify the game, both where the first modified card 
was discarded by the participant (removed from the game which was also 
allowed), but even these games ended when more modified cards were 
produced as the participate noted the breakdown of the common 
understanding of the game rules. 
The Demonstration Outcome 
 
The simple, but effective demonstration, it is suggested, facilitates an 
understanding of what this research is about at an introductory level; it shows 
the power of recalled assumptions and Relatedness in terms of misleading 
us when we are engaged in real time activities. The demonstration also 
shows how easily the assumptions can become rules themselves, which may 
constrain us from finding optimal solutions. Furthermore, it was clear as each 
demonstration unfolded, that once an assumption had been made and was 
considered ‗correct‘ the participant was easily led to move on to new 
information and never re-examine the assumptions. Indeed, the 
demonstration mimics real life where there are not normally clues to cause 
us to re-examine  and this forward passage through time is part of the Risk 
Clockspeed equation that needs to be considered.  
 
Consequential to this demonstration (exploratory experiment in Steinle‘s 
language (Steinle, 1997)), in this work we must consider the contextual 
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domain and the affect of assumptions, clues and artefacts (such as the pack 
of cards) and cues, times when we feel confident to act, such as to start 
without a full understanding of the context that may apply. 
Summarising the problem space 
 
In summary, this research has emerged from a belief that the industrial and 
commercial needs of risk management are changing, driven by increasing 
complexity, lean management, rising industrial clockspeed and increasing 
governance requirements. There is in the researchers mind now a need to 
extend formal risk management understanding and methods to encompass a 
greater number of the risks actually faced.  
 
There is a need to understand how heuristic risk management skills are 
learned, developed and managed and this requires models for understanding 
and communication purposes within an organisational environment. We 
should consider the role of the informal learning mechanisms running 
alongside the formal educational and training mechanisms organisations 
have in place as these may be very important for developing risk 
management skills. 
 
Within the research we need to consider the impact of assumptions, some of 
which may be pre-learnt and triggered by familiarity and relatedness (in the 
Kahneman and Tversky sense). This in turn gives rise for a need to consider 
the role of clues as part of a new process to unpick an uncertain risk laden 
situation. 
 
And lastly, there is a need to deliver a basis for a management response to 
engage with this new lens of Risk Clockspeed, which must support or at least 
lead towards a justified business case.  
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Models for Risk Clockspeed 
 
To help ensure this work is well established in practical application, it would 
be helpful if models could be drawn to position the learning and behavioural 
framework within which both Slow and Fast Clockspeed Risks are managed. 
The following section describes such models and how they have been 
derived based on existing literature. During the data collection phase, this 
work will collect data to  test some aspects of these models for validity. 
 
In the literature review, under the section on Culture, work by  Schein, Young 
and the famous McKinsey 7S model by Waterman, Peters and Phillips was 
identified as potentially useful in respect to building models which may be 
needed for Risk Clockspeed. The features that make this model particularly 
relevant are the relationships it provides between the systems, structure and 
strategy provided by management and the interrelationship this has with staff 
and culture. Without much difficulty this model may be redrawn to provide a 
sound core for both Risk Clockspeed models. 
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Figure 3: McKinsey's Seven S model 
 
Consider first the elements of the McKinsey 7S model, specifically Systems, 
Structure and Strategy. From Systems, we give emphasis to Training and 
Processes as these two are key aspects of Risk Clockspeed. We also 
separate out Training, because of its role in developing the Competencies 
that individuals acquire and Processes, for their centrality in the management 
of risk. Indeed, the current Risk Management paradigm captured in all main 
stream risk management standards is to have a strong identify, assess and 
manage cycle as an embedded process within the organisation. 
Furthermore, we can consider the response plans developed to address 
risks as an expression of the process considered necessary to manage the 
risk in the opinion of the organisation.  
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Since ‗Competency‘ is a broad term we can consider it to include the Skills 
element of the McKinsey 7S model and we do not need to separate out 
Skills. Similarly, Style and Shared Values, we shall subsume into Culture, 
which is shown in our model to include both employees and management 
addressing the Staff dimension of the McKinsey 7S model.  
 
In summary, while not in the same form, all the important aspects of the 7S 
model find their place and identity in the Risk Clockspeed models. 
 
 As with any Systems Model, we should consider the boundary of the 
organisational system that we are generating a model for and consider the 
stimulus that crosses that boundary to stimulate a response from the system. 
 
One of the limitations levelled at the Goffee and Jones ‗double S‘ model 
(Goffee & Jones, 1998) in connection with this research into Risk 
Clockspeed was its perspective of the ‗Individual‘ immersed in an 
Organisational context, where in risk management, there is a balance 
between the individual and the organisation. In the Risk Clockspeed models, 
clarity is assured by separating out the elements that can be associated with 
the individual and the elements that are associated with the organisation in 
the two hemispheres of the model. The value of this should be seen in 
practice when consideration is given to organisational changes vs personal 
development needs. 
 
Putting all this together and using lines to show connections we generate the 
diagram in the figure below. 
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Using the concept of the ‗Social construction of risk‘ a concept advocated by 
Douglas and colleagues according to Karl Dake (Dake, 1992, p. 27), one can 
envisage individuals collectively engaging in a process of ‗Normalisation‘ with 
the formal processes of Risk Management with each person working from 
their base of experiences and competencies, through a filter of heuristic 
models and expected outcomes. Again this is something the literature from 
Kahneman, Tversky, Slovic, Finucane, Zjonc and Gigerenzer all provide a 
sound theoretical basis for (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), (Slovic, 2000), 
(Slovic et al., 2004) (Slovic et al., 2007) (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Add this 
into the Risk Clockspeed model and one can observe clearly how individuals 
can interact with the organisational structure. 
 
Furthermore, there is a need to recognise the interaction of individuals, as 
part of an organisation‘s cultural perspective, as the culture is an important 
Figure 4: Partial Clockspeed Model 
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modifier fuelling adaption or even overriding recorded organisational 
processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider now the modifications needed in order to reflect the Fast 
Clockspeed situation, where the information necessary to manage the risk 
emerges at or close to real time. The Risk Management capture process is 
no longer dominant as it relies on having enough time to write down the 
essence of the risk and to follow the Identify, Assess, Evaluate, Plan, 
Manage Review cycle which is at the core of Risk Management standards 
such as the new ISO31000 ("ISO 31000: Risk management - Principles and 
guidelines," 2009). In its place however, there is the strong motivation of 
‗Expectations‘ from Management, Society, our peer group, even our family, 
friends as well as the expectations we place upon ourselves which can be 
Figure 5: Slow Clockspeed Risk Management 
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among the strongest of motivations. When time is short, the literature 
reviewed suggests we act from feelings (Affect) and this set of feelings and 
resultant expectation of outturn is encapsulated in a framework of 
expectations represented in the model. 
 
While many groups do not formalise their expectations, organisational 
management sometimes do in the form of Policies and/or Principles. 
However, no matter how many policies and procedures are in place, there 
are always those remaining expectations that emerge from the interactions 
we have with others. For example, when using a car on an organisations 
business trip; some organisations place a total ban on the use of mobile 
phones even with hands free kits to mitigate risks that may arise during the 
journey that may have consequences for the organisation. Other 
expectations such as ‗you will not drive recklessly‘ are not normally written 
down. 
 
Consider also the role of ‗Normalisation‘ in the Slow Risk Clockspeed model. 
Normalisation as described here it is an interaction between individuals with 
the formal process of risk management, modified by cultural values and 
beliefs. It takes time, often involves discourse, often disagreement and is at 
least partially a cognitive rational thought out position that we take. 
Normalisation embodies our expectations for the outcome of events as we 
rationalise our decisions with deep cognitive thought.  
 
Compare now the Slow to the Fast Clockspeed model, where mental 
processes are dominated by the System 1 mental model using the terms 
originated Stanovich and West (Stanovich & West, 1998). In the literature, 
the description of System 1 behaviour and mental processes is not one of 
normalisation, but one of strong committed action, with heuristics providing 
the main analytical part of the process. A good test for System 1 thinking is 
said to be that you can‘t really recall how you made the decision in detail, 
which discounts Normalisation as it has been described and captured in the 
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Slow Risk Clockspeed model. So for Fast Risk Clockspeed, a case can be 
made for the model as shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
In this model, heuristics take more of a dominate role, leading to an action 
orientated activity. A reduced role for rational cognition could have been 
shown, as individuals still retain the ability to change to a System 2 model, 
but this is not the dominant decision making activity when time is short which 
is why it is not shown. Expectations on the other hand are still present, as we 
are witnessing events we still have expectations around how people may 
behave and events outturn, even as they manifest in real time, providing 
there is sufficient time for our senses to react to the events. Expectations are 
the residual element which is left when the other slower cognitive processes 
around Normalisation are stripped away. The expectation framework has 
also been moved to span the line between individual and organisation to 
recognise the two sources of organisational expectations and self applied 
Figure 6: Fast Clockspeed Risk Management model 
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expectations. In the Slow Clockspeed model, there is time to understand 
company processes, policy and other documentation, but in a Fast 
Clockspeed situation, with no time to read and absorb relevant documents, it 
is suggested people react with a perception (expectation) of what the 
organisation may desire of us, based on our existing understanding.  
‘All Models are Wrong’ 
 
Having built these models on a basis and understanding of the literature, 
there is a duty not only to test these models against observation, but to look 
at the possible limitations these models may have.  
 
It was George Box (Box, 1976, p. 792) who made the simple but wise 
observation that: 
 
„All models are wrong‟  
 
George Box, 1976 
 
But who then goes on in his paper to suggest that some models are 
nevertheless useful. 
 
Indeed, models tend to describe part of reality rather than the whole of reality 
and in particular with models such as those drawn, there is a natural 
limitation introduced by the abstraction level the model is drawn at. 
Simplicity, omission and boundaries all play their part to invalidate models 
outside the tight conditions in which they are considered valuable. 
 
In a critical analysis of the models constructed, it is not possible to define a 
specific rate at which one model ceases to describe the situation observed 
and when the other model takes over. There is no simple answer to this 
question and therefore this is a model that needs careful and thoughtful 
application, along with awareness of the context in which the model is to be 
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applied. More to the point, organisations and individuals have their own 
performance limits, so again, in any organisation and specifically in each 
situation, there is a point of complexity and speed where the Fast 
Clockspeed model breaks down and risk management gives way to failure 
and disaster. Equally, at the other end of the spectrum, where risk 
management becomes drawn out over long periods, malaise and 
indifference may set in and the Slow Risk Clockspeed model makes no 
allowance for such behaviour modifying factors. However, it is recognised 
that organisations may well have both slow and fast limits, so another 
parameter ‗The Risk Clockspeed Window‘ can be defined as the range 
between which, an organisation may effectively manage risks. 
 
The constructed models are also underpinned by a set of assumptions and 
due consideration must be given to the importance of these assumptions if a 
level of objectivity over the models is to be maintained. The main assumption 
is that of a healthy organisation in that there is no significant alternative 
agenda between the organisation and the individual. Malicious thought or 
duality of purpose between any relevant groups would undoubtedly invalidate 
both of these models. There is also an assumption of empowerment, 
particularly in the Fast Risk Clockspeed model. For the individual to act, 
there is the assumption that the individual is empowered to act and that is 
not always a valid assumption, however in the kind of modern forward 
looking organisations where this model may be ‗helpful‘ one can tentatively 
expect this assumption to be true. The third important assumption and one 
that would need to be validated on a case by case basis is that the scale of 
Competency and Experience is sufficient to allow an action to be taken. 
Neither of these models have any use if the individual is paralysed by a total 
lack of experience in the situations contemplated. 
 
Having considered both of the major limitations and the necessary 
assumptions, the implicit question from George Box‘s developed statement 
that ‗all models are wrong‘ (Box, 1976) remains: Are the models useful? 
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Model Content 
 
Risk Management within the context discussed so far is the process by 
which people and organisations seek to manage the impact of events and 
scenarios on their objectives. The models produced highlight the relationship 
between organisations, the individual and the role played by explicit and tacit 
features of those relationships through culture and expectations. The models 
also clarify the different roles played by heuristics and link the individual‘s 
behaviour to their training and experience. The abstraction level of the 
models is high enough to make the models generalised, but the placeholders 
are sufficiently common terms to have meaning to people familiar with 
modern management thinking. 
Chapter Summary 
 
Within this chapter the problem being addressed has been explored using 
simple scenarios illustrative of real life events. The factors behind Risk 
Clockspeed and specifically the drivers that make this work both relevant and 
timely have been discussed. Two practical models have been derived from 
existing literature and explained to support the concept and potential 
usefulness of this work. What is important however is the novelty of this 
approach and the need for the research to validate the role of Risk 
Clockspeed in the management of risk and to validate the emphasis given to 
Experience, Competency and the Expectation framework which are key to 
the models drawn? 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Research Design Considerations 
Introduction to Research Design Considerations 
 
The validity of any research project rests on its ability to show the necessary 
rigour has been applied to build the foundation for the research. Such is the 
recognised difficulty in this area Quinton and Smallbone labelled ‗Reliability‘, 
‗Validity‘ and ‗Generalisation‘ as the ‗troublesome triplets‘ (Quinton & 
Smallbone, 2006, p. 125). In addressing the Research Design for this work, 
we take a systematic approach where each step aims to add depth and 
dimensions of rigour to our design and specifically deal with the troublesome 
triplets.  
 
In dealing with the methodology, it is important not be blind to the debate 
around qualitative or quantitative methods as researchers tend to have a 
predisposition towards one or other of these methods (Bryman & Bell, 2003, 
p. 25) and so there has been a lot written to build the case for validity in each 
method. In dealing with the development of the research design for this work, 
this section will engage with that debate sufficiently to ensure a defendable 
academic basis for this research, but will not seek to conclude anything 
beyond that position. 
 
The starting point selected for this systematic approach to the construction of 
the research design, is to consider the role of the researcher. What kind of 
mindset should the business research student seek to develop to undertake 
the work? This it is suggested should be followed by an assessment of the 
Research Design criteria from a position that is detached wherever possible 
from the detailed topic of risk management, so the researcher may focus on 
how to get to the root of a valid research work, without being distracted by 
the topic. This it is suggested is a means by which the researcher can 
maximise objectivity and arrive at a sound research design. Moreover, by 
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undertaking this journey in an academically critical way, the methodology 
design should address potential weaknesses and acknowledge the ongoing 
debates about validity in Qualitative research. The third consideration, before 
summarising in the design selection and the research method to be used, is 
a review of the designs used by respected researchers to produce classical 
work in the fields of enquiry this work resides in. This is a very important 
stage as it should connect the reader between the validity and reliability of 
this work into the wider body of knowledge and experience it rests on. Indeed 
we should always remember what Newton said: 
 
„If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants‟ 
 
Sir Isaac Newton writing to Robert Hooke in February 1676 
 
Where seeing further in scientific terms rests as much on the validity of the 
research methodology as it does on the observed results. 
The Ideal Researcher 
 
According to Gummesson (Gummesson, 2003) 
 
„The ideal researcher in business and marketing is an Indiana Jones hunting 
hidden treasures and a Sherlock Holmes solving the mystery of The 
Speckled Band Both are researching, courageous and passionate explorers. 
Walking in their footsteps, B2B researchers should not be bureaucrats and 
administrators of regulated research rituals. They should be entrepreneurs 
and their priority should be to find market treasures and to solve marketing 
mysteries.‟ 
 
Evert Gummesson 2003 p.492 
 
As a growing amount of managerial research is Qualitative, the tensions and 
debates about the quality of Qualitative research grows. Gummesson‘s 
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rather cavalier view of the business researcher may alarm many and feed 
the arguments that Qualitative only research lacks academic rigour. While 
Gummesson is mainly addressing the ideal researcher from the perspective 
of marketing research, the sentiments are aimed at business research in 
general, as made clear in the first line. Gummerson is also attributed with 
identifying both Researchers and Business Consultants as ‗Knowledge 
Workers‘ suggesting the differences lie in a difference between theory and 
practice (Gummesson, 2000). As a Doctor of Business Administration work, 
where the emphasis is on moving forward the boundary of practice as 
opposed to the emphasis on developing management theory, Gummerson‘s 
summary is considered appropriate, yet the spectre of poor quality in 
business research is there and this must be addressed. 
 
While this is management research carried out by a practitioner, this is 
Doctoral level work and due attention to both Epistemological and 
Ontological considerations is important to cross over from mere interest, 
however professional, to academic inquiry. In addition, since this work relies 
on qualitative methods, it is important to acknowledge and seek to avoid the 
valid criticisms that have been made at poorly conceived qualitative 
research.  
Inductive and or Deductive? 
 
Having originally been motivated to undertake this research by the nature of 
risk management as observed in organisations from the perspective of a risk 
consultant, it was perhaps inevitable that this work would have an inductive 
research undercurrent. It was clear from my observations that risk 
management did not sit comfortably with everyone in the many organisations 
visited. Risk processes as described by the popular risk standards were 
often compromised or hindered by practices and omissions of data. In 
addition, these issues seemed to be linked to the obvious discomfort with risk 
management practice exhibited by some people. It was also clear that the 
formal risk management system was not the only risk management practice 
 Page 107 
 
tolerated within every business again something that appeared to be linked 
in some way, though the mechanisms were not clear. These observations 
provide the background for the inductive undercurrent for this research.  
However, balance and objectivity were the watch words of this research as 
the author set out to generate a valid academic work, as well as a practical 
management contribution, in line with the DBA ideals. For that reason, it was 
decided that a deductive method should for part of the research design to act 
as both a validating and moderating control over possible overzealous 
inductive approach driven by observation. Encouragingly, it seems some 
Total Quality Management research was also subject to a duality of research 
undercurrent, one that started with a deductive approach and ended with an 
inductive proof based on case studies (Bryman and Bell 2003 p.11 citing 
Ghobadian and Gallear (Ghobadian & Gallear, 1997)). 
 
The deductive element however cannot be separated from the task in hand 
which is to better understand the processes of risk assessment and 
management in order to produce a practical risk management approach and 
push forward the boundaries of practice.  For that reason, the research 
questions need to be applied, achievable and formulated such that the 
answers add value to the practical implementation and not simply add to the 
philosophy. 
Epistemological Considerations 
 
In undertaking research in the field of business one must consider the impact 
of being immersed in the business environment. By this we mean 
considering how people perceive the subject matter being researched and 
indeed how the researcher, undertaking a line of enquiry will affect that 
environment. By way of example, to show how active this interaction can be 
within the field of risk management: In the closing weeks of 2009, a debate 
emerged within the Institute of Risk Management (IRM) about the nature of 
Risk Appetite. This debate was initiated by the Walker report and the 
potential changes to UK Corporate Governance. One conclusion of the 
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debate that stretched over months rather than days is that Risk Appetite is a 
fickle subject for the board to deal with. Risk managers and subordinates 
look to the board to give guidance on where the organisation should take 
more risk and areas where risk should be avoided. On the other hand, 
boards are looking for the organisational members dealing with risk to apply 
some rules derived from risk appetite, in order to table the right ‗level‘ of risk 
before them. Definitions, attitudes and appetites shift and change as a result 
of current perceptions and it appears that this continuous shifting means both 
parties (Board or subordinates) struggle to satisfy each other in risk appetite 
management. This is perhaps partially attributable to Simon‘s Bounded 
Rationality (Simon, 1982), in that people can only process so much 
information, but from the IRM‘s work on risk management, there are clearly 
other interactive factors to be considered here. Investigating the mechanism 
at work here is another research area outside the scope of this work and 
certainly outside the scope of the research design, but it does clearly 
illustrate the interactivity, the dynamic nature and the potential for mismatch 
between the environment and actors which is possible with this topic. It also 
illustrates the impact of inquiry, because the meeting concluded that the 
debate had indeed pushed forward the boundaries by exposing some of the 
weaknesses in the existing body of knowledge. 
Forms of Reality 
 
Having established there is a complex relationship to be considered from an 
epistemological point of view, it is important that we consider what kind of 
‗reality‘ we think we are dealing with. It should also be noted that ‗reality‘ is 
one of the areas of criticism levelled at qualitative research with some 
resulting to a multi reality argument (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 294) to 
validate their research case. A mechanism that seems unnecessary 
complicated for this particular research project. 
Bhaskar provides two perspectives on reality which can help us here; these 
are outlined by Bryman and Bell (Bryman & Bell, 2003, p. 15) citing Bhasar 
(Bhaskar, 1975, p. 2), the key parts of which are: 
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Empirical Realism: ‗fails to recognise enduring structures and generative 
mechanisms underlying and producing observable phenomena and events‘. 
 
Critical Realism: Recognises the reality of the natural order and the events 
and discourses of the social world. That is to say understanding is accepted 
as requiring identification of the structures that generate those events and 
discourses. 
 
With the interactivity and general complexity of the subject under research 
acknowledged, the design must follow the principle of Critical Realism to 
seek the underlying structures and discourses.  
 
At this stage there is an important question to answer. Does this design 
selection of critical realism and an acceptance that there are structures and 
discourses to be uncovered set us at odds with some of the seminal writers 
in the field of risk, Mary Douglas, Karl Dake and Arron Wildavsky? All argued 
that risk is a human construction that is perceived by people (Dake, 1992), 
(Douglas, 1994), (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). At one level, such a 
perception could be seen as a totally deductive point of view, based on 
islands of fact which do not rely on structures as such, nor is there a 
prerequisite of discourse or explanation for any person to arrive at their view. 
Looking further into these writers work, it is easy to see that they were not 
advocating this kind of thinking. The social construction of risk necessitates a 
‗social construct‘ a set of relationships between actors and subject matter, on 
which the perception of risk can be built and rest. Moreover, to develop ones 
argument and contribute to a socialisation of a risk (to agree its likelihood 
and impact) one must engage in or employ a coherent argument. As such, 
the idea of islands of fact, being tabled as a list without coherent connection, 
would have little persuasive power, so it can reasonably be suggested that 
this is not a correct interpretation of the Social School‘s work. 
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Before moving away from the topic of reality in the research design, there is 
a need to address the problem posed by Edmund Gettier (Gettier, 1963). 
This concerns the issue or reliability in connection with an assessment of 
reality. The problem faced is best explained with an example: A person is 
blindfolded and taken to a movie set consisting of multiple building facades 
with one real building constructed for internal film shots. With the blindfold 
removed, per chance the person walks down the movie set and chooses to 
enter the fully constructed building. The person may reasonably conclude, 
based on the physical and tangible evidence he or she has observed, that 
she is in a real street, yet this is a false reality. The design and ultimately a 
question that must be asked of the research, is how can we be sure that we 
have not fallen into this trap of a selective viewpoint, where the evidence 
supports a false proposition? 
Positivist of Interpretive? 
 
As an engineer by background, there is an instant strong tendency towards 
positivism based on the psychological construction of primacy. That is to say, 
I was trained as an engineer before I trained as a Social Science researcher 
and the guiding rule of Primacy would suggest that many of my engineer 
traits will dominate over my social science traits where there is conflict. So in 
designing my research around the area of positivistic or interpretive 
selection, I must be careful not to make one of two potential errors. One error 
could be to select a positivistic approach for the wrong reasons. Give in to a 
preference for phenomena that can be validated by scientific method and to 
discard any attempt towards an interpretive understanding of decision 
making under uncertainty. Or I could make the second mistake of over 
compensating and forcing an interpretive understanding in an area where a 
positivistic stance would be more appropriate. Perhaps, this is a question of 
balance as Gummesson argued all research is interpretive (Gummesson, 
2003, p. 482). 
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Otway and Thomas (Otway & Thomas, 1982, p. 69) make reference to this 
problem in risk perception research in the opening paragraphs of their paper 
Reflections on Risk Perception and Policy. They suggest the answer lies in 
the ideological commitment each researcher has towards objective or 
subjective viewpoints. They use the word ‗Division‘ to reinforce the 
seriousness held by each opposing camp, so clearly the issue is an 
important one for consideration in this research design. They present the 
positions of the two camps, the extreme essence of which is captured as 
follows: 
 
Objective Viewpoint: ‗Risk is a quantifiable attribute of technologies and 
naturally occurring hazards‘. The risk may be determined by objective means 
and to apply subjective methods introduces unacceptable approximations 
and sources of error. 
 
Subjective Viewpoint:  Truths in this domain do not live independently from 
the people, so rather than be unacceptable approximations, subjective 
methods and the interpretation of data in a social context is the best and only 
kind of data. 
 
The paper then goes on to provide quite a good critical analysis of the risk 
research domain in the area of risk perception and does not seek to resolve 
the tension found with any unified third way, but recognises some value in 
each. In terms of balance however, they come down mainly in favour of the 
subjective viewpoint. In their concluding comment, speaking specifically 
about risk perception studies, Otway and Thomas say: 
 
„We believe that risk perceptions can, to some extent, be assessed, but the 
search for objective answers and generalizations, and indeed the very 
assumption that generalizations in the manner of natural science are even 
possible, is misplaced.‟  
 
Otway and Thomas 1982 p.82 
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In a similar paper looking at policy implications Judith Bradbury (Bradbury, 
1989, pp. 380-399) also weighs up the two perspectives on risk research and 
concludes: 
 
„Social and cultural approaches, which explicitly deny the possibility of a 
standard of absolute risk, provide a firm theoretical foundation for an 
appropriate formulation of the policy problem of risk and a framework for 
solution….. 
…. The risk management problem requires the development of institutional 
procedures for structuring a critical dialogue among different perspectives 
and societal groups.‟ 
 
Judith Bradbury 1989 p. 394 
 
And finally, considering Denscombe (Denscombe, 2007) commenting on 
research strategies, it is noted that rather than be dogmatic, it is essential 
that reasoned choice be applied. 
 
„The crucial thing for good research is that the choices are reasonable and 
that they are made explicit as part of any research report‟ 
 
Denscombe, 2003 p 3 
 
Clearly, the final design of this research approach must carefully balance 
tendencies towards either extreme and given similarities between this 
research, which relies heavily on psychological models for decision making 
and risk perception, the balance should lean somewhat towards the 
Subjective Interpretive model, rather than be vested fully in a positivistic 
approach. Moreover, Bradbury‘s comment on how a risk management 
problem may be tackled is an interesting point to reflect on in terms of the 
direction the research may take? 
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A Useful Role for Scepticism? 
 
Scepticism should be considered as a controlling influence on the natural 
desire to assert as fact, that which is just a belief. Scepticism also has a role 
to play in developing the ‗Critical Approach‘ necessary for good research 
(Quinton & Smallbone, 2006, p. 16). Without scepticism, there is a danger 
that this research will become weak and its conclusions will be increasingly 
challenged. On the other hand, an unbridled sceptic may well end up 
concluding nothing, so the role anticipated in this research design for 
scepticism, should perhaps be limited to that of self test, in that the question 
is always asked ‗Can I justify this claim?‘. 
Ontological Considerations 
 
Like the Epistemological considerations that needed to be carefully picked 
through to establish the design constraints for this research, the Ontological 
considerations are no more straightforward. Essentially there is a choice to 
take Objectivism as the position or Constructionism as the position and the 
deciding factor is the view taken on the role of the actors that will be 
observed in this research. 
 
This research will relate to the behaviour of individuals and groups in making 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Constructionism as the starting 
position would suggest we must regard the phenomena of risk and its impact 
on the organisation (its meaning) as something that is open to continual 
reconstruction by the actors involved. If we take the Mary Douglas view, 
which is convincingly argued by Douglas, Wildavsky and others then risk is 
socially constructed in this way. On the other hand, an Objectivist position is 
far more attractive from a ‗business methodology‘ point of view as the 
resultant conclusions will be embedded through objective fact, easier to 
generalise and an easier concept for others to buy into. These are the fruits 
identified from separating the conclusions, from the social constructions in 
which the conclusions may have been researched. 
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Preferences and generalisation benefits aside, one must be dispassionate 
about the choice and weigh the evidence as objectively as one can. Without 
a doubt, risk and its assessment are socially constructed phenomena and 
the results of this research are undoubtedly going to be produced from a 
Constructivist point of view. 
Quantitative or Qualitative? 
 
Again given the researchers background as an engineer, the natural 
tendency is to quantitative measurement and assessment. Qualitative data 
has its own kind of ‗in built validity‘ in that there is a natural disposition to 
accept numerical data even if the root of the data is unclear or even 
unsound. In risk research, Kahneman & Tversky (Kahneman et al., 1982) 
researched the heuristic of Anchoring, where a number seeded to an 
expectant population, or a position is posed which becomes an anchor value 
from which people then work by a series of adjustments in order to arrive at 
the value or position they believe to be the answer. It was noted that this 
effect happens, even if the audience is given no reason to have any belief in 
the validity of the seed number or position. So when attaching numbers to 
inherently subjective data early in the work, we may be exposed to the 
Anchoring effect described? However, to rely on such effects as an argument 
for Qualitative methods is to suggest that Quantitative approaches in 
subjective research does not have true validity while in reality it is care in 
design that is needed? In one sense, why make this point at all as then? The 
point is made in recognition that quantitative data is fallible if true rigour is not 
applied and in which case, perhaps Qualitative data may lead to a more 
compelling case in some circumstances. 
 
In a more wholesome way, good quantitative data can be manipulated using 
mathematical methods. It is not necessary to infer that there are relationships 
between values, as there are statistical methods of correlation that can be 
used to prove any relationship. For this reason alone quantitative data has a 
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significant attraction, but what data could be collected on this topic? What 
are the natural numerical frameworks around the concept of Risk 
Clockspeed? Time is certainly one value that could be quantified, but if the 
accuracy of time is of less importance to the perception of time, accurate 
time measurement is not called for. According to standards, the impact of a 
risk can be assessed in two general ways ("ISO 31000: Risk management - 
Principles and guidelines," 2009). Using this standard, it is acceptable to 
suggest that the impact of a risk occurring must have consequences for our 
objectives. The consequences can be expressed in terms of extra work, 
missed opportunity, damaged relationships with customers, society or indeed 
in many other qualitative (descriptive) ways. Or it is acceptable to choose to 
evaluate the impacts in quantitative terms, loss of revenue in the local 
currency, the extra number of days of work to overcome the impact of the 
risk or as any other kind of quantity we choose. Again however, are these 
numeric values or indeed the quantitative impact of the risk core to this 
concept of Risk Clockspeed? The conclusion would have to be, probably not. 
 
To validate the principles behind Risk Clockspeed, it is necessary to 
establish that the timing with which the information necessary to manage the 
risk emerges is important to the extent that the way the risk is perceived, 
changes. It is a step change in thinking is sought, not a precise timing cycle. 
It is also important to validate the idea that this shift in mode is not openly 
recognised when it happens and we will not find this by evaluating the 
impacts, but by validating the mitigation strategy. So what of the mitigation 
strategy are there quantitative values here that may be used? Mitigation of 
risk undoubtedly takes time, so there is a cost and often a significant 
resource commitment, but again these are unhelpful in the quest to see if the 
selected strategy reflects a Risk Clockspeed point of view. And lastly, it is 
important to show business benefit from using the Risk Clockspeed method, 
now here there are some potential candidates to measure. How much money 
can be saved using Risk Clockspeed thinking? On the other hand quantifying 
such a sum will be conditional on the problem, so again it is important to look 
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towards showing general qualities that are, or have been shown in the past, 
to create added value. 
 
Setting aside the logical arguments based on quantities around the topic that 
may be measured, we should see if there is any natural alignment between 
the design considerations that have emerged and the decision that should be 
made between Quantitative and Qualitative data? 
 
Bryman and Bell, (Bryman & Bell, 2003, p. 25) from the perspective of 
Business Research provides a very useful table in this regard. 
 
Table 1.1 (from page 25 Bryman and Bell) 
Fundamental differences between quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies 
 Quantitative Qualitative  
Principal orientation to 
the role of theory in 
relation to research  
Deductive; testing of 
theory  
Inductive; generation of 
theory  
Epistemological 
orientation  
Natural science model, 
In particular positivism  
Interpretivism  
Ontological orientation  Objectivism  Constructionism  
 
Table 1: Fundamental differences between quantitative and qualitative 
research strategies 
 
A simple evaluation of the table shows that not only are the design 
considerations aligned, but they have aligned firmly under the concept of 
qualitative data collection. Moreover, simple rational thought analysis of the 
problem also confirms, that the research design should focus on qualitative 
data collection. On the other hand, all is not lost on the quantitative level as 
where appropriate, it is possible to formalise qualitative data into quantitative 
values by assigning classes and values to qualitative data items and terms. 
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Before leaving this aspect of the research design review, it should be 
acknowledged that there has been much criticism levelled at the academic 
value of Qualitative based research. In their article marking the launch of the 
International Qualitative Research Journal Casell and Symon ‗Taking 
qualitative methods in organization and management research seriously‘ 
(Cassell & Symon, 2006, p. 5) and in their earlier book (Cassell & Symon, 
2004, p. 4) acknowledge that it is more difficult to get work based on 
Qualitative methods published, but they do not side with this point of view 
and set out to highlight its academic value. However, for this work, it is right 
to evaluate these criticisms and where justified, modify the design or at the 
very least take precautions to make sure the research is not undermined by 
reasonable claims of poor research practice. Close attention therefore needs 
to be paid to validity, reliability and repeatability in this work, as these are 
three of the areas that have been singled out by critics of qualitative research 
(Seale, 1999) 
Mixed Methods Research 
 
There has been a long and protracted debate between purists of Qualitative 
and Quantitative research schools which it is right to simply acknowledge 
here, but which is adequately discussed in the paper on Mixed Methods 
Research by Burke Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004) for those who seek more. Each side has fought hard; neither has been 
an outright victor yet, but a third way; that of Mixed Methods has emerged 
from the debates. Burke Johnson and Onwuegbuzie characterise this third 
way in the title of their paper as a ‗research paradigm whose time has come‘. 
Within the paper (p15), they suggest that it is the interdisciplinary nature, the 
complexity and the dynamism of social research that has given rise to this 
third way response to the debate. On page 18, they affirm this position by 
stating that: 
 
“Many research questions and combinations of questions are best and most 
fully answered through mixed research solutions” 
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Burke Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004 p.18 
 
Denscombe (Denscombe, 2007, p. 107) introducing Mixed Methods on the 
other hand, suggests there is nothing new about mixed methods and 
comments that examples may be found throughout history. However 
Denscombe acknowledges mixed methods have come to the fore now citing 
papers by Burke Johnson‘s, Tashakkori and Teddlie (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2003), Gorard and Taylor (Gorard & Taylor, 2004) and others as recent 
influential works in developing this field. Denscombe also takes a wider view 
than Burke Johnson & Onwuegbuzie to say mixed methods extends beyond 
simply mixing ‗Quantitative and Qualitative‘ to any research which may cross 
over between recognised research boundaries. For this research work, this 
clarification is noted and embraced as while this research is firmly 
quantitative in nature, it does use a mixture of recognised techniques that 
cross recognised boundaries in order to triangulate and validate its findings. 
Denscombe‘s wider view of mixed methods is supported to a some extent in 
the latest version of Tashakkori and Teddlie‘s book on Mixed Methods 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010) with an chapter by Gert Biesta who provides a 
Level based system for classifying mixed methods on page 100. Applying 
this system of classification to this research, the approach may be classed as 
level 2, as it is proposed to mix data collecting methods. 
 
Also in the later edition of Tashakkori and Teddlie (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2010), where the authors acknowledge much growth and diversification in 
the field of Mixed Methods (p.ix) had occurred between editions, an 
important point on pragmatism is made which is again is highly relevant and 
descriptive of this research into Risk Clockspeed. 
 
„There appears to be a rather broad consensus within the field of mixed 
methods research that the rationale for a mixed approach has to be a 
pragmatic one. Rather than starting from particular philosophical 
assumptions or convictions, the choice of a mixed approach is seen as one 
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that should be driven by the very questions that the research seeks to 
answer‟ 
 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010, p. 96) 
 
The proposed research space, the natural questions emerging from the gaps 
found in literature and the exploration of current risk management practice 
are subjective in nature and the aim of this work is to support a practical 
approach to risk management. So without any further need for explanation, 
pragmatism is already seen as a significant element of this approach. In 
addition there are the complexity and interdisciplinary dimensions of ‗risk 
management‘ as a topic (see Chapter 1) to contend with, along with 
generalised models derived from literature (see Chapter 3) to consider. And 
finally, as this is a new approach to risk management, the very basics need 
to be established and it is necessary to underpin this new view of risk 
through some core observational research work on ‗what is‘. Where research 
claims to establish in part ‗what is‘, it is often labelled ‗phenomenological‘ in 
nature. In all, these general considerations already suggest this work may be 
characterised towards Mixed Methods, from a pragmatic position and 
phenomenological in nature however there are more issues to consider 
before arriving at the firm basis needed for this work. 
Research Framework 
 
In some ways the selection of an appropriate research framework is one of 
the notable characteristics of academic work. The selection of a justified 
academically sound framework to underpin this research, which adds logic to 
the research design, is important. 
 
In considering the type of research being undertaken, it involves people and 
their behaviour and so is social in nature, following a line of cultural enquiry 
in as much as we are considering the individual and the individual in the 
organisation.  
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A robust framework, which has gained increasing support particularly in the 
field of cultural enquiry is Checkland‘s Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) (P. 
Checkland, 1981) and (P. Checkland & Scholes, 1990). Originally published 
in 1981 as a four stage method, the latest iteration with Seven stages is 
outlined in Soft Systems Methodology in Action (P. Checkland & Scholes, 
1990). This SSM methodology provides some interesting features. 
 
Firstly the situation that is considered to be problematic is identified which is 
a scoping exercise that fits well with the need to place boundaries around 
this work. Next, the problem situation is expressed, which is useful, but not 
necessarily a feature important here as the expression of the problem is a 
feature of the steps preceding the research design. Root definitions are 
established which are designed to get to the very heart of the matter. Root 
definitions serve to remove extraneous features and to descend down to the 
root and not to be distracted by the symptoms. This is a useful step as to 
generalise successfully; any proposal for a method to address the research 
findings must address the root issues rather than the symptoms. Conceptual 
models are then constructed to represent the systems found in the process 
of establishing the root definitions. These conceptual models are then 
compared to the real world they are designed to model. This is the model 
testing phase as a model must accurately represent the real world situation 
to be of any use. An interesting step, as it would be useful to establish with 
clarity what we believe to be the cases before suggesting any improvements. 
Changes are then contemplated based on the knowledge gained so far and 
the changes implemented to improve the problem situation. Not a step in the 
process, but the implied follow on activity is to establish the success of the 
action. Within the following diagram, it is possible to see this research 
mapped against the steps in Checkland‘s model and given the fit, this is 
perhaps an ideal framework for this work? In a way, this not surprising, as 
the phenomenological credentials of this work have been established above 
and such studies are classic cases for what Checkland and Scholes term as 
a ‗Stream of Cultural Inquiry‘. 
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Figure 7: The Soft Systems Approach 
 
Before leaving the assessment of frameworks and as a critical assessment 
of Soft Systems, there is one area in which Soft Systems does not deliver. In 
a paper by the originator of Soft Systems, Peter Checkland acknowledges 
that Soft Systems as a technique cannot deliver on repeatability (P 
Checkland & Howell, 1998). The problem is illustrated by Checkland using a 
comparison to a chemical experiment where repeatability is demonstrated 
with the outcome always being the same every time the same chemicals are 
mixed. With business research, this high degree of repeatability is rarely 
going to be an option. However, we cannot ignore repeatability for the 
research to be conclusive; the experimental aspect of the design must deal 
adequately with this potential weakness. 
Validity and Reliability 
 
Searle (Seale, 1999, p. 471) suggests that while quality in qualitative 
research is important, the headings of validity and reliability no longer seem 
adequate to encapsulate the range of issues that a concern for quality must 
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raise. This is a view backed up by Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (Onwuegbuzie 
& Johnson, 2006) who favour the term ‗legitimation‘. Those opinions are 
respected, but nevertheless whether it is called validity or ligitimation, it is 
appropriate to make a case in these areas of research design and for this 
there are the four tests described by Yin (Yin, 1994) 
 
 Internal Validity 
 Construct Validity 
 External Validity 
 Reliability 
 
There are three types of validity to consider in this work if the work is to use 
this framework: Internal Validity, the validity of causal inferences, Construct 
validity, the ability to show we are able to measure what we set out to 
research and External Validity, the ability to generalise the results of this 
research with confidence. 
  
Having undertaken the review of the literature, there are a substantial body 
of evidence to call upon, where others have engaged in research of a similar 
nature, so it is natural to look at this evidence in the first instance. The 
problem of internal validity only arises if we cannot produce a compelling 
case for the observed behaviours, but the literature is very strong in this 
respect and the compelling behaviour based case is not seen as a problem. 
Similarly, strong literature and established research may be used to support 
the case for Construct Validity in as much as we are seeking to comment on 
human behaviour in the same way. It therefore follows that using similar 
methods to previous successful research should yield equally measurable 
results. 
 
External validity is more difficult and must be addressed as part of the 
primary data collection in that we must be able to show that features and 
behaviours identified in any one experiment, must be shown to be valid in 
subsequent experiments, allowing for due changes in circumstances. 
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Reliability on the other hand is slightly different, in that we need to be able to 
show that the experiment are repeatable, the conclusions that may be drawn 
from those experiments largely the same and hence the improvements 
suggested warranted as a course of management action. These constraints 
are clearly something that must be addressed in the design of the actual 
experiments, in light of the existing body of information established by the 
literature review. 
Triangulation and Confidence 
 
Triangulation, validity through a variety of methods, was claimed by some as 
the only requirement for good research, but Bloor cited by Seale (Bloor, 
1997; Miller & Dingwall, 1997, pp. 37 - 50) suggests that since it is possible 
for several methods to converge on an incorrect answer, so triangulation is 
not a Silver bullet for qualitative research. Bloor‘s argument is consistent with 
a strongly positivistic view which says any number of positive outcomes 
cannot prove a theory, only proof that there is no dissenting case, can be 
conclusive. Bloor‘s argument is strong and difficult to counter which is why 
this research design should not rely exclusively on triangulation for rigour. On 
the other hand, with qualitative research in business we must not neglect the 
role of confidence within the business community we are seeking to 
influence. To have an impact, confidence can be as important if not more 
important than proven fact and triangulation is a good way to build 
confidence in the findings of this work. Indeed there are many facts that fail 
to gain traction in the business community because they either seem counter 
intuitive or do not seem to hold water when translated into a business 
environment. If the research goal is to have impact and traction, then 
perhaps it is right to engage with one of the best known methods for 
engaging the business community and test Risk Clockspeed thinking against 
a real life case study? 
 
A case study is also a proven method in Qualitative business research 
(Harrison & Leitch, 2005, p. 106). In addition, Denscombe (Denscombe, 
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2007, p. 38) highlights the value of case studies for surfacing detail and 
complexity in social systems and notes its particular value as a method ‗to 
the study of processes and relationships within a setting‘ which is exactly 
what is needed here for this research work. Clearly a case study is required 
to provide Construct Validity.  
Research Ligitimation and Data Saturation 
 
In this sub section of text it seems more appropriate to use the term 
preferred by Onwuegbuzie and Johnson as any proposal for a survey, within 
the context already discussed, will be essentially qualitative and it was in this 
context that Onwuegbuzie and Johnson argued for the term ‗ligitimation‘ to 
be used (Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006).  
 
To ensure this research has ‗ligitimation‘, that is to say the work stands up as 
a piece of social research according to Glaser and Strauss (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) this work would need to engage in the [contended] practice of 
Data Saturation. Mason (Mason, 2010) provides a good all round 
introduction to the background and contentions surrounding Data Saturation 
and by citing Glaser & Strauss, Mason also helpfully provides a simple guide 
as to what is meant by ‗data saturation‘. 
 
„..when the collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue 
under investigation‟ 
 
Glaser & Strauss 1967 
 
Bowen (Bowen, 2008), is critical of research works that do not identify what 
is meant by data saturation and points out that many research papers also 
fail to adequately demonstrate when or if saturation has been reached. On 
the other hand Guest et al (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006) provide a series 
of researcher views on the number of data references required which 
illustrates why these omissions may occur so often. For this work the 
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concerns of both Guest and Mason will be addressed in that there will be 
comment on the selected point of data saturation in the research findings. In 
addition, given the statistical analysis provided in the paper, guidance will be 
taken from Mason citing Morse (Morse, 1994) and a saturation point of 6 
concurring views will be required in any survey undertaken, based on the 
view that this research is a ‗Phenomenological‘ [examination of what is] 
study. 
Methodology of Others 
 
Having worked through the methodology issues from an objective position, it 
should not be forgotten that this is not the first research project in this field of 
risk and much can be learnt from the endeavours of others, both for ideas 
and to substantiate the case of validity. In the following sections there is a 
selective review of other research looking at which methods have had a 
success record in the domains of enquiry shared by this research? 
Psychological Research 
 
Experiments using selection appear to feature strongly is psychological 
experimentation into reasoning. The classical psychological selection 
experiment as conducted by Wason (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) 
involves easily recognisable objects such as cards, in Wason‘s case with 
numbers and letters on opposing sides. By testing a group of subjects, 
psychologists are able to test theories of reasoning. This is perhaps what is 
needed in this research work to initially understand the underlying 
psychological mechanisms of reasoning under different Risk Clockspeeds? 
 
Another classical psychological technique is the survey. Hans Eysenck 
carried out a classical experiment to determine ‗dimensions of personality‘ in 
1947 by surveying several hundred war weary soldiers as his sample (Butler-
Bowdon, 2007) from which he was able to determine key factors in 
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personality; a base from which much of the current trend in Psychological 
Profiling owes its existence too. 
 
Observation also has played a big part in Psychological Research. Indeed, 
Mary Douglas a classical and prolific writer in risk management was an 
Anthropologist and the vast majority of her work emerged from critical 
observation and so there is no reason to exclude observation as a feature of 
this research. Indeed, observation is a form of case study and Denscombe‘s 
point on detail stands adding to the case for Construct Validity (Denscombe, 
2007, pp. 211-215). 
Risk Research 
 
In documenting risk through disasters, Turner (Turner, 1978) and Perrow 
(Perrow, 1984) produced some outstanding work as referenced in the 
Literature Review of this research. Theirs were both great examples of 
research being founded on detailed material already collected as the result of 
a formal inquiry into substantial failures to manage risk. Depending on formal 
inquiry for validity and rigour, these works have proven academic qualities 
and are considered key works in the risk management domain. In addition, 
the strength and unquestionable validity of both these works is encouraging 
as it suggests the reliance this research places on the substantial body of 
secondary research is not misplaced and can lead to some excellent results. 
In respect of considerations of triangulation and confidence, the fact that both 
cited works relied on real life case studies has also been noted. In selecting 
the case study, the availability of independent, authoritative inquiry 
documentation would align these research methods well with the methods 
used in these studies. 
 
As discussed in the Literature review Dörner carried out some valuable 
research using simulation (Dörner, 1996, 1997). The results he achieved with 
his simulations were detailed, far reaching and enlightening as he addressed 
the mechanism of failure within a context where the players could have 
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achieved good results with the right actions at the right time. This is what is 
required from Risk Clockspeed. Further attraction for this method comes 
from the control that can be exercised over the situation in a simulation, in 
that the researcher can instigate a simulation under controlled conditions. 
This has potential to eliminate, or at least reduce sources of error, increase 
the reliability and to raise the overall quality of the data gathering exercise 
through the tight focus a simulation can bring. However, to realise these 
benefits, the simulation needs to be carefully designed.  
So What Needs Proving? 
 
The earlier chapters of this thesis describe what scope this research has, the 
construction of the models from existing literature has been covered and the 
goal of validating some aspects of these models was touched on. 
 
In this chapter so far, the fundamental issues of the research design have 
been dealt with along with the case for validity through a systematic 
approach to the development of the research design. Now it is appropriate to 
give due and deeper consideration to the goals of this research in order to 
align the research aims with the methodology in order to make the final 
research design selection. 
 
Essentially, for Risk Clockspeed to be sufficiently proven as a valid 
consideration in risk management practice, this research needs to establish 
that: 
 
 There is a problem with the existing practice that has negative 
consequences or positive opportunities to be understood and 
exploited 
 The background principles to the problem can be established and 
general facts 
 The form and application of any new process that would constitute a 
Risk Clockspeed approach can be theorised to address the problem  
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 The models have validity in the key areas of Experience, Competency 
and Expectation as these are the critical areas supporting the use of 
heuristics and supporting the process of decision making 
 The new process has proven beneficial value, which can be broken 
down as one or more of the following: 
o Effectiveness in reducing the negative consequences of risk 
and/ or increasing the benefits from opportunity (upside risk) 
o Practical applicability in that the approach may be applied 
without undue complexity 
o General applicability in that the approach may be used within a 
wide enough set of circumstances to warrant understanding 
and practice 
o Cost effective applicability in that the application of Risk 
Clockspeed thinking yields sufficiently more gain than cost to 
make the application worthwhile. 
Furthermore, considering the models proposed were justified on literature 
alone, the specific elements of Experience, Competency and Expectation are 
derived components from the literature cited. Verification of some of the 
constructs around the role of Experience, Competency and Expectation 
would therefore be valuable in providing a degree of assurance and 
illumination that each has a justified place in the models. And as already 
discussed, there is an over arching requirement to establish these points with 
sufficient validity and reliability through the research design. In addition, if it is 
possible to apply the findings that emerge from both the secondary and 
primary research phases, to a real life case study where such characteristics 
have been found to exist through either conscious design or otherwise, then 
there would have a basis for building the confidence sought for this work in 
the business community. 
Research Design Selection 
 
Having considered the issues, the research design can now be built from 
within the methodological constraints of Mixed Methods, where Denscombe‘s 
wider definition of Mixed Methods has been adopted. Furthermore, with the 
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wide recognition given to the pragmatist position, where the method itself is 
constructed with consideration given to the research questions, the work can 
happily proceed from a pragmatist position, justified by the general research 
questions set out above. 
Simulation 
 
Zott concludes that Simulation is an increasingly popular way of developing 
theory particularly in the field of organisational learning (Zott, 2003, p. 109 
note 17). So a well structured simulation, where suitable candidates evaluate 
a situation from a risk perspective could be a basis for argument if it is 
possible to observe the thinking process in action, the current omissions and 
the consequences of the current omissions? Furthermore Davis, Eisenhardt 
and Bingham argue Simulation is a good choice where the research question 
is intriguing and the theory is quite simple, as is the case here (Davis, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007, p. 485). With this adding weight to the general 
discussion on simulation earlier in this chapter, it is now concluded 
Simulation should be part of this research to establish the scope and 
complexity surrounding any natural tendency to apply Risk Clockspeed 
thinking, as it may be that Risk Clockspeed is already applied by instinct? 
 
If Simulation is to be used, it is important to give due consideration to the 
selection and development of the Simulation model and again, the work by 
Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham is relevant in these deliberations. 
 
To satisfy the criteria for validity it is important to observe the conditions 
either in the individuals or emerging as a team position without undue bias or 
steerage from the researcher. This would be easiest to achieve by using a 
simulation that requires little explanation, by being close to the experience of 
the individuals, or one particularly easy for the participants to project 
common sense thinking too. A complex simulation, which requires 
substantial explanation, or is unrealistic, may lead to confused results, 
significant bias and results which would be low in validity. 
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A simple simulation which engages with a existing body of knowledge as well 
as meeting the validity and bias requirements, is also more likely to satisfy 
both reliability and for a business topic, repeatability. Indeed, running more 
than one simulation should allow subjective judgement to be made on both 
reliability and repeatability for the chosen simulation. 
 
In using simulation, it is considered important to ensure that the participants 
are, as close as possible, following behaviours they would follow in a real 
example. Failure to engage with the simulation as a simile of real life, would 
detract from the value of the findings. 
 
Having established the model and facts within the boundaries of secondary 
and primary simulation research, the application and verification of the 
findings through a well documented real life case study would conclude what 
may be considered to be a sound case for the academic and business 
community acceptance of this research. 
Triangulation through Case Study 
 
Having built on the existing body of research through simulation, a suitable 
case study would add rigour and confidence to this research as this would 
allow identification of any bias errors in the simulation. This being particularly 
relevant to any models developed as there is a danger that the simulations 
will lead to a case specific model, rather than the generalised business 
model that is required. Moreover, if the findings of the case study, which is 
independent to both the literature review and the simulation, endorse the 
research findings, a degree of validity and repeatability through triangulation 
would then exist. 
  
According to Denscombe (Denscombe, 2007, p. 39) , case studies are not 
randomly selected so it is important to give due consideration to the case 
study selection criteria. 
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In selecting the case study, it is important to find a study that as well as 
having the elements of time pressured decision making necessary for this 
work, the case study should have independent documentation from an 
inquiry to substantiate the details and facts beyond any reasonable 
challenge. 
 
It is not considered important for the case study to come from the same 
domain of activity as the simulation. Indeed, it is the ability to transfer the 
ideas from one area of risk to the next (generalisation) that will make this 
work important. Also there is an option to embrace the concept of 
isomorphism discussed in the literature review and seek common threads 
that will transcend domain specific issues and increase the confidence level 
of the whole research approach. 
Triangulation through Survey 
 
The simulation and the Case Study are indeed likely to be strong sources of 
research data and it is quite appropriate to triangulate between them. Indeed, 
this is necessary for generalisation and to explore the richness that will 
undoubtedly be found in each method. By comparing simulation findings with 
the case study, it will be possible to learn more about the case study. 
Similarly, issues that emerge strongly from the case study it is hoped will 
allow a deeper look at the results from the simulations. However, to give 
additional depth and rigour to this research work there should be a third 
method to add extra richness and a survey would be an ideal choice 
because of the richness it can bring. And the principles of Data Saturation 
will apply to the survey as discussed earlier, to ensure ‗Ligitimation‘. 
 
The expected value of a third point in the triangulation is threefold. Indeed 
the triangulation of results is a valuable gain and with such varied sources, 
the case for rigour and validity in presenting the models is certainly made. 
However there is also the extra gain of depth, were the respondents 
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verbalise their answers, they are almost certain to add a new dimension of 
interpretation that can be used to re-examine both the simulations and the 
case study. The third gain from including a survey is the opportunity it offers 
to provide a degree of validation around the models constructed from 
literature. Specifically, we can take a simple look at the role of Experiences, 
Competencies and Expectations as discussed in the research goals. 
 
Throughout this work there has been a thread of ‗Systems Thinking‘ applied 
but attention has not been drawn to this other than through references to 
Checkland and Cultural Enquiry earlier in this chapter. However in providing 
three distinct threads to the Mixed Methods approach, there are three distinct 
viewpoints from which to analyse the problem space. This ‗triple viewpoint‘ is 
very much in line with a ‗Systems Thinking‘ approach and it follows with the 
essence of a ‗Stream of Cultural Enquiry‘ in that each of the selected 
methods engages with how people perceive and react to risk. In other words, 
made fashionable by Peter Checkland, this is a ‗Soft Systems‘ approach 
rather than a ‗Hard Systems‘ approach (P. Checkland, 1981). 
 
To ensure saturation is justifiably achieved and in respect to the danger that 
a broad scope may prevent saturation being achieved, a limit to the scope of 
the survey will apply to probe specifically and only into the areas identified of 
‗Competency, Experience and Expectation‘. In addition, the survey will not 
probe these elements for content, for example what constitutes 
‗Competency‘, but will seek to detect that these elements are being used, 
based on term use, synonyms or clear inference.  
The justification for limiting the scope in this way is that this survey is just one 
part of a comprehensive Mixed Method approach and the research boundary 
as defined by the elements this research seeks to investigate outlined above 
and in earlier chapters, is a general study in nature. Any detailed 
investigation in any domain of human activity may indeed be the subject of a 
specific follow on study in due course and this research does not close the 
book on Risk Clockspeed research. 
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Given the selected survey scope and to ensure that the results will be 
appropriate to triangulate with and hence support or decry from the 
conceptual analysis of the problem, the survey will have three parts and a set 
of open questions in each part.  
 
The survey will investigate: 
 The complexity of the respondent‘s field of work as risk content and 
the methods employed in risk assessment and decision making are 
considered proportional to the degree of complexity involved.  
 
 The availability of information, as expectancy and inferred information 
is directly correlated to the lack of important or useful decision making 
information. Furthermore, it is a fundamental observation of the 
problem definition that decisions are made with both incomplete and 
emerging information in the real world, so this aspect of the survey will 
provide confirmation of these observations. 
 
 The use of Experience and Competency, in the conceptual models 
expressly show these as relevant to the use of heuristics in decision 
making and so the acknowledged role of these as individual 
considerations will be key in validating this aspect of the conceptual 
models. 
The analysis will centre on the key terms themselves as well as evidence 
that the respondent is referencing one of the three areas of experience, 
competency and expectation in their response. If proven, there is an 
expection to find evidence within the respondent‘s answers for the centrality, 
importance and pervasiveness of each of these elements. If there is little or 
no justification for the inclusion of each term, then the analysis of the 
respondents answers will have little recourse or reference to these terms. In 
this regard there is a hypothesis to test: 
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Hypothesis: Given the importance of Competency, Experience and 
Expectation, we expect widespread reference, description and 
acknowledgement of the importance these elements play in decision making.  
Summarising 
 
This chapter has taken a broad and deep look at the research options before 
concluding with the research design. In selecting the design there has been 
an integration of three distinct views in a Mixed Method approach, each of 
which is expected to give greater insight into the findings of the other. The 
principle of isomorphic learning has been embraced, in that the small 
samples in each part of the data collection can be used collectively as a 
powerful set of rich data from which to draw the research conclusions. For 
data collection and in support of the models derived from literature, there is a 
hypothesis to test to justify the importance given to Competency, Experience 
and Expectations. 
  
For simplification, it is worth summarising the research methodology in a 
simple concise statement form. The approach to this research is based on a 
Mixed Methods research methodology from a pragmatic, phenomenological 
(critical realism) position. The primary data collection will feature a 
simulation, to observe people in a realistic decision making role in support of 
the ‗phenomenological, pragmatist‘ approach adopted. The data from the 
simulation will be triangulated against a Case Study selected for its 
appropriateness to this field of study. Depth and a further element of 
triangulation will be added using a classic open question survey which will be 
‗ligitamised‘ using a justified ‗data saturation‘ approach. The research 
framework in use is drawn from a ‗Systems Thinking‘ background and may 
be best described as a ‗Stream of Cultural Enquiry‘. 
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Chapter 5: Data Collection and Results 
The Simulation Experiment 
Simulation Aims and Purpose 
 
Building on the choice of Simulation as described in the Methodology 
Chapter, the first part of this chapter addresses the aims for the simulation. 
 
Risk Clockspeed is considered a new approach to risk management, but that 
does not necessarily mean that Risk Clockspeed thinking is not already 
embodied in how people manage risk already. By observing the participants 
in the simulation, it will be possible to see if any respondent proposes and 
applies what may be considered to be a ‗Risk Clockspeed‘ influenced 
technique.  
 
So aim 1 is to look for natural application of Risk Clockspeed thinking or 
technique. 
 
The second aim is to observe first hand and in a controlled environment, the 
techniques currently used by a group for decision making under uncertainty. 
This is the Phenomenological ‗What is?‘ dimension, with the simulation 
therefore providing as much realism as possible. The importance of this aim 
is twofold, firstly to understand the techniques being used and secondly, to 
identify where new Risk Clockspeed techniques may be applied to produce 
an improved approach to risk management within an organisation. 
 
So aim 2 is to observe what natural decision making methods are applied. 
 
The simulation was not specifically run to test the models or to validate them 
as such. 
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Structure 
 
To be in line with the Research Design Considerations, the simulation 
needed to be simple enough to participate in, yet structured enough to 
produce reliable data. To meet these objectives, the simulation developed 
was in line with a subject most educated adults would follow, even if it was 
not within their specific job role. The selection for the simulation was for a 
land clearance and house building scenario, which used a simple five stage 
plan. Most people can at least conceive of such a plan as house building is a 
common and widespread activity. Some people would also have notional 
experience of building work happening at their home, or in respect to an 
acquaintance. In the case of this research, this simulation was very 
appropriate in that the simulation groups (two groups were used), were Civil 
and Structural Engineers for whom building is their profession. 
 
The plan steps were: 
 
 Demolish the existing building and clear the land 
 Undertake the ground works to put in the foundations 
 Build up the walls and put on the roof 
 Fit the property with Electrics and Plumbing 
 Decorate the property ready for occupation 
The plan was provided to the participants laid out in an Excel Workbook. The 
time plan was a simple spreadsheet with the months across the top and the 
steps down the left hand side (Gantt chart style). The effort was shown in this 
simple plan on the same sheet, the costs of the project were on a second 
sheet, the risks the participants raised on a third and the risks introduced by 
the facilitator, to represent unforeseen risk on a fourth. To see how the 
project was progressing, a fifth sheet was used to show the cash flow and a 
sixth and final sheet showed the balance sheet on which the delegates could 
see the profit line. 
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The object of the simulation set before the participants was to maximise the 
earnings, while not investing too much of their own money. To make the 
relationship between choices non linear and hence more realistic, any 
underfunding by the participants for the project was balanced by a bank loan 
which was quite severe in its loan charges to represent short term unplanned 
borrowing. Equally, to prevent the participants from excessively overfunding 
the project themselves, the profitability measure used took negative account 
of overfunding. While this negative effect was less severe than the bank 
loan, it was felt (and was later shown to be) sufficient deterrence to simply 
overfund the project to remove the simulations financial complexity. 
 
Having a design that was easy to understand, that had set stages to make 
the application of the simulation easy to control was considered an 
advantage as this allowed the researcher to manage the simulation and yet 
capture the process as it unfolded. Copies of the cash flow and project were 
captured in each of the simulation runs and these are available in the 
appendix. The staged structure of the project, kept the simulation real, yet 
also allowed due concentration on each stage in the project, again making it 
easy to manage. In summary, the structure of the simulation was considered 
to be robust for practical application in a group setting and the choice had 
some key benefits in terms of realism and acceptance. 
 
Risk was introduced in the simulation from two directions to simulate real life. 
The participants were encouraged to identify risk for themselves and the 
facilitator (the researcher) introduced other, but equally realistic risks from a 
pool of risks to simulate the projects unforeseen risks. At the outset, the 
participants knew that unforeseen risks would be a dynamic of the project, 
which again is true to real life in that we all understand not all the risks 
captured in complex or even semi complex situations. 
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Running the sessions 
 
The first session was run in London at the offices of the engineering 
consultancy that had provided the six participants. The participants were a 
mixture of experienced senior engineers, middle and junior engineers 
(nominally two of each). Everyone however had more than two years of 
experience. The first simulation instance was run on 10th November 2009. 
The researcher facilitated the simulation capturing Spreadsheets of the 
finances as the simulation progressed. The Spreadsheets captured can be 
found in the appendix. The participants had no prior warning of the topic or 
any risk information relating to the simulation. 
 
The second session was also run in London at the offices of the engineering 
consultancy who again provided the six participants. Again, there was a mix 
of engineer grades and everyone in the room had more than two years of 
experience. This was a different consultancy to the first and none of the 
people involved had any knowledge of the first session run in November. To 
maintain consistency, again the participants had no prior knowledge of the 
risks that may emerge, nor were they given any indication of the risks 
emerging from the first simulation participants. This second instance of the 
simulation was run on the 18th January 2010. Again the session was 
facilitated by the researcher and Spreadsheets captured at points through 
the simulation to capture a snapshot of the finances and status of the 
simulation. Again these may be found in the Appendix. 
 
Meeting the Research Design points 
 
With sufficient structure built into the simulation a check of its design against 
the research requirements was undertaken. 
 
Would it be reliable? In running the simulation, it was considered possible to 
look out for overlaps where the participants mixed the simulation with real life 
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examples and anecdotes. If observed, this would be an indication of 
immersion into the simulation, which could in turn be taken as a strong 
indicator of reliability. The reasoning behind this being that to be reliable, the 
simulation had to elicit real reactions and if these reactions were elicited in a 
normal way, they would show themselves in a natural manner. The second 
and important test of reliability was to run the simulation twice with two 
groups of participants. Indeed some differences are bound to occur, but if the 
core results are the same, then the requirement for reliability would be 
satisfied. 
Would validity be easy to assess? Validity is difficult to demonstrate in any 
experiment, but again the proliferation of realistic comments and the post 
simulation question session could be used to establish if the participants saw 
this as a realistic simulation. If the simulation was judged to be realistic, then 
it is very likely that the reactions were realistic and the case for the validity of 
the results partially made. Validity of course will be helped by a degree of 
triangulation as similar results from another source would substantially 
strengthen the case for validity. 
 
Would the simulation yield any important research results? This was of 
course the big question, but it was not a difficult question. This is of course a 
direct test of the quality of preparation and ‗Grounded Research‘ thinking that 
went into the research ahead of selecting a simulation to test the work. With 
substantial background reading, supported by field observation and pre 
experiment validation (see Card demonstrations), the researcher was 
confident that good quality results would emerge and furthermore, there was 
an expectation of a high degree of consistency between the two simulations. 
Nevertheless, there was both the possibility of surprise results that destroyed 
the theories and surprise results that added refinement. On top of that and 
the worst outcome of all, would be inconclusive results that showed too much 
value had been placed on the simulation. 
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With this assessment completed, the simulation design was finalised on the 
basis that two simulations would need to be run to meet the level of rigour 
required. 
Simulation Results 
General Context 
 
The simulation experiment was run twice, both times with 6 people, 
experienced in the construction engineering domain. Two firms supported 
this research and a group of participants were formed from each firm. The 
simulations, one with each group were run on different dates. These firms do 
not work together, so there was a good degree of independence in the 
simulations and common ground was formed only by participation in the 
same industrial sector. Given these two groups were from the same area of 
the same industry, Industrial Clockspeed was the same and hence did not 
serve as a source of bias. 
 
For the rest of this results section, each group (one from each firm) shall be 
referenced as groups designated Group 1 and Group 2 accordingly. 
 
Each group were volunteers from a pool of employees from the same firm, 
so the individual participants in the groups knew each other well, ahead of 
their participation in the simulation. The results captured from the simulations 
have been distilled and organised in this thesis as a series of significant and 
meaningful paragraphs from the notes made at the time.  
 
While it may appear so in places, the time order of the results as they were 
generated was not preserved  as it was felt time order added no value and 
actually would reduce the readability, sense-making and hence value of the 
captured results. 
Result collection started from the very beginning of the simulation when the 
format and tasks were described to the participants. Result collection then 
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run right through the simulation until the researcher left the room. Notes were 
made during and after the simulation to capture the raw data. 
 
From the very start of the simulation the researcher was looking as to 
whether the participants were taking to the simulation as a real life exercise. 
For both simulations the topic material was judged to be aligned to their 
normal type of work of construction engineering, although the simulation was 
much simpler than anything they may normally deal with. Encouragingly all 
participants reacted positively to the exercise from the outset giving their full 
attention to the briefing, so the simulations started from a good attitude base. 
Minor comments and questions during the presentation of the exercise were 
also seen as positive indications of willing engagement. The researcher was 
particularly interested to see the degree of acceptance of the scenario after it 
was fully explained and the project plan had been presented, as it was 
expected that this would be the point at which the realism of the exercise 
would be challenged. The researcher was pleased to see both groups 
appeared to accept the simulation as a reasonable task, with a clear and 
reasonable goal. (The research questions and underpinning theories had not 
been presented at this stage to avoid bias).  
 
Later on in the simulation, it was noted with both groups that past 
experiences and significant outcomes from previous real world work 
outcomes were being shared between the individuals of each group in 
relation to the tasks built into the simulation. Examples where clients had not 
appreciated the value of preparation, examples where the unexpected had 
surprised people and experiences of working relationships (good and bad) 
with other disciplines all emerged from both groups. This was taken as 
indicating that the simulation had successfully linked into their previous work 
experience and hence a realistic mindset had been triggered and engaged 
by the simulation. With this type of exchange emerging during the simulation, 
the researcher concluded the results from the experiment would have 
substance and the results were considered to have at least internal validity. 
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Simulation performance 
 
Having had the simulation exercise presented, it was interesting to note that 
there was reluctance in both groups to start the first documented step of the 
simulation to arrive at the initial cost model for the construction. All 
participants were experienced in construction projects of far greater 
complexity, all were educated and the groups were teams of individuals who 
had worked together for more than a year, and in some cases, several years. 
What was apparent is that while anyone of them could have made a credible 
first step in such an easy project, each was waiting for the other to do so. 
 
As well as the cost model being built within the spreadsheets used to run the 
simulation, it was clear that both groups were building, within the group, a 
shared mental model of the construction project as well. The sharing of 
experience appeared to be an important part of this process as each shared 
anecdote seemed to shape how each small piece of the model was seen and 
presented to other group members. This process could be compared to the 
assembly of a mental jigsaw where the shared experience or anecdote 
served to shape and orientate the piece for the others and suggest a location 
for it to fit. No one directly challenged a substantial piece of the picture, but 
some contrasting views did metaphorically shape the edges or present it in a 
new light. New aspects (jigsaw pieces) were each initially introduced to the 
discussion in simple, relatively unrefined chunks. For example in one 
simulation, the testing of ground conditions was tabled as a way of mitigating 
risk from contamination and poor soil structure. This was further shaped by a 
comment that it was possible to miss spot contamination still, which could be 
an issue in this kind of construction so the risk was reduced not eliminated. 
Another example with one of the groups arose around the character of the 
builder. One created a view of this builder as the consummate professional, 
the type of builder who they deal with as part of their daily work on major 
projects, but this was moderated by other comments that a builder involved 
in a one off demolition and house build such as this may be, shall we say, 
less reliable and not so good at planning.  
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As the mental model developed so did the conversation and participation 
although in both cases some shared more than others and this degree of 
sharing nominally reflected the seniority of the individuals in the groups. The 
indications were that once the mental model, which seemed to be shared 
between the group members, grew in robustness and definition, so relative 
confidence grew within group members to share and contribute. This growth 
in activity cannot be associated with individuals meeting each other for the 
first time as they all knew each other well. It is thought the shared mental 
model served to reduce the likelihood of ‗missing the point‘ and appearing 
uninformed, even on this simple project. This is an important result as one of 
the tensions considered to be an issue with risk is between the subjective 
judgement required to assess a risk and the often unshared ‗importance 
criteria‘. 
 
While the project tabled for the simulation was well within the capability of 
each participant, it seems there was sufficient scope for risk and uncertainty 
for people to become exposed in the eyes of their peers.  Failure to correctly 
navigate and discern the risk appetite criteria being applied could lead to an 
individual feeling exposed and nobody wanted to rush into this position. The 
shared mental model appeared to be the vehicle of moderation of this 
tension, where people could gain confidence before sharing.  
 
As well as commonality in mental model building, both groups applied a 
strong staging process to their approach. Both looked to balance the model 
ahead of any risk evaluation, so no monies were borrowed from the bank 
and interestingly both groups aimed for much the same nominal ‗comfort 
level‘, one being £4k over funded and the other group £3k overfunded. In 
both groups getting this baseline into the project was important and several 
iterations of the financial model were tried until the desired result was 
achieved. No seed value had been given for overfunding, indeed no 
suggestion of over or underfunding as an approach was given, so this target 
value approach was totally emergent behaviour observed in both groups. 
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Having established what was perceived as a strong opening position, which 
meant no monies were borrowed from the bank, both groups then turned to 
risk. In some ways this was guided by the steps in the simulation, but it was 
interesting to note that while both groups knew this research was interested 
in the subject of risk and that risk would be introduced to the simulation in the 
next steps, both groups did not discuss risk in any level of detail when 
arriving at the degree of overfunding that was required. This was not a 
declared and discussed suggestion; it just worked out that way. It was as if 
the mental model each group had constructed was robust enough to allow 
for a ‗Rule of Thumb‘ approach to emerge. 
 
With the first risk stage of the simulation, more experiences were shared to 
develop the mental model that each appeared to hold as part of the process 
to arrive at the key risks. Areas of activity such as the planning, ground 
works and construction were addressed systematically, but not in the same 
order by both groups. Each group also appeared to place different weighting 
on the importance of the areas under consideration. The discussion held was 
also wider than the explained scope of the project and indications were that 
this was fuelled by a degree of suspicion that part of the simulation was 
hidden.  
 
As the risks were shared, discussion focussed on how and whether the risks 
were already mitigated, needed mitigation or could be tolerated. This initial 
discussion was linked to the risk identification stage in both groups preceding 
the point where the facilitator gave the pricing for mitigation. There was also 
some discussion about probability, but most of this discussion was around a 
binary ‗will hit/ won‘t hit‘ approach rather than a detailed discussion about 
likelihood, with one notable exception. This generally binary approach to 
probability could have been a function of the simulation, but comments made 
by individuals suggested this was more a reflection of the risk granularity 
being established in that too much detail needed to be avoided. 
 
 Page 145 
 
The notable exception was the idea that in judging whether to pay mitigation, 
the cost of the mitigation being offered should be directly related to the 
probability of the risk. This emerged in both groups as the issue and prices 
for mitigation were discussed and in each group from more active 
participants. Also in both cases, rules of thumb seemed to emerge where 
high cost of mitigation in the simulation and low probability in real life played 
a part. This is interesting as the probability of occurrence was to be decided 
by the roll of two dice, something that was in the simulation outline. The 
researcher saw this appeal to real life expectations as further evidence that 
the simulation was indeed triggering realistic responses from the participants.  
 
In respect to how the risks should be treated, one group was substantially 
more committed to risk transfer, either through insurance or by contractual 
obligation on the builder. This group, in response to the possibility that the 
ground investigation may miss ground contamination also favoured court 
action against the specialist contractor who they expected to employ to 
undertake the work. Interestingly, this leads to another observation which 
was the high degree of hands on management planned by both groups. This 
however is most likely to be the fact that both groups were experienced in 
this kind of work. Lay people would probably see the builder as taking more 
responsibility for job management. 
 
In one of the two groups, given the knowledge that other groups would 
participate in other runs of the simulation, there was a desire to obtain 
feedback about how successful they had been in relation to the other groups. 
While not a sentiment that helps us understand Risk Clockspeed, it does 
reflect an interest in the simulation which is encouraging. Had the simulation 
been considered a waste of time and uninteresting, it is felt that this 
comment would not have been made. 
 
When reviewing some of the comments and experiences being made by the 
first group, the view was formed by the researcher that to a degree, risk 
would be tolerated rather than addressed. Indications were that technical 
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information would be passed to inform, but even where there was possibility 
to misunderstand and make errors, there was no suggestion that secondary 
risk management activities would be undertaken to avoid the risk of error. It 
is unclear which aspects of the comments (that which was said or left unsaid 
even) led to this thought, as the simulation had not brought this out as a clear 
result; it was more of an emergent feeling. With the second simulation, it was 
decided that this may be investigated further in the post simulation 
discussion. 
Post Simulation Conversation 
 
When asked about the way the participants saw the risks, the universal view 
was that they were simply a bunch of risks differentiated mainly by cost but 
also by likelihood. Nobody identified the timing of the information availability 
as a differentiating factor. However, on further discussion and when the two 
risks of land contamination and mis-delivery of plumbing parts were tabled 
for comparison, the groups each accepted that the information availability 
was a discernable factor. 
 
With one of the groups the mis-delivery of plumbing parts was explored 
further. The fact that there are many plumbers merchants, so a source of 
replacements was likely to be available was identified, but this was clearly a 
response prompted by the line of enquiry. Until the problem was raised for 
discussion, this risk was simply accepted as a possibility. This raises another 
finding in that risks may be identified but not deeply investigated. Everyone 
was happy that there was a placeholder. Investigating the risk further, the 
cost of such a mis-delivery with Group 2, irrespective of fault was considered 
to be the builders reinforcing this group‘s tendency to transfer risk where 
possible. 
 
Another interesting factor shared by both groups was the desire to get prices 
fixed rather than minimised prices. The relationship appeared to be that a 
fixed price carried less risk than a variable price. Considered in context, this 
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seem to be part of the risk transfer process used extensively by Group 2, but 
on the agenda of Group 1 where the agreed ‗fixed price‘ is considered to 
include all risk as opposed to a minimised price where risk transfer may not 
be factored in. 
 
Following the emergent feeling about how risk was managed in this kind of 
industry. Where solving the problem was preferred over managing the risk; 
the postulation was raised with the second group by throwing it out as a 
theory that often, engineers prefer to solve a problem than manage the risk 
that gave rise to the problem. Two supporting ideas were also tabled; 
because the prospect of managing these class of risks by engaging in a 
verification with another party was unpalatable, and because engineers are 
taught and enjoy problem solving rather than risk management. From the 
reception the theories received, this does seem to be far from the truth. 
 
(Following this information on „Solve the problem not address the risk‟ came 
to light, further enquiry suggests this is indeed a possible problem driven by 
a lack of risk management culture. The concept was also tabled to the 
management of one of the companies involved at a follow up meeting and 
the management also accepted that this was a likely explanation for the 
currently experienced level of risk management maturity perceived within the 
organisation) 
 
The staging process of the simulation did structure the exercise and clearly 
did impact when people thought about the risks. This is arguably one of the 
downsides of the simulation as conducted. On the other hand, the discussion 
around risk that emerged while the ‗mental model building‘ went on showed 
that the structure had not fully constrained the groups. Part of the mental 
model was an implicit acceptance that everything had its time and its place. 
The site investigation had to come first, the risks associated with gaining 
access to the premises needed to be addressed before the demolition could 
take place, the risks associated with transportation were likely to be issues 
addressed at the time ‗cross that bridge when we come to it‘ attitude, even if 
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that particular expression was not used. In particular, this approach to 
transport delay risks demonstrated a natural recognition of Risk Clockspeed 
issues, however there was no overt discussion about  the clockspeed of the 
risk (in any language or terminology) so the opportunities to potentially 
mitigate those risks went un-discussed. 
Unspoken Results 
Not all the results from the simulation came from what was openly discussed, 
indeed from a Risk Clockspeed point of view, what was not said has proved 
to be an important result. Consider the risks identified by each group.  
 
Table 2: Group Risk Lists 
 
Group 1 Risk List Group 2 Risk List 
Material cost increase Asbestos is found on site 
Labour costs increase Risk of access injury 
Unforeseen including contamination Ground contamination 
Local Authority Regulation Soil mechanics poor 
Vandals Contractor goes bust 
Loss of partner in scheme Syndicate member pulls out 
Bad weather acts of God Time of connection for utilities 
Loss of contractor 
 
 
 
Each of the risks identified are substantial and there are some risks to cover 
the same issue in both lists. The lists are themselves not surprising and the 
fact that the groups have been able to home in on these obviously key issues 
illustrates their expertise in this field. From a Risk Clockspeed perspective, 
substantial value would be gained in dealing with some of these risks by 
managing the context such as managing the partnership, connection of 
utilities, weather and vandalism; however this method of mitigation did not 
arise in any of the discussions. Indeed, it was openly acknowledged in the 
post simulation discussion that there was no distinction for the risks based on 
the time availability of the information. This is not to say that no efforts would 
be made to manage the context, in that there is likely to be some deterrence 
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for vandals in the form of fencing and natural barriers such as hedges to 
prevent easy access. There would also be some acknowledgement of the 
weather, this was discussed and is clearly seen as a natural hazard that 
must be tolerated and where possible planned around. But this falls short of 
the Risk Clockspeed concept of due consideration of when the information 
necessary to manage the risk becomes available.  
Assumptions and Expectations 
 
Within the scope of the unspoken results, it was obvious that there were in 
fact more than just heuristic methods and past experience being used to 
speed the analysis of the scenario and in the construction of the mental 
model. There were a number of assumptions being made, for example about 
relationships between the developers (the team) and the builder who would 
be employed. These assumptions are a manifestation of both expectations 
and experiences. This is not an unexpected result, indeed, it is an obvious 
result given the Card Demonstration described earlier. The capture and 
assessment of assumptions is also accepted practice within some 
organisations for the management of risk as Assumptions can generally be 
re-written in a form that describes a risk. 
 
Woven within the response and behaviour of both teams was a network of 
Expectations, even down to how the simulation should be run. The fact that 
the most senior people took the lead has already been documented, but this 
can be looked upon from the more junior people as an expectation that the 
more senior people will lead. The junior people expected the senior people to 
take the lead and this affected their behaviour as they waited for the initiation 
of the mental model building to take place, even though the simulation was 
well within the competency of even the junior members. If we consider the 
topic of simulation and the mental model itself, it was clear that there were a 
number of expectations that could be used. For example, the builder was 
cast as either ‗the professional‘ or, the builder as ‗the unprofessional‘, the 
‗manage on the day‘ stereotype. The decision came from the discussion, 
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itself based on expectations in respect to which type of builder would bid for 
which type of work. 
Degree of Correlation 
 
While both groups exhibited slightly different emphasis, with one favouring 
risk transfer more than the other which tended more towards more risk 
sharing, the degree of correlation in terms of problem approach, shared 
model building and style of control was substantial. Style of control was 
expected to be similar, as both groups operated in a job control environment 
and the methods of control are pretty much industry standard. What was 
more surprising was the degree of correlation on items such as attitude to 
risk, the similarity in buffer amounts, the staging and group work dynamics. 
The correlation between risk lists is also quite interesting in that both groups 
identified Contamination, failure of the contractor to complete the work and 
loss of a syndicated partner. The first group did not go down the path of cost 
risk being allocated to the contractor where the second group did and this 
accounts for the differences around price changes. However both groups did 
acknowledged that cost change risk was likely. 
Effects of Simulation Structure 
 
Given a simulation is not real life, it is reasonable to examine the impact bias 
and simulation structure may have had on the experiment. 
 
The staged approach of the simulation may have led to the staged approach 
to the tasks taken by the participants. Both groups balanced the books 
without too much discussion about risk and then proceeded to contemplate 
the key risk list. That said, there is no evidence to suggest that this staging 
influenced the determination of the risks and from consultancy experience 
and the natural way both groups fell into this pattern, the approach did not 
seem to be far from the normal working pattern. 
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The restriction around identifying around 8 key risks around the project was 
indeed a limiting factor, brought about by time and the limits of expectation 
the researcher could put on the participants as a full risk list would have been 
a substantial undertaking. On the other hand though, asking for 8 to 10 risks 
does appear to have focussed minds and each risk identified in substantial. 
 
The limitation to tolerate, treat or transfer of the risks is artificial as there are 
other strategies that could have been considered such as take or terminate. 
However, take may be considered as close enough to tolerate for these 
research purposes without introducing problems. Consequently, there is little 
or no bias attached to this simplification and the experiment‘s validity is 
determined by how the Groups saw the risk treatment as opposed to whether 
risk treatment takes place or not. 
 
The greatest weakness of the simulation appears to be in depth. While the 
participants entered into the spirit of the simulation, there was no build and 
the participants knew this was a limited time simulation to support research. 
Had this been a real development, the risks would have probably been 
discussed more and the actual treatments discussed in a lot of detail, 
particularly where costs was an issue. While the general finding of how the 
set of risks was perceived is considered valid, the discussed details of 
managing those risks within the simulation are considered to be weaker than 
the real world situation. For this reason, conclusions drawn around the detail 
of mitigation may be considered as limited. 
 
To conclude the section on the Simulation, the two aims (reproduced below) 
given at the beginning of the Simulation section should be revisited. 
 
So aim 1 is to look for natural application of Risk Clockspeed thinking or 
technique. 
 
So aim 2 is to observe what natural decision making methods are applied. 
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No substantive evidence was found for naturalistic Risk Clockspeed thinking, 
although this cannot be considered as a proof as this is positive proof 
problem, in that a further study may demonstrate such thinking in the future. 
Nevertheless, the fact that no evidence was found does indicate there may 
be management value here in simply highlighting this view. 
 
Natural decision making methods were in evidence and are extensively 
documented in the write up above. The value, centricity and development of 
the Mental Model is perhaps the most important element of natural decision 
making as observed in these simulations.  
The Case Study: The Crash Landing of BA038 
 
Just before 12.52 on the 17th January  2008, a Boeing 777  aircraft was 
making a normal decent into Heathrow airport. Local conditions at Heathrow 
were good and the journey had been until then had been uneventful. The 
aircrew, unaware of the situation that was about to unfold, were following 
normal procedures and the Co-pilot had just taken over the plane controls 
ready to land the plane.  
 
Around 50 seconds before touchdown, the crew noticed there was an 
unprecedented loss of power on both engines. This was the starting event of 
a disaster, which would lead to the total loss of the aircraft, but fortunately 
not the loss of a single life. Given the short time between starting event and 
crew actions, this recent disaster, from which several heroes emerged is 
considered an excellent case study for this grounded theory research study 
into Risk Clockspeed.  
What makes this a good case study? 
 
In nearly every case the situation in disasters is a highly complex picture, the 
key features of which emerge over an extended period building over weeks, 
months or even years. The public inquiries that follow generally find a whole 
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series of sub failures that led up to the final catastrophic situation, each of 
which had become normalised into the working pattern and contribute to the 
final disaster. This is the pattern identified by researchers such as Turner 
and Perrow both of whose works are covered in the literature review of this 
thesis. When the actual disaster unfolds, the actions of individuals reacting to 
the catastrophe would certainly be of interest to Risk Clockspeed research, 
but this type of data is sometimes a small part of the larger inquiry process.  
 
Denscombe (Denscombe, 2007, p. 39) identifies a key point in the selection 
of a Case Study which we need to heed here. He says 
 
„A case study should be chosen deliberately on the basis of the specific 
attributes to be found in the case – attributes that are particularly significant 
in terms of the practical problem or theoretical issue that the researcher 
wants to investigate.‟ 
 
Denscombe 2007 
 
In this example, the inquiry initially focussed in what happened in the cabin of 
BA038 during the final 50 seconds before the final impact of the aircraft 
before turning to the fuel system which was finally held up as the cause of 
the disaster. This initial focus on the cockpit activities along with ‘to the 
second‘ timing was at least in part due to the recognition that this could have 
turned out so much worse if the aircraft had come down a mere 350 metres 
shorter. This short distance of 350m was critical, as the aircraft passed over 
a petrol station and the surface entrance to Hatton Cross tube station as the 
critical stage of this accident unfolded. Given this important pre impact 
element to the situation, the detail captured about the actions carried out in 
the cockpit was key to the inquiry. In addition, the cross validation of those 
actions available from radio and flight deck recording, means this case 
provides a substantial amount of high quality data to work with. 
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The important details from the report 
 
The following information was drawn from the Air Accident Investigation 
Report (Sleight & Carter, 2010) 
 
On discovery that the aircraft lacked power, the aircrew, Capt Peter Burkill, 
Senior First Officer  John Coward and First Officer Conor Magenis found 
themselves in an intense and unquestionable Fast Risk Clockspeed 
situation. Air crew training did not cover emergencies such as this at the low 
height this aircraft was at when this situation unfolded. At only 500 ft the 
considered expert opinion was that the opportunity to manage the situation in 
such circumstances is considered unrealistic and so training at this height for 
power loss was not seen as a useful exercise (a situation that has now 
changed). 
 
The other important detail from the Risk Clockspeed point of view was that 
there was no time to sit down as a team to debate the options. There were 
no easy exits or stop buttons to press that could arrest the situation, clearly 
the aircraft was going to crash? Yet as this case shows, there were clearly 
choices to be made and actions to be taken, each of which involved the 
almost instant assessment of risk. 
 
At the point at which the situation started to unfold, the aircraft was 2 miles 
from touchdown. Ahead of the aircraft, potentially in the crash zone, were 
Hatton Cross Station and a Petrol Station on one of the roads near the 
airport. Given the current rate of decent (1800ft/min) caused by the lack of 
power, Capt Burkill had estimated the initial crash point would indeed be on 
or around the tube station and or, the petrol station. In his testimony on the 
accident, Capt Burkill said he viewed that as a 100% casualty situation and 
of course there was a high prospect of significant ground casualties as well. 
While pilot training may not explicitly deal with situations unfolding this close 
to ground, power loss is one of the situations covered in training. In addition, 
the pilots of course could readily access and use the personal experience 
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they had built up over many hours of operation with this aircraft. In a normal 
situation of this kind at height, where time allowed, normal procedures were 
that the Co-pilot would take over the flying of the aircraft while the Captain 
tried to determine and rectify the causes of the problem using a series of pre 
determined drills. In this case however, three things were clear to the crew: 
The plane was going to crash. There was insufficient time to run the normal 
drills: Without action, the crash in a populated area and a high number of 
ground as well as aircraft resident casualties could be reasonably expected. 
 
Because of normal landing procedures, the Co-pilot was already in position 
having taken over when the aircraft was at 800ft and was piloting the aircraft 
for the approach; so in terms of ‗normal process‘ for emergency situations, 
this one condition was fulfilled. This was indeed good fortune as, Capt Burkill 
was actually free to take in the situational information and react almost real 
time without the distraction of the primary aircraft controls. Had a transfer of 
control been necessary, a few seconds would have been lost in a situation 
that unfolded in around 57 seconds. 
 
Significantly from  a Risk Clockspeed point of view, there was no time for 
debate and in fact records show there was little communication at all past the 
point where the Co-pilot had communicated to the Captain that he had 
recognised the unexpected had emerged with the words; ‗Pete, what‘s it [the 
plane] doing, I can‘t get any power?‘ (Recalled by Capt Burkill in BBC 
Interview Feb 2009). Also of significant interest from the Risk Clockspeed 
perspective is the fact that the action of adapting the flaps setting, which was 
the key avoidance action in this situation, was considered as a non standard 
response to a power loss scenario.  
 
Reducing the flaps meant the aircraft needed to fly faster to prevent a stall 
which is when the aircraft stops producing sufficient lift so fails to remain in 
true flight and falls from the sky uncontrollably. This situation certainly had to 
be avoided at all costs as all hope of control ends at the point of stall given 
the aircraft was so close to the ground.  
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The warning systems on the plane had given an initial stall warning which 
indicated the plane was close to its minimum speed to prevent a stall, but in 
evidence Captain Burkill said he felt he knew the aircraft sufficiently to take 
this action. Specifically he referenced his twelve years experience with this 
aircraft type. Given the consequences of the stall, this was a serious decision 
that could quite easily have proved to be a wrong choice. As it turns out, it 
was this choice that sets Capt Burkill out as a hero. Examination of the 
factual data on stall speeds and the speed of the aircraft quickly, shockingly 
and impressively shows how little margin there was on this decision. At the 
point 10 seconds before touchdown, the stick shaker operated giving the 
speed margin on the stall to be about 4kts. At 27 seconds before touchdown, 
over the vulnerable areas, the margin was little better, at no more than 29 
kts. 
Key statistical data, factual information and performance 
expectations for the aircraft 
 
The following information covering the period of interest here was derived 
from the official air accident report EW/C2008/01/01 Section 1 – Factual 
Information. 
 
The aircraft involved was a Boeing 777-236ER powered by two RB211 Trent 
895-17 turbofan engines. This is a ‗Fly by wire‘ aircraft which means the 
pilots controls are interpreted by a computer system that then modifies the 
aircrafts engine and air surface controls to achieve the desired changes. 
 
Injuries: One person was recorded to have had a serious injury (leg fracture). 
151 people were recorded as having no or minor injuries. 
The flight time experience in each case in this class of aircraft was significant 
and given as: 
 
Capt Burkill (Commander): 8,450 Hrs 
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Senior Co-pilot ( Operating): 7,000Hrs 
 
Distance from runway when the situation became known: 2 miles 
 
Theoretical stall speeds for this type of aircraft with loading and distribution in 
place at the time: At FLAP 30: 104 kts. At FLAP 25: 106 kts.  
Situation timeline 
 
The following timeline information covering the period of interest was derived 
from the official air accident report (Sleight & Carter, 2010)  
 
EW/C2008/01/01 Section 1 – Factual  
Information pages 4 and 5. 
 
Aircraft was fully configured for landing with no abnormal situational 
awareness at 1000ft (83 Seconds from touchdown) with FLAP 30 selected. 
Co-pilot took over the control of the aircraft at 800ft in accordance with 
normal procedures 
 
After initially responding to controls, at 720 ft (57 Seconds before touchdown) 
the thrust from the right engine reduced. At 50 Seconds before touchdown, 
the left engine thrust also reduced. Both engines were producing thrust at 
slightly above flight idle level, but below that required to compensate for the 
increased drag caused by the landing gear and FLAPS 30 setting, as both of 
these cause significant drag through air resistance.  
 
At 48 Seconds before touchdown, the Co-pilot noted the thrust levers had 
begun to split (indicating a thrust differential)  
 
Approach was judged to be and announced as stable (*just) in the cockpit at 
34 seconds before touchdown. (*‘Just‘ was the comment heard from the Co-
Pilot at the time the declaration was made) 
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At 27 Seconds before touchdown, the Co-pilot noted that the airspeed had 
dropped below the 135 kt mark which is the accepted minimum for safe 
landing. 
When the speed had dropped to 127 kt, the automatic ‗Airspeed low‘ warning 
sounded, which is a safety feature of this aircraft to protect against simple 
human error. In this case however, it just reinforced the criticality of the 
situation and a few seconds later, Captain Burkill changed from FLAPS 30 to 
FLAPS 25. 
 
10 Seconds before touchdown, the stick shaker operated. This is a physical 
warning device that is a final warning of a stall, which physically shakes the 
main control held by the pilot and in response the Co-pilot pushed forward 
the stick, which changes the aircraft‘s attitude and would normally increase 
the airspeed.  
 
The aircraft touched down 330 m short of the runway and 110m inside the 
perimeter fence of the airport. 
Background of Air Crew Training 
 
Flying aircraft is a recognised skill and because aircraft visit other countries 
the rules and regulations governing pilots and airlines are similar around the 
world. After the initial pilot training programme, which provides the pilot with 
the right to fly passenger aircraft of a particular type, a layered approach to 
training and monitoring takes over. The number of operating hours each pilot 
accrues is recorded and used as a measure of experience. This is broken 
down to hours of flying and as hours on the particular type of aircraft. When 
transferring to another aircraft type, even pilots with many hours of flying 
must undertake training on the new type. If a pilot does not fly for a period of 
? days, even if they have a long history on an aircraft type, they must 
undergo a refresher course in a simulator before operating again. On top of 
this strict training programme, some senior pilots progress to a ‗check flight‘ 
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role, where they operate alongside qualified pilots with less experience and 
constructively comment to help develop the skills of those pilots. 
 
Other than the training described, which ensures a high standard of normal 
operation, advanced training simulators, which mimic many essential 
behaviours of the aircraft are used to train pilots for emergency conditions. 
Situations such as single engine loss, power loss and failure of some 
avionics systems are all practiced in safe conditions. Pilots are expected to 
react to these emergency conditions in prescribed ways called ‗drills‘. These 
drills have a diagnosis element to ensure that the pilots are reacting to the 
right conditions and so do not make an emergency situation worse. Pilots are 
expected to undergo repeated simulator training sessions periodically, so 
these ‗drills‘ remain fresh even though the conditions trained for are 
reassuringly rare.  
What does the Training Cover? 
 
This section is not an authoritative guide to recovering a plane that is out of 
control, but a short peek at the kind of guidance and training that crew 
receive in managing aircraft in emergency situations. This section is 
deliberately short and high level. The aim is just to set the scene for how 
these situations are viewed by the industry. 
 
Situations where the aircraft is not performing as it should be, or where the 
aircraft is not ideally configured to fly properly are considered to be ‗Upset 
Aircraft‘ situations according to the Boeing Airplane Upset Recovery Training 
Aid Revision 1 2004 (Boeing & Airbus, 2004). Specific named conditions for 
aircraft upset are (Page 2.1): 
 
 Pitch attitude greater than 25 deg, nose up. 
 Pitch attitude greater than 10 deg, nose down. 
 Bank angle greater than 45 deg. 
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 Within the above parameters, but flying at airspeeds inappropriate for 
the conditions. 
In the case of BA038, given the engine problems, the aircraft, while within 
the angular parameters, was dangerously low on airspeed for the approach 
and so falls into the final category. 
 
The same training guide recognises the ‗infinite variables that comprise 
upset situations‘ and points out that the industrial group behind the training 
guide unanimously agrees that simulator testing may lead to negative 
learning situations. So that training remains positive the focus in simulator 
exercises and training is on developing skills to recognise why the aircraft is 
upset and where possible, correct for the conditions to re-establish stable 
controlled flight. For this reason, the simulator exercises associated with this 
set of ‗Aircraft Upset‘ conditions focuses on recovery action, but importantly 
assume the aircraft is fully functional. 
 
Section 2.5.5.11 deals with ‗Flight at Extremely Low Airspeeds‘. The focus in 
the guide is on the danger of the ‗Stall‘ where the aircraft loses lift. The 
aerodynamic features of this situation are described and the recommended 
action is to change the angle of attack and ‗use whatever aerodynamic 
forces are available to orient the airplane so that a recovery may be made 
when sufficient forces are available‘. In the words the document appears to 
be avoiding, nose down and dive. 
 
As well as the low airspeed and the condition of stall, Captain Burkill and his 
team also had to deal with the lack of power and drag. In this area, the guide 
comments on the three states of ‗energy‘ that the plane can have. 
 
1. Kinetic Energy, which increases with airspeed 
2. Potential Energy, which is proportional to altitude 
3. Chemical Energy, from the fuel in the tanks. 
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In the case of BA038, it is known that the chemical energy was limited, so 
Captain Burkill and his team had to conservatively use the Kinetic Energy 
(airspeed) and Potential Energy (from the decent). In the same chapter 
(2.5.2) The guide helpfully points out that it is the chemical energy that is 
used to overcome the drag on the aircraft which is exactly what the crew of 
BA038 could not do. So in book terms, BA038 should dive to recover 
airspeed, but clearly at 500ft and with a tube station below, this was not a 
sensible option. 
Results from the interview 
 
As part of the primary data collection, Captain Peter Burkill was interviewed 
for the research on the 30th April 2010. This interview provided an insight into 
the process of analysis and decision that Captain Burkill followed during the 
incident. (Note: The account of the accident recalled during the  interview is 
referenced against the early pages of the book written by Peter and Maria 
Burkill ‗Thirty Seconds to Impact‘ (Burkill & Burkill, 2010), where the events 
of the accident are described) 
Background to the Case Study 
 
According to Capt Burkill, pilots are taught that there is no such thing as an 
emergency in the sky as there is always time to correct flying 
inconsistencies. Pilots are taught a process which has the acronym DODAR: 
Diagnose, Options, Decision, Action and Review. The expectation being that 
air crew will use the standard checklists provided as part of the aircraft 
operating procedures to diagnose the problem. The crew would then discuss 
the corrective options and make a decision, the decision is actioned and then 
the crew review the results of their action. If the action does not give the 
expected results, the process is re-run. For situations that happen to fast for 
DODAR, such as a fire in an engine as the aircraft heads down the runway, 
standing orders exist such that no cockpit decision is required. The 
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assumption underpinning all this of course, is that all possible emergency 
situations that can be rectified have been covered. 
 
Checklists play an important part in the DODAR practice. Some checklists 
are provided by the aircrafts computer systems in response to problems 
diagnosed by the aircrafts own systems. Other checklists require the crew to 
identify the symptoms and to call up the correct checklist for themselves. The 
examples given in the interview were smoke in the cabin and quite topically 
for the recent problems in European airspace, the smell of sulphur which 
would lead the crew to pull out their Volcano checklist. 
 
Following the BA038 incident, DODAR has been modified within British 
Airways to include Time so the acronym used is now TDODAR, assess how 
much Time there is first. 
 
In discussing the timing of the incident, the view expressed was that if the 
engine problem had emerged 2 minutes before landing, the crew would have 
been able to keep the aircraft ‗clean‘ in its decent and not relied on the 
engines to overcome the drag as the aircraft would have had the benefit of 
speed (Kinetic energy) to use. If the engine condition emerged at 15 
Seconds before touchdown, the aircraft would have easily made it to the 
runway. So while the outcome of this incident in human life terms was 
remarkable, the timing of the engine failure was poorly timed for the crew. 
 
In response to the question, ‗Would you have approached the problem 
differently if there was only 15 Seconds‘, Capt Burkill replied, he would not as 
the action taken was the only viable option. 
Problem Analysis and Cockpit Actions 
 
When Senior First Officer John Coward first declared he had no power 
(Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 14), Captain Burkill turned to the instruments. The 
Senior First Officer had the best ‗feel‘ of the plane as he had his hands on 
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the controls, Captain Burkill explained that as a pilot, even when travelling in 
the cabin as a passenger, a pilot can feel how a plane is performing. By 
turning to the instrumentation, Captain Burkill was looking to start the 
process of diagnostics from the best source of information he had. He had 
already identified that this was a non standard scenario and none of the 
Checklists that are normally used, was applicable. Captain Burkill explained 
that the readings on the instruments were confusing. It was clear full power 
was being requested from the controls, but the power readings on the 
gauges for engine output displayed minimal output.  At this stage Captain 
Burkill explained, that as the aircraft makes its approach, the aircraft systems 
suppress the unimportant warning signals, Captain Burkill was puzzled that 
he had not heard the ‗engine fail‘ warning, but the instrumentation was 
indicating minimal engine output? For a moment, he wondered if the engine 
fail warning had been suppressed, but having quickly dismissed that thought, 
he still did not have a reason for why the engine warning was not sounding. 
 
At this point First Officer Magenis verbalised what Captain Burkill was 
thinking, which was that they had suffered a double engine failure (Burkill & 
Burkill, 2010, p. 15) and that had a galvanising effect, because at that point, 
Captain Burkill felt they were all on the same page and that it wasn‘t just 
himself contemplating this prospect. Captain Burkill also recalled that this 
was the point where he knew the plane would crash. 
Captain Burkill‘s immediate reaction was to reach for the ignition (Burkill & 
Burkill, 2010, p. 16) and he remembered being frustrated that it was a Rolls-
Royce engine set which did not have the continuous ignition of other 
manufacturers. Still confused by the readings and lack of warning he fired 
the ignition anyway as a quick response; this did not restore power, so 
Captain Burkill deepened his analysis, snatching elements from various 
checklists, but basically thinking on his feet (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 16). 
 
At this point, Senior First Officer Coward flagged up that the throttles were 
‗splitting‘. This is where the two throttles, one for each engine, had separated 
so each engine was being asked to provide a different amount of thrust. At 
 Page 164 
 
the time, Captain Burkill assumed that this was a normal reaction of the auto 
pilot to the gusty wind conditions, however now it is recognised as one of the 
symptoms for the kind of fault that was manifesting on flight BA038. 
 
In diagnose and react mode, Captain Burkill worked systematically through 
the controls, convinced by the symptoms that he was dealing with a fuel 
problem (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 17). Ignition was followed by fuel pumps, 
cross flow valves between the tanks and finally the fire systems. Clearly 
nobody had pulled the fire controls as part of the approach, but Captain 
Burkill was running out of option, so no matter how unlikely, he felt he 
needed to check and pressed down on the controls in case they had ‗Popped 
up‘.  
 
By this time, the throttles had levelled up as expected. While this appeared to 
Captain Burkill as a good sign, it was not just an evening up of power as 
expected, it was the second engine rolling back to the same minimal level as 
the other. 
 
Asked if the small time window was hampering his thought process, Captain 
Burkill suggested he did not feel that it was. 
 
At this point, the low air speed warning sounded in the cockpit (Burkill & 
Burkill, 2010, p. 18). This surprised Captain Burkill because he had started to 
believe that the warning system had ‗gone to sleep‘ as it had not warned 
about the double engine failure (It is now known that the engines had not 
failed, which is why the warning sounder had not operated, the icing of the 
fuel pipes had causes the engines to roll back to idle speed, so while they 
had not failed, they were also not giving anything like the expected thrust) 
 
When the low airspeed warning sounded, Captain Burkill looked out of the 
window and from his experience as a pilot in this aircraft type, he could see 
the crash point was in the region of Hatton Cross, where there is a rail station 
and a Petrol station (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 19). Captain Burkill reasoned 
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at that point that the crash would be a total fatality situation for those on the 
aircraft and there would also be ground casualties to consider. It was at this 
point that Captain Burkill changed strategy, giving up on the engines and 
focussing on the issue of air drag which was causing the decrease in air 
speed (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 21). 
 
Captain Burkill‘s first thought was the drag caused by the wheels which is 
substantial. This option he quickly rejected as not only is the ‗gear down‘ 
necessary to absorb some of the impact when the crash happened, but 
opening the landing gear doors would greatly increase the drag for a number 
of seconds and the aircraft could not stand more drag (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, 
p. 21). The second and indeed only other option was to consider the flaps 
(Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 21). 
 
The flaps were set at Flaps 30, which had been selected by the Senior First 
Officer before the onset of the incident. This was a high setting but consistent 
with the gusty conditions, as it allowed for a slower, more controlled landing, 
providing there was thrust from the engines of course to overcome the high 
level of drag caused by a Flaps 30 setting. 
 
In training simulators, pilots are taken to the point of stall so Captain Burkill 
had a subjective feel for the limits of stall with this kind of aircraft. Using that 
‗inbuilt model‘ he decided he could change the flaps to Flaps 25, which would 
reduce the drag and he could leave Senior First Officer Coward to fly the 
plane feeling for the edge of the stall. The plan worked and the aircraft made 
the airport boundary but fell short of the runway. Looking ahead, Captain 
Burkill judged that the crash point had moved and he re-estimated the likely 
fatalities at 50%. 
 
(It was noted during the interview that Captain Burkill was estimating the 
outcome, not in technical terms such as the speed or angle at which the 
aircraft would impact, but in % of casualties. When asked about this method 
of success measurement, it appears that this can be attributed mainly to 
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Captain Burkill‟s character as a people orientated person. It was clear he felt 
direct responsibility for the lives of his passengers and this came out in one 
of the video clips as „feeling the weight of the bars on his shoulder‟) 
 
Having made the flap change and with Senior First Officer Coward at the 
controls (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 15), Captain Burkill‘s mind went back to 
the Checklists and mental tools which formed a large part of a ‗normal‘ 
response to an air emergency. At 200 ft, Captain Burkill returned to his 
trained response and used PPP: Plane, Path, People. He reasoned he had 
done as much as he could for the plane, the path was also as good as it 
could be and Senior First Officer Coward was continuing to hold the plane on 
the edge of stable flight (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 22). When considering 
People, this was the appropriate time to advise the passengers and cabin 
crew to adopt the brace position. Captain Burkill contemplated whether to 
make that call. If this situation had happened at height, the cabin crew would 
have had a chance to brief the passengers on the correct brace position. In 
this incident, there had not been enough time for that process to be followed. 
In weighing up the decision on making the brace call, Captain Burkill 
remembered Kegworth, after which the recommended brace position was 
changed as the one in use at the time was considered to have increased the 
number of bone fractures in the survivors. Having considered Kegworth and 
the fact that passengers may well adopt the wrong brace position, Captain 
Burkill decided not to issue the Brace Call (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 24). 
 
Sliding across the ground, Captain Burkill became remembered the 11 
tonnes of fuel he had noted earlier when approaching London. While this had 
been a comfort then, it was now a fire hazard and while there was nothing 
Captain Burkill could do about it, the fact was now at the forefront of his 
mind. 
 
While Checklists form much of an aircraft‘s emergency procedures, to get to 
this point, Captain Burkill had, in his own words, engaged in ‗seat of the 
pants flying‘. Indeed, much of the interview was about actions he felt were 
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appropriate under the circumstances, but it was clear that the tools, 
checklists and training had been a part of that process. In response to a 
question over the role of Checklists in this situation, Captain Burkill said: 
 
„A lot of tools were popping into my head, some I couldn‟t use as there 
wasn‟t any time‟ 
 
Peter Burkill 30th April 2010 
 
Although, Captain Burkill acknowledged, some of the tools and checklists 
had been helpful during his handling of this incident, the emphasis here is 
clearly options, fast selections and importantly adaption, including merging 
ideas. 
 
At this stage the aircraft had crash landed and come to rest some distance 
from the normal landing point on the runway. In Captain Burkill‘s eyes, this 
was now back within the scope of his formal training and so the checklists 
were now applicable and specifically the evacuation checklist (Burkill & 
Burkill, 2010, p. 28). The circumstances in which this checklist would be used 
are very clear, so the list is simple, clear and printed on an Aluminium panel 
in the cockpit. All the crew had seen this list many times before and 
specifically Captain Burkill had 12 years of experience with this aircraft type 
(Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 20). Nevertheless, he felt obliged to read it to make 
sure he got everything right. In the interview, Captain Burkill acknowledged 
some degree of comfort factor in actually reading this checklist. The list splits 
in two and Senior First Officer Coward did one half while Captain Burkill did 
the other half. One notable incident was the setting of the parking brake 
which was an item on the list (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 48). To set the brake, 
the foot operated controls are pushed forward and a small lever is set. While 
the foot controls moved, the lever would not set and Captain Burkill 
acknowledges that he spent several vital seconds trying to accomplish this 
task which was on the list. These were important seconds as he should shut 
off the fuel to the engines, while Senior First Officer Coward set the fire 
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levers. As it turned out, Captain Burkill, delayed by the brake issue, shut the 
fuel off after the fire levers had been set (Burkill & Burkill, 2010, p. 48).  
 
Another interesting (from the perspective of this research) was that during 
the crash, Captain Burkill‘s ill fitting and slightly damaged headphone set fell 
from his head. In picking them up and reseating them on his head to make 
the evacuation control, he failed to set the switch to PA and broadcast his 
evacuation call over the Air Traffic Control radio channel (Burkill & Burkill, 
2010, p. 49). However, the checklist then requires the Captain to reset the 
radio to the Fire channel and to set the set to cockpit loudspeaker. In doing 
this, Captain Burkill heard the tower advise him that the call had been made 
in error and he was able to remake the evacuation call. 
At the end of the interview, Captain Burkill made an observation that many 
people make in accident situations where stress has been a factor. While the 
whole incident had lasted for no more than 50 seconds, to Captain Burkill, it 
had seemed much longer than that and he was surprised at how much he 
had covered in that short time. 
Conclusion of the BA038 investigation 
 
While it is of little interest from the perspective of Risk Clockspeed, having 
developed the case study it would be unfulfilling for the reader to leave out 
the key findings of the investigation. The investigation concluded that the 
reduction in power which led to the accident was from an icing effect in the 
fuel system causing a lack of fuel to reach the engines. The icing effect had 
been brought about by the sequence of conditions encountered flying from 
China, where the aircraft had left some hours before. No blame was attached 
to the crew, their actions were found to be exemplary and indeed their 
actions were clearly heroic in the face of significant personal danger. It is 
perhaps an indictment of society however, that after such a display of calm, 
good choice and flying skill, Captain Burkill should find his life battered by the 
press, culminating with an extended period out of work. 
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(The researcher would like to formally record his thanks To Captain Peter 
Burkill and his family for the hospitality, openness and substantial amount of 
time he gave to this interview at his home on the 30th April 2010) 
The Survey 
Analysis 
 
The survey of 19 questions is provided in the appendix.  
 
As covered in Chapter 4, interest is in the three perspectives of Competency, 
Expectation and Experience as these three perspectives are used in the 
models for Risk Clockspeed (note: Expectation is considered part of the 
Normalisation process in the Slow Clockspeed Model). The limit to the scope 
of analysis is documented in Chapter 4 and the focus is on the use or 
inference of the three terms. For the purpose of codification of results, it is 
considered important to at least describe how the judgement of a reference 
to one of the three perspectives has been made. 
 
Considering each term, any recognised synonym and how they may be 
legitimately used in conversation. Terms being as found and interpreted 
based on common dictionary definitions. The following structures have 
considered as justified uses for the codification: 
 
Table 3: Valid term usage 
 
Perspective Used as Comments 
Competency May be held by oneself, 
held by another, 
recognised in someone 
else, developed as the 
result of training or 
experience and 
demonstrated 
Equally, we should 
include the negatives for 
each of these where 
competency is not held, 
developed or 
demonstrated as this is 
still a reference 
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Expectation May be on oneself from 
others, held by oneself on 
oneself, held by a person 
on another person or 
group, the result of 
experience or the result of 
having seen a certain 
outcome 
It is recognised that an 
expectation can be 
developed as a result of 
competency or 
experience. In addition, an 
expectation may appear 
to be baseless, although 
this would be impossible 
to prove 
Experience May be gained by oneself, 
attributed to others, 
recognised by evidence, 
demonstrated through 
decision making, held by 
others and developed 
alongside the 
development of 
competency 
It is also to recognise the 
absence of experience in 
each of these forms 
 
A significant point to be made at this juncture is how rich the language is 
around these three terms and given the interaction between the terms, the 
vast range of possibility in how people may use and display the consideration 
of such terms in how they respond to questions. The codification therefore is 
somewhat subjective in that another person may re-codify the survey 
responses and conclude a slightly different numeric result. However, the 
expected error that may be introduced is considered insignificant for this 
research, as all that is required is to illustrate the terms are valid and 
frequently referenced and therefore justify their use in the models. Hence no 
inference is being drawn from the actual numbers; the result is in the scale of 
referencing. 
 
Each survey response was analysed to examine how frequently the 
respondent made reference to Experience, Competency or Expectations 
using any of the justified cases shown in the table above. Two of the 
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questions (18 and 19) were designed to give a little insight into the sources 
that the respondents may use to build and maintain their competencies, so 
as well as being included in the codification, a table to subjectively assess 
the value placed on two main ways of learning has been produced. 
 
Based on the type of research being undertaken (Phenomenological) and the 
scope of this enquiry, literature suggests a data saturation point may be 
achieved with 6 respondents. In all, 9 surveys were undertaken and all 
provided substantial positive results and so it was concluded that data 
saturation had been reached.  
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Results 
The following tables and graphs were drawn from the surveys after codification. 
 
Table 4: Codified Results by Question 
Analysis of Survey Results: By Question 
      
        Question Question Text Experience Expectation Competency Total by Question Aim 
1 
In consideration of your role in X as a Y, 
would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
2 1 7 10 Try to probe 
the nature 
of the role 
and the 
complexity 
associated 
with it 
2 
What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in 
your line of work? 
3 2 4 9 
3 
Do you find it easy to communicate the 
essence of what you do to people outside 
your industry? 
0 4 1 5 
4 What about communicating the subtleties of 8 8 5 21 
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what you do? What is most difficult to 
explain to people outside your industry? 
5 
When called to make your these judgement 
calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called 
to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
10 5 4 19 
Probes the 
availability 
and use of 
information 
6 
How do you fill in for missing information if 
it occurs? 
3 2 2 7 
7 
In practice, how frequently do you act based 
on indirect information?  
5 2 3 10 
8 
How do you make the call between having 
enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a 
judgement until you have more information? 
13 11 7 31 
9 
In what circumstances do you find it hard to 
make a good judgement call? 
7 6 2 15 
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10 
Have you ever been surprised by 
circumstances (arising, presenting 
themselves)? Can you describe that situation 
for me please? 
3 20 4 27 
 
11 
What do you consider to be important in 
terms of being a good Y? 
7 3 19 29 
Probes for 
Experience 
and 
Competency 
indicators 
12 
What do you think your (Customer, Client) 
thinks makes a good Y? 
7 4 3 14 
13 
Can you recall meeting someone in your 
industry who you or your (customers, 
clients) didn’t or wouldn’t respect? If so, 
what do you think they lacked? 
5 7 6 18 
14 
You have practiced as a Y for some years 
now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) 
Y? 
10 11 7 28 
15 
Are there any areas of performance where 
you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y 
2 2 8 12 
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could outperform you? 
16 
If you were recruiting for someone to work 
as a Y at your level, and you had just three 
bullet points on the advert, what would you 
require from a prospective candidate? 
5 2 11 18 
17 
When recruiting new staff, some 
organisations recognise the category of 
‘Qualified by Experience’ often abbreviated 
to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession 
where this is quite common. How would you 
defend QBE as a valid category in your 
industry? 
11 2 15 28 
18 
Do you consider it important to maintain 
your professional skills with formal 
academically based studies? 
0 3 5 8 
Sources of 
Experience 
and 
Competency 19 
Do you consider peer based learning through 
industry journals, conferences etc to be 
5 2 2 9 
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important? 
  
  
  Total 106 97 115 318 
  Average 11.8 10.8 12.8   
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Responses by question are also shown graphically as follows: 
 
Table 5: Codified Responses by Question 
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An analysis of the same data by respondent was produced to examine the distribution across the different roles held by the 
sample interviewed 
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Table 6: Results by respondent role 
Analysis of Survey Results: By Respondent 
   
      
Respondent Role Experiences Expectations Competencies 
Total 
References 
1 Financial Advisor 10 8 9 27 
2 Marketeer 21 21 16 58 
3 Chief Engineer 18 16 18 52 
4 Management Accountant 6 2 6 14 
5 Check Line Pilot 4 4 8 16 
6 Structural Engineer 9 5 9 23 
7 School Deputy Head 10 11 15 36 
8 Accountant 17 23 21 61 
9 
Banking Global Relationship 
Manager 11 7 13 31 
  
  Totals 106 97 115 318 
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Graphically, the Responses by Job Role were: 
Table 7: Codified results by Job Role 
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If we consider first the hypothesis from Methodology section. 
 
Hypothesis: Given the importance of Competency, Experience and 
Expectation, we expect widespread reference, description and 
acknowledgement of the importance these elements play in decision making.  
It can be clearly seen with the results obtained in the tables above and with 
the point of saturation having been reached that each of the terms were 
prolifically used or inferred across the range of roles interviewed. In all, 
across 9 surveys 318 instances of the combined terms were identified 
averaging 35 terms per interviewee. 
In response to question 10, which directly asked about being surprised (you 
can only be surprised if you had an expectation of an outcome) it is noted 
that 20 instances were recorded based on the codification criteria used. 
In response to question 11, which enquired about qualities that made 
someone good within the role of the interviewee, a strong correlation is 
noted with competency (19 instances). 
In response to question 17, which dealt with the issue of being qualified by 
experience rather than being qualified by formal qualification, a strong 
emphasis on competency and experience is seen and note a lack of terms 
that relate to expectation. This is considered significant in demonstrating the 
terms are representing different qualities and while they are often used in 
conjunction with each other, this is not reflecting confusion with what each 
term means. 
Similarly, for question 8, experience and expectation are seen as strong 
qualities in deciding if sufficient information exists for the decision to be 
made. Also to be considered is question 5, which examines the case where 
less than ideal information is held. Out of 9 interviewees, 8 said they often or 
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never had a full set of information and experience dominates in the 
responses given for question 5. Neither of these results are surprising and 
each serves to underline that differentiation between the terms, their 
meaning is widely understood and this seems to justify the value in 
separating them out within the models constructed and introduced in 
Chapter 3. 
Consider now the sources of learning that may be used to develop 
competency and in some ways experience in the form of learning from the 
experiences of others. 
Table 8: Important Sources of Learning 
    
  
Source of Learning 
Respondent Role Formal Study Peer Based 
1 Financial Advisor Yes Yes 
2 Marketeer Yes Yes 
3 Chief Engineer Yes Yes 
4 Management Accountant No Yes 
5 Check Line Pilot Yes Yes 
6 Structural Engineer Yes No 
7 School Deputy Head Yes Yes 
8 Accountant Yes Yes 
9 
Banking Global Relationship 
Manager Yes Yes 
    Although this is a small sample and in respect to the type of question being 
asked, this is not considered as statistically proven, it is none the less 
interesting that 8 out of 9 respondents appreciated formal learning and 8 out 
of 9 respondents felt that they could develop their own performance from 
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interacting with their respective peer groups. This suggests a high respect 
for both forms of learning. 
 Triangulation with the Simulation 
 
The results from the simulation centred on the concept of the ‗Shared Mental 
Model‘. It was found that the model to support the construction of the house 
at the centre of the simulation was quickly established and shared by the 
team members. With the results from the survey, it is established there is a 
high reliance on and centrality to Competency, Experience and Expectation. 
Within the simulation, all shared similar competencies, similar experiences 
and given the approach to generating the financial buffer, similar 
expectations. For example, when anecdotes were shared and what may be 
described as ‗stereotypes‘ for the builder who might be engaged were 
shared, all team members related to the anecdotes and shared in the 
stereotypical images. With this evidence, it is suggested that it is perhaps the 
strength of common competency, experience and expectation which allows 
the Shared Mental Model to be built and used so readily. 
Triangulation with the Case Study 
 
Peter Burkill made an interesting comment during the interview. While clearly 
in a situation in which he had a reasonable expectation that he might be 
killed, he said he felt the weight of the four bars on his shoulder. (The four 
bars of the Captain). He explained this in terms of the expectation he 
believed the passengers held for him as Captain, to do all he could despite 
and indeed because of the gravity of the situation.  Interpreting the 
significance of this in the Risk Clockspeed models, it is clear that the 
motivation of Expectation can, in certain circumstances, be a very powerful 
force. 
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As part of the interview set, one of the respondents was a serving check line 
pilot. That is to say his role was to fly with other more junior captains and first 
officers, instruct them and carry out checks of competency. One of the 
questions was whether a ‗Captain‘ could be qualified by experience and the 
response is very interesting. 
 
“Ok, would you like to take your wife and kids on holiday with a brand new 
pilot and nobody else in charge?” 
 
Check Line Pilot interviewee. 2011 
 
Clearly, experience is a highly respected additional element to competency. 
Limitations in the primary data capture 
 
While the primary data capture has given some good results and strategy of 
triangulation has worked well with several reaffirming themes emerging, it is 
important to remain objective and consider the limitations of the data 
collection now that the experiments are complete. 
 
In the literature review, some important System Dynamic work around 
complex feedback by Diehl and Sterman (Diehl & Sterman, 1995) was 
identified. This work raises questions about complex feedback and delay and 
the fall off of human performance when delays and feedback is complex. 
The simulation and case study have been unhelpful in exploring the role of 
complex feedback, when overlaid on Fast Risk Clockspeed situations. So no 
comment on whether these two effects are, additive, geometrically combined 
in their impact in some way, or even simply whether one effect becomes lost 
in the other, can be made. 
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Another limitation in the nature of the data collection, is that the simulation 
and the case study are quite process orientated. This has perhaps helped in 
providing good clear results and possibly an important factor behind the 
success found in the triangulation. But on the other hand, the research has 
not been able to investigate the Risk Clockspeed Lens in the area of social 
systems that deeply. The survey was an enquiry into how people perceive 
risk, but the scope was justifiably tight and did not explore the wider social 
drivers behind the terms the research survey was looking for. We could call 
upon the ‗Isomorphic‘ comparison technique, widely used in risk 
management by Toft in particular (Toft & Reynolds, 1997) to suggest that 
even in social systems, people will develop mental models and acquire 
experience and competencies in the same way, but we do need to be critical 
of this research work in this respect and identify it as a limitation of the study. 
   
A further significant limitation is recognised in the survey around questions 
18 and 19 which sought to establish the value placed on the sources of 
learning. While the results were overwhelmingly in support of both academic 
learning and peer based learning as valuable sources, it is recognised that 
the sample size was too small for this to be a fully validated finding in this 
research and is therefore only recognised as an indication of how a full, 
statistically significant survey may turn out. 
 
In terms of the research, like many research undertakings for Doctoral 
submission, there is the scale constraint that limits the scope of the study. 
Again, we can point to some good results and success in triangulation, so 
this is not an apology for the data that has been collected, so much as a 
recognition that this work has only just started to uncover this new area of 
Risk Clockspeed. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
What do we know now? A review of the new knowledge. 
 
With the Simulation, Case Study and Survey completed and the results 
recorded in terms of people‘s observed behaviour, there is a need to reflect 
on what we now know and how that new information builds on the existing 
knowledge derived from the literature. Then can then use that combined 
knowledge to develop a management response and reflect on how that may 
help organisations in the future. 
 
With the simulations, we were able to gather some good information about 
how people behave as individuals participating in teams and because there 
was two simulation instances run, it is possible to see what behaviours carry 
cross as shared behaviour and what forms distinct behaviour which may 
change from team to team. However, there is a need to be cautious from a 
research methodological point of view as two simulations can only give  
limited confidence in terms of those two classes of behaviour. 
The use of mental models 
 
Form the work by Perrow we know that when people engage with a situation 
they develop mental models of how that situation will unfold (Perrow, 1984, 
p. 27). We also know that while these mental models are limited (Simon‘s 
Bounded Rationality work), existing research also suggests it is human 
nature to initially interpret deviation from these models as ‗within the model‘ 
until there is overwhelming evidence that the model has been invalidated by 
events (Perrow, 1984, p. 27) and to some degree, James Reason‘s ‗strong 
but wrong‘  (Reason, 1990, pp. 54-55). Furthermore, we know mental 
cognitive powers are limited particularly where non linear interactions occur 
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(Dörner, 1997, p. 33). In summary therefore, mental models are common, 
but there are issues with their use. 
 
In the simulations, it was possible to confirm the use of these ‗mental 
models‘, but more than that the researcher was able to witness those models 
actually being formed and shared. While any of the participants could have 
developed the model, the initiation of the mental model to be used was left to 
the most senior people and it was only as the model took shape that 
subordinates started to contribute. In addition, the researcher saw how those 
models were built, through shared description and anecdote. This is 
important as it is the mental model of the future situation that people will be 
used to judge which risks apply and the consequences those risks may have 
on the organisations objectives. In addition, Jonassen (Jonassen, 1995) 
provides evidence that the ability to problem solve and the quality of learning 
is dependent on the form and quality of the mental model developed and 
used by the people involved. 
 
As well as the style of model construction, it was also noted that a staged 
approach to the scenario had been taken by both groups. Risk was not 
considered until an established baseline had been reached (around £3k - 
£4k) suggesting that mental model construction also takes place in stages. 
This staging allowed the group to move forward when they felt confident as a 
group. This can be described as a cue effect, where working on the problem 
needs to get to a certain point before the next aspect of that problem is 
introduced. 
 
Another factor, learned from the simulation, was that within the structure of 
the simulation, the assignment of probability was initially on a Hit/ No hit 
basis. This crude assessment of probability was universally accepted 
throughout the group without the need for discussion, indicating that there 
was a shared qualitative image of how refined (or unrefined) the model they 
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were all using actually was. We cannot be sure how co-ordinated that view 
was, as the simulation was not refined enough to determine this, but it is 
sufficient to notice that each group did appear to share a common view. 
 
When the simulation moved to mitigation costs, the binary Hit/No hit was 
judged to be insufficient and the group discussed each of the mitigations 
briefly. This may be seen as an attempt at refinement, however while this 
approach was quite sensible in the real world, the probability of impact in the 
simulation was decided by a dice. So we have a situation where the model 
they had built was at odds with reality and they chose to refine their model 
anyway. Existing research covered in the review of the literature suggested 
people interpret facts through the model they hold, but what we have 
identified here, is that a mental model can gain enough strength to command 
more attention than the real facts. This is a different, but equally 
compromising use of mental models which can affect people‘s performance 
in managing real time situations. 
 
When discussing the risks at the end of the simulation, it was clear that the 
risks that had been identified had not been considered from the perspective 
of the rate of information necessary to manage those risks. But more than 
that, the risks had not been considered in any great detail. What we appear 
to be uncovering is a process of layering, in that the risks as identified, could 
be seen initially as placeholders. 
From the survey, we have been able to establish the validity and 
independent recognition for the three terms of Competency, Experience and 
Expectation, justifying their role and place within the models drawn for Risk 
Clockspeed. 
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Verification from the case study 
 
While these are interesting results, it is important to seek some verification 
from the case study so there is assurance that the results found from the 
simulation were not a consequence of the artificial conditions imposed by the 
practicalities of running the simulation. That is one of the reasons why the 
research design method requires triangulation of the findings where possible 
with the case study. 
 
While it is a verification of the work already published by Turner and Perrow, 
it is interesting to note that the case study confirms their findings, at least in 
a small way. As the aircrafts warning systems had not sounded the engine 
failure warning and the crew‘s model of what was happening was that they 
were dealing with a double engine failure, the assumption was that the 
system ‗had gone to sleep‘ not that there was any supporting evidence for 
that assessment, nor was it likely, but it did allow Captain Burkill to fit the 
facts to his concept of what was happening. Similarly, when the engines 
started to shut down, first one, then the other it caused the levers that show 
engine thrust to separate. This was significant enough for Captain Burkill to 
note, but he attributed it to the autopilot compensating for the gusty wind 
conditions; which was not the case. 
 
We note from the interview that Captain Burkill clearly had a model of how 
the situation would unfold as he was predicting the point at which the aircraft 
would hit and he had in mind that both engines had failed. To his model he 
attached a measure of rating for the consequences, so he was using that 
model as a predictor of the future and he used the number of casualties as 
the yardstick.  
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There is evidence that Captain Burkill worked through stages of the 
unfolding situation, even though there were only seconds for him to act. 
Stage 1 was to assess the role everyone was engaged in, to decide if that 
was the best deployment for the crew. Having decided it was, he tried to deal 
with the engine problem and gave up when it was clear that the engine 
power was not going to be restored easily. He then addressed the next step 
in his model of what was unfolding, which was the high level of drag (in 
which he was successful). And only as the plane was sliding across the 
ground, did he return to consider the issue of excess fuel and fire as a cause 
of casualties. Even under extreme pressure, he did not try and multitask 
between the three serious issues. He prioritised and staged his approach to 
the problem. While the two situations of the simulation and the cases study 
are quite different, operationally, this does seem to match the staged 
approach used in the simulation.  
 
The second point drawn from the simulation was the crude use of probability 
to categorise the risks, which we took to be a qualitative assessment of the 
model itself. In the case study, Captain Burkill used the expected number of 
casualties as his yardstick for the scenario at each stage of the incident. 
Initially, he estimated 100% losses, after reducing the drag factor, he re-
evaluated to 50% and following the impact, he used an estimate of 25% 
casualties. Clearly, in both cases there is a subjective assessment of the 
accuracy being assigned, although we do not have enough evidence to say 
how that subjective assessment was arrived at in either the simulation or the 
case study? 
 
The third point drawn from the simulation was that no appreciation had been 
given to the rate at which the information necessary to manage the risk 
would become available. In the case study, the whole event was in Fast 
Clockspeed so there is no possible comparison to draw on this point. 
However, the fact that the participants confirmed it was not part of their 
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conscious thoughts around the risk environment, is in itself a strong result, 
so triangulation is perhaps less of an issue here. 
Lesson’s from the Case Study 
 
The role of the case study in this research has always been more than as a 
simple verification of the simulation and by its very nature, there are some 
findings exclusive to the case study that we should consider. 
 
In seeking to achieve the best outcome for the passengers the crew and 
specifically Capt Burkill were seeking the right path from a number of 
options. We have evidence to support the cognitive assessment in terms of 
the choice to abandon the engine restart in favour of seeking other courses 
of action, but we also have collected evidence of intuitive sorting, selecting 
and adapting based on the checklists. In the time pressured situation, we 
can see the rejection of the whole checklists and standard processes, such 
as the recommended action of diving to increase airspeed, but the adoption 
of some of the underlying principles; ‗if the aircraft lacks airspeed, it needs 
greater lift from the speed it has?‘ This whole process and the raw 
knowledge necessary for it to work, is a direct function of the training and 
learning process the crew undertook, but this ‗learning‘ is beyond the topics 
of any single lesson. The crew had learned to solve problems under 
pressure. 
What do we know now about Dual Process Theories? 
 
The literature review gave a substantial insight into the existence, form and 
role of the multiple processing modes. There has clearly been a lot of work 
carried out in this area and the literature review will certainly provide the bulk 
of the information needed. However, the case study has provided something 
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quite interesting which it is believed is new and certainly something that is 
important for this research work.  
 
In dealing with the unfolding incident, it is clear from the evidence that 
Captain Burkill was using both rational cognitive System 2 thinking and 
affective System 1 thinking. He quickly transitioned from one to the other 
throughout the incident and was not conscious of that transition at any point. 
Noting this and reflecting back to the simulations, it is clear that the 
participants in the simulation were doing the same. Risks were being judged 
affectively based on how unpleasant the consequences were thought to be, 
where as the funding was calculated quite rationally to the point where they 
discussed the margin of over funding they needed before moving onto 
assess the risks. This ability to flip seamlessly between modes of decision 
making, in a way that even group members are not troubled by, is perhaps a 
root cause of the problem we set out to investigate? 
 
As a general observation, in both the simulation and the case study, there 
appears to be no distinction given to ‗decision quality‘ assigned to either 
Affective (System 1) or Rational Cognitive (System 2) modes of thought. 
Each decision is judged on its merits and apparently not based on the 
mental process used to make that assessment. In perhaps the most exacting 
of examples, all of Captain Burkill‘s actions were driven by his Affective 
judgement of where the plane would come down and the consequences of 
that crash point. He placed a lot of trust in that affective judgement, although 
it is fair to acknowledge he had good experience of the 777 (12 years) and 
little option as this was not a problem he had chosen. On the other hand, 
had he not identified the initial impact point as a problem, he may have 
directed his efforts in a different direction? Indeed, even outside the scope of 
this research, it is hard to imagine affective judgement being applied in a 
more stressful or significant situation?  
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A role for expectations 
 
In the simulations, it was clear that many assumptions were being made, 
and this was an expected result consistent with existing practice. Without 
making assumptions, even the simulation would have taken far too long to 
run and if this was a real task, working without any assumptions would be an 
impossible task.  
 
However, the role of expectations is perhaps less considered and yet in Fast 
Clockspeed situations, more interesting. In the literature, review, the 
importance of expectations in context to risk management did not seem that 
important. None of the writers appeared to give it any significance, but in 
looking at how people react in real time or close to real time risks, the 
expectations they are working with will be very important. In the simulations, 
there were clearly expectations being made around the behaviour of the 
builder and stereotypical images were used to add richness to the mental 
model being used. In the case study, Captain Burkill made the observation 
that at certain times ‗He felt the weight of the four bars on his shoulder‘. This 
statement was investigated during the interview and found to be a reflection 
of the position he felt he had as the Captain and the weight of expectations 
he felt he carried as a consequence. Primarily, during the incident itself, the 
expectations of the passengers, rather than anybody else. And further to 
this, Expectations was demonstrated to be an important element of decision 
making through the survey. 
 
Within the experiments and case study, examples of both expectations 
applied (by the simulation participants) and expectations felt (By Captain 
Burkill) are found. We could also consider the expectations we place upon 
ourselves for our own performance and self satisfaction which clearly will 
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combine with the expectations others place upon us. Those we know of that 
is. 
Moderation and the ‘Feeling of Knowing’ effect 
 
The literature review covered some very interesting work by Koriat on the 
‗Feeling of Knowing‘ effect  (Koriat, 2000) (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). This 
is typified by the situation where you see a person‘s face; you believe you 
know the person and yet their name appears to just be out of reach. Often, 
we use that very descriptive expression ‗On the tip of my tongue‘ to express 
how close we feel to the answer and yet that name may elude us for hours 
and may never finally be recalled.  
 
We believe within the scope of this research, we have perhaps touched upon 
a close relative of this effect, where we deliberately suppress the knowledge 
of something we perhaps need to manage at some time in the sequence of 
events, but not necessarily at that moment, in order to deal with the current, 
more pressing issues (such as the excess fuel in the case study, or the 
effect of risks in the simulation)? This ability to suppress a path of thought 
demanding attention, is of course a double edged sword in that temporary 
suppression can be an advantage, whereas failure to recall and deal with the 
situation in due course, could be our undoing.  
 
Omodei and colleagues (Omodei, Wearing, McLennan, Elliott, & Clancy, 
2005), researching into information quantities, noted a similar suppression 
effect when researching experienced emergency managers over 
inexperienced managers. What they found was that the more experienced 
managers knew which information deserved their attention and which did 
not. They were also quite prepared to hold back informants with new 
information in order to give due attention to the information they were 
currently assessing. While this is not the same as ‗putting out of mind‘ as 
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observed in this research, the findings of Omodei and his colleagues are 
clearly related to our work. Within the case study, it is also seen that Captain 
Burkill dedicated time to analyse the situation, something that Tan describes 
as an ‗Element of Expertise‘ (Tan, 1997, p. 32) 
 
From the case study, it is also seen that the suppression of the fuel problem 
in order to deal with the higher priority problems of no thrust and high drag 
was so complete; the fuel load issue was not recalled until the plane was on 
the ground and Captain Burkill was as much at risk on that flight as everyone 
else.  
 
In writing about the Feeling of Knowing effect, the idea put forward by Koriat 
may be thought of as incomplete image (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). One 
where the complete set of recognition tags necessary for instant recall, are 
not available or directly triggered. For example by the appearance of the 
face of someone we think we recognise, but some of the necessary tags are 
triggered to give us that Feeling of Knowing effect. It does not seem to 
require a great leap of faith to attach the suppression process we saw in the 
research, to the mechanism through which these tags become lost. This 
mechanism may for example, explain why in some situations we may also 
have that ‗I think I missed something‘ feeling? The research design for Risk 
Clockspeed however did not anticipate this result and there was nothing built 
into research design to explore this possible linkage, so while this is of 
interest, it is definitely an item for follow on research. 
Limitations in the primary data capture 
 
While the primary data capture has given some good results and strategy of 
triangulation between simulation and case study appears to have worked 
well, we must remain objective and consider the limitations of the data 
collection now that the experiments are complete. 
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In the literature review, some important System Dynamic work around 
complex feedback by Diehl and Sterman (Diehl & Sterman, 1995) was 
identified. This work raises questions about complex feedback and delay and 
the fall off of human performance when delays and feedback is complex. 
The simulations and case study have been unhelpful in exploring the role of 
complex feedback, when overlaid on our Fast Risk Clockspeed situations. 
So there is no comment to be made on whether these two effects are, 
additive, geometrically combined in their impact, or simply whether one 
effect becomes lost in the other. 
 
Another limitation in the nature of the data collection, is that the simulation 
and the case study are quite process orientated. This has perhaps helped in 
providing good clear results and possibly an important factor behind the 
success in triangulation. But on the other hand, we have not been able to 
investigate the Risk Clockspeed Lens in the area of social systems. We can 
call upon the ‗Isomorphic‘ comparison technique, widely used in risk 
management by Toft in particular (Toft & Reynolds, 1997) to suggest that 
even in social systems, people will develop mental models and acquire 
experience and competencies in the same way, but we do need to be critical 
of this work in this respect and identify it as a limitation.  
 
And lastly, we acknowledged some of the limitations around elements of the 
survey in terms of the source of learning which was seen as indicative, but 
not statistically valid due to sample size, which had been designed for data 
saturation around the phenomenological elements of the research.  
 
In terms of the research itself, like many research undertakings for Doctoral 
submission, we must acknowledge the limited scope of this study. Again, we 
can point to some good results and success in triangulation, so this is not an 
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apology for the data we have collected, so much as a recognition that we 
have only just started to uncover this new area of Risk Clockspeed. 
 
Summarising the new knowledge 
 
In summary, we have some important new insights to help in this work to 
improve the management of risk: 
 
(1) People tend to stage problems, dealing with them one stage at a time 
where that is possible, even when time is short (as in the case study) 
(2) People do tend to build models of what is going on and where a team 
is involved that model becomes a shared resource. 
(3) As well as sharing the model, it appears that there is a subjective 
qualification of the models we use and that can also become a shared 
view. 
(4) That these models can become so strong in people‘s minds, that they 
can start to demand more attention than the actual facts. 
(5) People are able to transition very quickly between Affective and 
Rational Cognitive thinking modes and they are not overtly aware of 
those transitions. Indeed, it is even difficult to spot as an observer 
(6) There does not appear to be any difference in the qualitative 
assessment of judgements made by either mode. Affective 
judgements are not seen as second rate or better than Rational 
Cognitive ones. 
(7) In support of the underlying premise of this work, it appears people do 
not give significant thought to the way a problem should be managed 
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based on the rate and timing of the information availability. Partially at 
least, it is believed that this can be attributed to the fact that people 
are unaware of the transition between thought modes. 
(8) While assumptions are known to be important in risk management, 
the role of expectations is perhaps less well known. In both the 
simulation and the case study, the framework of expectations around 
the actors involved influenced behaviour. 
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions 
Learn and React 
 
In the first instance, the models described in chapter 3 would be helpful if 
they illuminated part of the learning cycle and in this, there is some face 
value validity in what we have shown in the model. Simply by considering 
what is in place for each element identified in the model and giving due 
consideration on how each aspect may interact along the lines shown, may 
give illumination and even a basis for a gap analysis for what an organisation 
‗expects‘ to be in place. The presentation of the two models over the normal 
single process model of risk management is also potentially useful in the 
way it brings a particular focus to the outworking of the System 1 and 
System 2 modes of thought. Such an approach also allows due 
consideration of the form, quality and robustness of the mental model of the 
system which the actors may have formed. Given the quality of decision is 
linked to the quality of the mental model (see Jonassen (Jonassen, 1995, p. 
1) citing Gott, Bennett & Gillett  (Gott, Bennett, & Gillet, 1986)) a subjective, 
but potentially useful view of acquired competency may be formed. Not only 
is this something we identified in the problem statement as an area not well 
communicated in organisations at the moment, but the perspective in the 
Risk Clockspeed model is on the people and the organisation rather than the 
process and this is a view which is lacking in the current practice given in 
risk management standards. This different perspective should not be under 
estimated as it is common practice in Systems Thinking to look at problems 
from multiple perspectives. The third potential use of these models is to 
highlight the fact that Fast Clockspeed Risks do have different 
characteristics and need to be managed differently from Slow Clockspeed 
risks. With this finding, there is an implicit consideration placed upon an 
organisations risk management systems on how to respond to this new 
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knowledge. In summary, there appears to be some good reasons to use 
these models in the management of risk. 
Implications for management practice 
 
The original drivers for this work came from the observance that the World is 
an increasingly complex, more joined up and faster moving environment, 
were people are expected to make increasing more difficult decisions, under 
greater stress and with less time to make them. What has emerged is an 
alternative structured model to describe how people learn and make 
decisions using Cognitive Rational thought, and the variations necessary to 
adapt the model to explain the faster acting Affective, Intuitive modes of 
thought which may have developed.  
 
The structured model approach also opens up as a framework for 
considering the mental models that may have formed in people‘s minds, 
including the quality dimensions of those models. This broader view of the 
learning environment in turn can help the quality of decision making under 
uncertainty. While the importance of the mental model has been known for 
some time, it has not previously been discussed in the context of risk 
management in this way and this perspective is current not explicitly 
addressed in the standards. 
 
It has been observed, particularly in the case study which was a life and 
death situation, how effective good System 1, Affective decision making can 
be. Fast in terms of analysis and reaction, low in mental overhead and 
consequently low in terms of cost. This is confirmation of the point made by 
Gerd Gigerenzer among others  (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 23) that 
heuristic based decision making can be ‗fast and frugal‘.  
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We have seen that there is informational value in each situation, from 
considering the rate at which the information necessary to manage a risk 
presents itself which is largely ignored in the existing body of literature, yet 
we have identified significant differences in both how the decision is taken 
and consequently identified differences in how each class of decision should 
be managed. 
The extension of risk management practice 
 
Given the findings of this research, there is no longer justification for 
curtailing organisational risk management to the management of risks that 
lend themselves to Rational Cognitive, System 2 consideration. The very 
least that can be expected from this work is that people start to acknowledge 
the differences between these types of risk. Slow Clockspeed risks only form 
part of the risk environment that organisations find themselves in. Standard 
writers and Shareholders have an increasing expectation on organisations to 
manage risk and they make no such distinction on the types of risk that the 
organisation should manage (Risk Definition: "ISO 31000: Risk management 
- Principles and guidelines," 2009) (Risk Abatement: Gallagher, 1956, p. 77). 
With the increase in Industrial Clockspeed, it is perhaps simply a matter of 
time before organisations will universally have to recognise the business 
significance of the Risk Clockspeed dimension and the value inherent in the 
Fast Clockspeed decision. 
 
As well as the models to foster deeper thought and analysis about the risk 
management context and the development of competency for decision 
making under uncertainty, from the findings of this work we would advocate 
some other specific actions to be considered in a risk management 
programme. 
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The identification of Risk Clockspeed as a type 
 
One of our skills as human beings is our ability to transition from System 1 to 
System 2 thinking very quickly, very easily and consequently without 
noticing. By creating two organisational management models, we are 
separating out these two modes, but that would be pointless if the 
organisation Risk Management process simply consolidates these risks back 
into a single form. With this in mind, it is considered important that each risk 
is labelled with its Risk Clockspeed, much as we would label a risk to identify 
the organisational owner. This labelling of type should then be reflected in 
the way the risk is to be managed, much as the record of causes is 
considered to be a driver to the risks probability of occurrence. The 
argument for this action is that the first step in management is recognition of 
the issue. 
Differences in managing the risk 
 
Slow Clockspeed Risks can be managed with actions and controls that 
directly impact on the causes of a risk to affect either the likelihood of 
occurrence or on the impact they may have. This is the benefit of having the 
information necessary to manage the risk in advance for rational debate 
among knowledgeable people. Fast Clockspeed Risks on the other hand 
may need additional management with prototype actions which we test 
within a framework of expectation assembled by knowledgeable people and 
which may be implemented at an appropriate time. By prototype actions, we 
mean a set of actions that have to be tested to evaluate their potential 
effectiveness in a Fast Risk Clockspeed situation, which if found to be 
satisfactory leads to the action being pre-positioned ready to be 
implemented as appropriate. By expectation framework we mean an 
understanding of, and if necessary the addition of, statements that clarify 
what is expected to happen under conditions that may arise when there is a 
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need to manage the risk. Implicitly of course this means there is a need to 
have a good understanding of the possible scenarios, where the risk may 
arise and this in turn brings us back to the clarity and accuracy of the mental 
models being used. 
 
Examples may help to clarify the differences in management thinking being 
proposed here. 
 
With a Slow Clockspeed Risk, a pre emptive action may be implemented 
because by definition, the information necessary to manage the risk is 
available. Someone may fall from a high platform. The risk is easily seen, the 
likelihood and consequences are easily assessed and the management 
strategy is also predictable. So a pre emptive action is called for to put up 
protective railings in place which then becomes a control in risk management 
terms. Controls such as these rely on forecast behaviour and so in the main 
work irrespective of the Risk Clockspeed dimension. The railings put in place 
to stop people falling works whenever someone gets close to the platform 
edge, no further decision is required within the scope of the situation 
described. 
 
A pre emptive action is aimed at a Fast Clockspeed Risk makes no sense as 
by definition the information necessary to take that action is not available so 
a control cannot be pre positioned. However a prototype action to be taken 
at the time, if the conditions are right would be quite appropriate. For 
example, ‗If pressure starts to rise in the pipeline, then release valve A‘ until 
the pressure drops to a safe level‘. In other words, if there is predictability to 
the risk, but not the possibility to put in place a control. We cannot leave 
‗Valve A‘ open all the time, then there is a conditional decision to be made at 
the time. Here, the prototype action can be seen as a Checklist response (as 
used in the airline industry) and this is a reasonable risk mitigation strategy. 
And these kinds of action of course already exist; the change through the 
 Page 204 
 
Risk Clockspeed lens is to see the action set, control framework and the 
thinking behind them in a slightly different light. The suggested benefit is 
derived from the clarity and communication such a framework of thinking 
allows along with the formal recognition of the role played by mental models. 
 
For the expectation framework concept, again consider the railings around 
the platform to prevent a fall. This is a very simple example, but the 
expectation framework includes the expectation placed upon people who 
use the platform to report any damage or corrosion that may cause the 
railings to fail. The argument is that this should be a stated ‗Expectation‘. 
Most people would say that this was obvious and is part of normal Health 
and Safety which clearly paces responsibilities on everyone to act 
appropriately on health and safety matters ("Health and Safety at Work," 
1974, p. Sec 7). We would agree, but that same expectation framework 
containing the explicit statement, would also need to set out the expectation 
on management for the repair or replacement. The suggested benefit is to 
address the counter culture which may arise that there is no point in 
reporting corrosion or damage, as nothing will be done about it. What is 
different here is that the ‗expectations‘ are considered part of the strategy, 
they are connected and they extend to include the influence they may have 
on people‘s behaviour, if followed and if breached.  
Expectations 
 
The importance of Experience and Competency in decision making has long 
been recognised and cited works within this research refer. ‗Expectations‘ 
and their management on the other hand are more subtle (when considered 
against assumptions which are similar) but significant new introduction to the 
risk process as a result of the work presented here. Expectations lead to 
behaviour constraints and a desire to take action; un-met expectations on 
the other hand lead to an alternative set of behaviours, not all of which may 
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be undertaken with good intentions. The significant step here is to realise the 
role of expectations in managing risk, how they interact with experience and 
competency and to place some formality around their consideration, 
recording and management. Setting and communicating the right set of 
expectations currently appears as an underutilised method of managing risk, 
judging from the literature and standards, but its advantages in managing 
Fast Clockspeed Risks is many fold. Managing expectations should become 
as normal to the risk management process as managing actions and 
controls. 
 
In many situations, the knowledge of experts will no doubt be sufficient to 
establish an appropriate understanding of the required expectation 
framework. In other cases, some of the expectations and behaviours may 
need to be tested. In the case study, the evacuation checklist used in the 
airline industry, which was put together based on the understanding of 
experts was changed after the accident of BA038. The consequence of this 
finding is that simulation and role play may need to become a much bigger 
part of the risk management data collection framework.    
The extra T 
 
There is a common model in use within the UK Government, the source of 
which is found in the Orange Book (HMG, 2004, p. 27) used to remember 
the options available for use within risk management based on an alliteration 
of words beginning with the letter T. Each T is considered a ‗pure‘ strategy 
for managing downside risk and in some cases the risk management plan 
will contain elements of more than one pure strategy. 
 
Treat: To undertake actions and controls to reduce and limit the risk. 
Tolerate: Put up with the risk as there is opportunity to be gained 
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Terminate: D something to avoid the risk 
Take: The risk could be avoided, but at the loss of desired 
opportunity. 
Transfer: Pass the risk impact contractually to another party. 
 
The contemplation of Risk Clockspeed gives rise to another pure strategy to 
form an additional sixth T in the set. 
 
Translate: If the information necessary to manage the risk is available and 
sufficient to determine its outcome fully. In other words, very low Risk 
Clockspeed, then translate that risk into either an issue (the risk has 
impacted) or a non issue (there is nothing to manage). In the simulations, the 
potential contamination of the land was such a risk in that the cause of the 
risk (contamination) is there to be discovered at the outset of the project. 
Translation, ideally before the land was purchased, is clearly the best 
strategy for managing this risk. Translation is not treatment, nor transfer, it is 
discovery.  
The Avoidance of ‘Avoidance Language’ 
 
In reading the guides and training information, used to provide context 
around the case study, you cannot avoid being struck by the choice of 
language used, particularly in the Boeing and Airbus ‗Upset Aircraft Guide‘ 
(Boeing & Airbus, 2004). The very title of ‗Upset Aircraft‘ sounds as if it has 
been carefully selected so as not to alarm. The avoidance of the direct 
language in the guide to suggest the aircraft should dive to build up 
airspeed, again sounds as if the authors of the document wanted to avoid 
any language that may even hint at a ‗negative‘ thought.  
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Based on one guide and acknowledging a lack of domain expertise in 
aerodynamics, we should not infer too much from this, but such avoidance 
language is unlikely to be helpful. In building up mental models from training 
and sharing, it is clear language is an important communication mechanism 
from one person to another, so clarity of meaning becomes equally 
important. 
Future Work 
 
In carrying out the research, several interesting areas for future research 
arose, not least the opportunity to undertake a longitudinal study on 
organisations that include Risk Clockspeed thinking into their decision 
making process. 
 
In this work we have focused on the elements that help organisations 
prepare their staff with appropriate training and to prepare for Fast 
Clockspeed Risks as part of the overall strategy for organisational risk 
management. During the simulation, there was evidence that there was a 
shared qualitative assessment of how ‗good‘ the mental model being used 
actually was and this finding aligns closely with work by Lim and Klein (Lim & 
Klein, 2006, p. 405). Given risk management is dependent on how well the 
future is predicted, for accuracy of risk and effectiveness of mitigation. It 
seems wise to extend this work into investigating this qualitative assessment 
building on the existing body of knowledge referenced in part by Jonassen 
with his work with Refrigeration technicians (Jonassen, 1995). There are two 
threads that come to mind on how such research may proceed; more work 
on how these models are constructed and shared, and leading from that, 
how to promote the development of good quality mental models of the future. 
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Naturally, the limitations identified with the primary data collection 
undertaken does provide opportunities for others to build on this original 
work in the area of Risk Clockspeed. 
 
The role of the mental model for both personal and group use has become 
clearer through this research, particularly in Fast Clockspeed conditions 
where there is not time for discussion and clarification. In the course of the 
work, we observed the use of what we termed ‗Avoidance Language‘ in 
aircraft crew training materials and we linked this to the importance of 
communication as the transport mechanism for understanding. Clearly there 
is a tension between alarmist language, which may cause unnecessary 
stress and language that creates false security by avoiding any difficult 
issues. The effect of language on learning and more importantly 
performance in Fast Clockspeed situations may be a difficult topic for future 
research, but possibly one with surprising results? 
 
For the management technique to be successful, we have suggested that 
due consideration needs to be given to the feedback loops, delay and 
variability in both feedback and delay based on the work by Diehl & Sterman 
(Diehl & Sterman, 1995). As an extension to this work, it would be interesting 
to see the results of the combined effect of both a Fast Clockspeed situation, 
where feedback and delay is considered complex. 
 
In respect to social systems, where we identified the rather process 
orientated nature of both the simulations and the case study, the research 
relied on Isomorphic comparison to infer the Risk Clockspeed models would 
still hold. But this work would be strengthened by independent verification of 
Risk Clockspeed theories and suggested management practice is more 
generic social systems such as the caring professions, where some of the 
dynamics are quite different. 
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Having observed the suppression of the least important of the Fast 
Clockspeed risks that Captain Burkill had to manage and with respect to the 
work of both Zajonc on the primacy of affect (Zajonc, 1984) and Omodei on 
the behaviour of experts (Omodei et al., 2005), there is a potential avenue of 
research into the role of suppression, recall and the risk of non recall in 
decision making under uncertainty and time pressure. 
Conclusion 
 
The relationship between our competency, our experiences and the mental 
models we build in our minds to explain and manage what is happening 
around us is very complex. There is evidence in this research that backs 
existing psychology research that we hold and use these mental models 
during decision making and these inform the heuristic based judgements we 
are making. In team work, it is clear that shared mental models develop and 
they need to be built as part of the process of moving to that productive 
phase that teams enter into. 
 
Moreover, it appears that for both our own and for our shared models, there 
is an understanding about the quality, accuracy and predictive ability of 
those models, although it is not clear how this perception of quality works or 
is shared? 
 
By extending training and analysis methods to consider the quality, accuracy 
and degree of shared model that has been created in the minds of 
individuals and teams, we have a basis for understanding how those 
individuals and teams may perform in a time critical environment and we 
have the opportunity to prepare them given our insight of the future through 
our Risk Clockspeed lens. Moreover, with understanding of the clues and 
cues that are important to the decision process, our view of the world via the 
Risk Clockspeed lens, along with our understanding of the mental models in 
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use, we have a basis for emphasising the positive clues, while suppressing 
the unhelpful clues and distractions which may burn up precious seconds. 
Research by others such as Omodie et al (Omodei et al., 2005), would 
suggest this would be a fruitful approach as it would reinforce the behaviour 
observed in above average performers. 
 
Equipped with our mental models of the world around us, we know actors in 
a situation are able to transition across the boundary between System 1 and 
System 2 thinking rapidly and eloquently. Our research indicates actors in 
situations with domain expertise and experience are able to transition at a 
mental level where we they are not conscious they are even doing it. This is 
perhaps one of the key factors that has hindered the kind of risk 
reclassification into types using Risk Clockspeed thinking from emerging 
before. But given the increasing pace of socio-technological development 
and our needs to make better decisions in less time, it is simply a matter of 
time before Risk Clockspeed becomes an essential classification tool in the 
management of business and organisational risk. 
 
In positioning this work, it is indeed new work in a new direction in risk 
management, but it is also clear that there is much more to be learnt from 
research in this area. So the final line of this conclusion is to respectfully 
conclude that this is a beginning and not an end.  
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Appendix B: My Journey. A Personal Reflection 
Background 
 
Trained as an engineer, I have been a hard science problem solver for much 
of my working life. My first encounter with Social Science and Business 
Research was through my MBA completed in 2000. Having completed the 
MBA, I felt I had moved from my hard engineering background towards the 
„softer side‟, but it seems this was only preparation for what was to come. 
The DBA Journey: The Stage 1 DBA Course 
 
The DBA started off much as the MBA did with lectures and course work 
examining aspects of the work ahead, but rather than Business Subjects, we 
were studying the skills required to become competent business 
researchers. The nature and scale of the task was soon apparent as I found 
some of the coursework challenging and time consuming. However, the 
validity and need for the work was clear and I felt I was learning to move 
deeper than the level I had achieved for the Masters qualification. Critical 
reading skills started to develop, an appreciation of sound research 
methodologies was fostered and the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative research methods became very apparent. As an engineer, my 
first place of safety is to look towards statistics and quantitative methods and 
indeed my first thoughts were towards survey and statistical analysis. 
However, in parallel with the stage 1 lectures of the DBA, I was using my 
role as a Risk Consultant to observe and investigate what was happening in 
my industry so I could identify the gap in practice that I would like to 
investigate. 
 
As we came to the end of Stage 1, we were „invited‟ to prepare a paper that 
could in theory be sent for publication. In part this was to prepare us for 
publication and dissemination, but also in preparation of the thesis itself. This 
was one of the hardest tasks of the Stage 1 years as it took me to new levels 
of writing and academic rigour. Citations had to be found and academic 
argument constructed. While the task was difficult, not least because my 
written English style also had to improve, I felt the exercise was good 
preparation for what was to come. 
 
In preparation for Stage 2, I had formulated some nebulous thoughts around 
the concept of Risk Clockspeed from the purposeful observation I had been 
undertaking. The thoughts however were poorly formed and I had little 
evidence for my notional thoughts, I also had little in my literary review 
portfolio to support my thoughts, but I had overcome that first barrier, which 
is learning to acquire and read academic papers. To help form my views, I 
developed a way of explaining my ideas around the Risk Clockspeed 
problem using a modified set of cards. The demonstration, as it was not an 
experiment, is written up in the thesis and it describes the role it took in 
helping me clarify my thoughts and it gave direction to my ongoing literary 
review which was by now well underway. I had began to feel comfortable 
with the research process, at least in context to secondary data collection.  
The DBA Journey: Stage 2 Research and Thesis 
 
By the time I moved to stage 2, I knew what I wanted to research and my 
primary supervisor was asked if he wanted to supervise me. I am pleased to 
say he accepted and he quickly saw that I had already formulated my ideas 
about the subject area I wanted to study. After a short validation, my 
research area was approved. 
 
I had developed personally at this stage in my confidence to undertake desk 
research and given encouragement from the paper exercise we undertook, I 
ventured into my first peer reviewed paper. The paper was accepted with 
modifications and my confidence was again boosted. I decided that it was 
time to widen the audience for the early work and I started to deliver 
presentations on the early Risk Clockspeed work derived from secondary 
research sources.  
 
The presentations helped greatly as with each presentation my own 
understanding deepened and through the card demonstration, which by now 
I had done with many people, helped formulate my ideas around the gap in 
the body of knowledge. However, I was now at a point which at the 
beginning of the DBA I would not have expected to be at. Where I had 
expected a hard science research project, the nature of my topic was not 
going to be met with such an approach. Applying the objective skills I had 
developed, it was clear my research needed to be qualitative. 
 
I had never used simulation before as a method of data collection, but it was 
clear that this would give the best results, so once again I had to move 
forward against my initial thoughts. Given the weaknesses of a simulation 
approach I had also decided I needed to triangulate my work and as if by a 
divine gift, the ideal case study became a possibility, if I could get the 
interview?  
 
It was a high profile accident which had ended in success as everyone had 
survived and from the knowledge I had, I could see it would be a rich source 
of primary data for my research. I obtained and prepared for the interview 
which was made so much easier by the interviewee who was professional 
and accommodating throughout. 
 
Armed with my primary data, I proceeded to write up the work, in part 
thinking the hardest parts were behind me. In some ways they were, I had 
the topic, it was a new area, I had the data and I had the literature. What I 
was not prepared for however was the long task of writing and rewriting my 
thesis in a clear academic style appropriate for this level. This was yet 
another personal challenge which I had to rise too. Progress was initially 
slow due to other pressures on my time, so I made the decision to invest in a 
small netbook which I could use on the train. All I can say is, thank you 
computer makers as the netbook allowed me to snatch regular time at the 
keyboard and within weeks the first draft was on the computer. For the next 
five months, this initial draft was worked and reworked. With each iteration, I 
felt the literary style of the thesis was improving and the academic standard 
was improving as well. This has been a long process, but in the end I had a 
thesis which captured the work I had done in researching Risk Clockspeed, 
but equally importantly, I had a thesis I was pleased with. 
Closing Comments 
 
When I completed my MBA, I was pleased with my dissertation and I felt I 
had been exhausted by the whole experience. Now, at the end of my DBA, I 
can say I am no longer happy with my MBA dissertation. This is not a 
negative comment, but a recognition that I have developed and moved on. 
However, I am just as exhausted now as I was at the end of the MBA. 
 
Will I return to research? Undoubtedly. This whole experience has been 
tough and I really had to dig deep to produce this work, but in doing so I 
found I could do things I couldn‟t ever believe I would be able to do. Now I 
have completed this work, it would be a shame not to continue to undertake 
research in some form. 
 
 
Keith Smith 
 
  
Appendix C: Simulation Data 
 
The following pages contain the raw data from the two instances of the 
house building simulation. The first three pages describe the simulation. The 
fourth page gives the fixed questions and then the raw data follows. The raw 
data consists of time stamped captures of the game play model, the answers 
to the questions and notes made at the time of the simulation.
House Building Simulation to Support Risk Research 
 
The desktop simulation is built around a simple project to demolish a house 
and replace it with a new build. A project plan is provided with the stages 
and the baseline costs already set out. This project plan and associated 
costs feed into a simple Income Statement so the profit resulting from the 
decisions can be seen. From the participants point of view the simulation is 
about maximising the jobs profit in the face of risk and uncertainty. 
 
The first stage of the simulation is for the participants to agree a monthly 
amount to cover the cost of the works. If they select a figure that is less than 
it costs, there is an automatic bank loan that kicks in with penalty charges 
and interest. 
 
The next stage of the simulation requires the participants to identify the risks 
to the project objectives. Risks will have financial consequences and the 
model used for the simulation is designed to take these impacts into the 
financial consideration. The facilitator decides on the impact of the risks, but 
the participants can pay a mitigation cost which will lessen the impact. The 
participants then have a final chance o agree the monthly investment sum 
before the risks are applied. The decision as to whether a risk impacts or not 
is decided with a dice. 
 
For the next stage of the simulation the facilitator introduces unforeseen 
risks, again dice are used to determine whether the risks will impact. 
 
Once run, the profitability of the job is assessed in respect to the original „no 
risk‟ model. 
 
Questions are then asked by the facilitator about the stages of risk 
identification and the way participants would address these risks. 
 In closing the simulation, the facilitator (researcher) will summarise the key 
points arising from of the simulation and place them in context with respect 
to how people address risk.  
 
The whole simulation is expected to run within a 2.5Hr window. Participants 
will have gained an understanding about the nature of risk and the way 
people address risks as a result of participation 
  
The House Building Simulation 
Game play of simulation 
Context 
 
As a group of individuals you have come together to speculate on a house 
rebuild. Collectively you have purchased the land from funds each of you 
already had. The land has an existing 1920‟s property on the site and the 
plan is to demolish the existing property and build a new house. The existing 
property has been empty for some time and vandals have broken in and set 
fire to the property damaging the internal staircase.  
 
The simulation is limited to the demolition and new build part of the project 
so we have assumed you have found a reliable estate agent who has given 
you a sale price for the house which you can trust.  
 
To fund the redevelopment each individual has to contribute a fixed amount 
which is entered on the Project Plan page. If the sum raised is less than the 
cost of the work, the extra funds are automatically borrowed from the bank at 
a fixed rate of interest and penalties are incurred for the overdraft facility. 
Borrowing isn‟t cost effective so to maximise profit it is important to maintain 
adequate funds. On the other hand, money paid into the consortium is lost to 
the players and at the end of the simulation; excessive funds will count 
against the profit when evaluating success. In other words, financial 
efficiency is really the aim of the game play in this simulation. 
 
As the simulation progresses, you will identify and on occasions incur 
impacted risks. When a risk is identified, you will as a team have the chance 
to pay a sum which provides a degree of mitigation to a risk. The simulation 
co-ordinator will decide on the cost of mitigation for the risk and as a team 
you will have the choice of mitigating or running the risk. The decision as to 
whether the risk will impact will be decided by two rolls of a common dice. 
The first dice roll provides the break point for the decision. For example if the 
dice shows a 3, then on the second roll any number less than 3 will mean 
the risk has not impacted. Any number 3 or above means the risk has 
impacted and the risk impact value will be taken into the cash flow. 
 
To manage the project you will have sight of the original project plan and you 
will not be asked to modify this plan, the simulation is all about the risks 
incurred. You will also be able to see the cash flow projection and the 
Income Statement in order to make your decisions along with the list of risks 
you have identified. 
 
The simulation facilitator will also inject other risks into the simulation. These 
are to simulate unforeseen risks. The facilitator will give you a choice of 
mitigation by insurance in as much as you decide on a level of insurance at 
the outset and that buys cover for as much of the risk as you decide. Not all 
the facilitators risk however is insurable so even if you take the full level of 
cover, there will be some impacted risk. Again, risk impacts will be based on 
chance decided by dice. 
Game Process 
 
(1) Team players decide on the amount of contribution to make to the 
project. The number of payments and the amount of each payment. 
Each month can be a different sum, but the value is a per team player 
sum. 
(2) The team players then identify the risks that may impact and for each 
risk the facilitator will determine impact values and mitigation costs. 
Players need to understand that the risk identification must realise the 
key risk areas (there will be a least 8 well formed risks) otherwise the 
facilitator will introduce them as unforeseen risks which will impact the 
project harder. It is therefore very much in the interests of the players 
to identify eight risks.  
(3) The players then decide on the amount of insurance to buy from the 
simulation facilitator who will advise on the maximum amount that can 
be purchased. This insurance will mitigate other risks that the 
facilitator will introduce. 
(4) The team players then have an opportunity to re-evaluate the monthly 
sum to contribute remembering that the object of the simulation is 
financial efficiency. (Maximum profit, minimum overfunding) 
(5) Round 1 deals with the risks that the team identified. Dice are rolled 
to see which risks hit and which risks did not. The values are then 
taken into the model 
(6) Team players then discuss 
a. Whether they made the right mitigation choices in the light of 
what actually happened 
(7) The facilitator then reveals the other unforeseen risks and the dice 
are again used to determine the outcome 
(8) Again the team players comment on whether the right choice was 
made to cover the unforeseen risks 
(9) A final questions are then addressed. These questions will be 
revealed by the facilitator at the end of the simulation.  
 
 
Experiments in Risk Management 
 
(1) How do people look at risks they identify? Is there any natural 
concept of Risk Clockspeed evident in the way people identify and 
plan to manage their risks?  
 
(2) When people identify risks, do they naturally identify the clues and 
cues around those risks?  
 
(3) What makes someone prefer to manage a risk on the fly over 
managing that risk in advance? 
 
 
 
Questions to ask the simulation group. 
 
(1) What would identify as being different in terms of characteristics 
between the risk that contamination was found over say the risk that 
inappropriate plumbing materials may be supplied to site? 
(2) Mitigation 
a. How would you mitigate the risk of contamination and when 
would you carry out that mitigation?  
b. How about the plumbing mis-delivery how might you mitigate 
that? 
(3) Where you consciously separating out risks into classes as you 
worked through the simulation or did you see all these as just a bunch 
of risks? 
  
 
Company 1 Cash flow 1: Timestamp 11:05 
 
Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Totals 
Contribution per Developer £2,000 £1,500 £3,000 £500 £1,000 £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£13,00
0 
0 
£10,00
0 £7,500 
£15,00
0 £2,500 £5,000 
£25,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£65,00
0 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              Demolition Labour £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,000 
Demolition Transport £1,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,000 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice £1,600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Ground Works Labour £0 £1,100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,100 
Ground Works Machines £1,600 £1,600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,200 
Ground Works Materials £0 £1,250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,250 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 £2,500 £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,500 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 £1,500 £3,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,500 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,000 
General Building Labour £2,000 £2,000 £2,000 £2,000 £2,000 £2,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Roof Labour £0 £0 £2,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,000 
Roof Timber £0 £0 £1,150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,150 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 £3,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,000 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 £1,500 £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,250 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 £2,750 £1,375 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,125 
Plumbing and Electricals 
Consumables £0 £0 £100 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£150 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £1,750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,750 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 £1,250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,250 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 £2,250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,250 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,00
0 
£10,30
0 
£20,55
0 £9,225 £7,900 £2,050 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£62,27
5 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £2,000 £4,800 
£10,35
0 
£17,07
5 
£19,97
5 £2,975 
£2,92
5 
£2,87
5 
£2,82
5 
£2,77
5 
£2,72
5 
   
  
 
Company 1 Cash flow 2: 
Timestamp 11:18 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,60
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,10
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,20
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,50
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,50
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,00
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,15
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,37
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,12
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£150 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,75
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£10,3
00 
£20,5
50 
£9,22
5 
£7,90
0 
£2,05
0 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£62,2
75 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 
£1,70
0 
£6,85
0 
£4,07
5 £25 
£9,97
5 
£9,9
25 
£9,8
75 
£9,8
25 
£9,7
75 
£9,7
25 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 3: 
Timestamp 11:23 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,20
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,60
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,20
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,20
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,30
0 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,07
5 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,72
5 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,10
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,80
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,20
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,20 £2,20 £2,20 £2,20 £2,20 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£13,2
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,10
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,05
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £875 £63 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,43
8 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,42
5 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,20
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £90 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£210 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,77
5 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£625 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £15 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,26
5 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,26
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£10,7
00 
£21,0
75 
£10,2
40 
£8,40
8 
£2,32
5 £250 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£65,1
98 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 
£1,30
0 
£7,77
5 
£6,01
5 
£2,42
3 
£7,25
3 
£7,0
03 
£6,9
53 
£6,9
03 
£6,8
53 
£6,8
03 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 4: 
Timestamp 11:27 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £230 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,23
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£900 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,65
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,20
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,62
0 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,24
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £125 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,37
5 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £275 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£575 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,07
5 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,72
5 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,10
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,80
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,20
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,30 £2,30 £2,30 £2,30 £2,30 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£13,8
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,10
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,05
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £875 £63 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,43
8 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,42
5 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,20
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £90 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£210 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,77
5 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£625 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £15 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,26
5 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,26
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£11,0
50 
£21,5
45 
£10,3
40 
£8,50
8 
£2,42
5 £350 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£66,4
18 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £950 
£8,59
5 
£6,93
5 
£3,44
3 
£6,13
3 
£5,7
83 
£5,7
33 
£5,6
83 
£5,6
33 
£5,5
83 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 5: 
Timestamp 11:30 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £270 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,27
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£900 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £110 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,71
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,20
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,62
0 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,24
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £155 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,40
5 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £275 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£575 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,17
5 £350 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£8,02
5 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,16
0 £320 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,98
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,20
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,30 £2,30 £2,30 £2,30 £2,30 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£13,8
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,10
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,35
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £125 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,12
5 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £875 £63 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,43
8 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,42
5 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,20
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £240 £95 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£435 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,77
5 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £45 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£645 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £15 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,26
5 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £85 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,33
5 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£11,1
50 
£21,7
35 
£10,9
85 
£8,58
3 
£2,52
0 £350 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£67,5
23 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £850 
£8,88
5 
£7,87
0 
£4,45
3 
£5,02
8 
£4,6
78 
£4,6
28 
£4,5
78 
£4,5
28 
£4,4
78 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 6: 
Timestamp 11:33 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £310 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,31
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£900 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £110 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,71
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,30
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,62
0 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,24
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £205 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,45
5 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £275 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£575 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,17
5 £350 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£8,02
5 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,16
0 £320 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,98
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £400 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,40
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,50 £2,50 £2,50 £2,50 £2,50 £500 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£15,0
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,20
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,35
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £125 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,12
5 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £975 £113 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,58
8 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,42
5 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,20
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £240 £95 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£435 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £75 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,82
5 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £45 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£645 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £65 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,31
5 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £85 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,33
5 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£11,3
90 
£22,0
85 
£11,3
85 
£9,03
3 
£2,82
0 £550 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£69,4
63 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £610 
£9,47
5 
£8,86
0 
£5,89
3 
£3,28
8 
£2,7
38 
£2,6
88 
£2,6
38 
£2,5
88 
£2,5
38 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 7: 
Timestamp 11:34 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £310 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,31
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£900 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £110 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,71
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,30
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,62
0 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,24
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £205 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,45
5 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £275 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£575 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,17
5 £350 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£8,02
5 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,16
0 £320 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,98
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £400 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,40
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,50 £2,50 £2,50 £2,50 £2,50 £500 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£15,0
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,20
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £200 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,35
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £125 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,12
5 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £975 £113 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,58
8 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,42
5 £25 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,20
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £240 £95 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£435 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £75 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,82
5 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £45 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£645 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £65 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,31
5 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £85 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,33
5 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£11,3
90 
£22,0
85 
£11,3
85 
£9,03
3 
£2,82
0 £550 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£69,4
63 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £610 
£9,47
5 
£8,86
0 
£5,89
3 
£3,28
8 
£2,7
38 
£2,6
88 
£2,6
38 
£2,5
88 
£2,5
38 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 8: 
Timestamp 11:35 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £330 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,33
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£900 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £110 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,71
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,35
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,62
0 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,24
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £255 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,50
5 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £275 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£575 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,25
0 £500 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£8,25
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,16
0 £320 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,98
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £500 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,50
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,60 £2,60 £2,60 £2,60 £2,60 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£15,6
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,45
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £125 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,12
5 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 
£1,02
5 £138 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,66
3 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,47
5 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,27
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £240 £95 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£435 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,85
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £45 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£645 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £90 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,34
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £85 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,33
5 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£11,5
10 
£22,3
60 
£11,8
85 
£9,28
3 
£2,97
0 £650 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£70,8
58 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £490 
£9,87
0 
£9,75
5 
£7,03
8 
£1,99
3 
£1,3
43 
£1,2
93 
£1,2
43 
£1,1
93 
£1,1
43 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 9: 
Timestamp 11:37 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 
£12,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £330 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,33
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£900 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £110 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,71
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,35
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,62
0 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,24
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £255 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,50
5 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £275 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£575 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,25
0 £500 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£8,25
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,16
0 £320 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,98
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £500 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,50
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,60 £2,60 £2,60 £2,60 £2,60 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£15,6
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,45
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £125 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,12
5 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 
£1,02
5 £138 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,66
3 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,47
5 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,27
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £240 £95 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£435 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,85
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £45 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£645 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £90 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,34
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £85 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,33
5 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£11,5
10 
£22,3
60 
£11,8
85 
£9,28
3 
£2,97
0 £650 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£70,8
58 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £490 
£9,87
0 
£9,75
5 
£7,03
8 
£1,99
3 
£1,3
43 
£1,2
93 
£1,2
43 
£1,1
93 
£1,1
43 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 10: 
Timestamp 11:43 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,20
0 
£2,20
0 
£3,30
0 
£2,20
0 
£1,5
00 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
0 
£13,2
00 
£13,2
00 
£19,8
00 
£13,2
00 
£9,0
00 
£3,6
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£72,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £330 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,33
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£900 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £110 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,71
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,35
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,62
0 £20 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,24
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £255 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,50
5 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £275 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£575 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,25
0 £500 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£8,25
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,16
0 £320 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,98
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £500 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,50
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,60 £2,60 £2,60 £2,6 £2,6 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£15,6
0 0 0 0 00 00 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,45
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £125 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,12
5 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 
£1,02
5 £138 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,66
3 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,47
5 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,27
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £240 £95 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£435 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,7
50 £100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,85
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £45 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£645 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,2
50 £90 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,34
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,2
50 £85 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,33
5 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£11,5
10 
£22,3
60 
£11,8
85 
£9,2
83 
£2,9
70 £650 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£70,8
58 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) 
£1,20
0 
£2,89
0 £330 
£1,64
5 
£1,3
63 
£1,9
93 
£1,3
43 
£1,2
93 
£1,2
43 
£1,1
93 
£1,1
43 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 11: 
Timestamp 11:50 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,20
0 
£2,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£2,20
0 
£1,50
0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,5
00 
0 
£13,2
00 
£15,0
00 
£21,0
00 
£13,2
00 
£9,00
0 
£3,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£75,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,60
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,10
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,20
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,50
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,50
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,00
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,15
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,37
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,12
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£150 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,75
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£10,3
00 
£20,5
50 
£9,22
5 
£7,90
0 
£2,05
0 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£62,2
75 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) 
£1,20
0 
£5,90
0 
£6,35
0 
£10,3
25 
£11,4
25 
£12,9
75 
£12,9
25 
£12,8
75 
£12,8
25 
£12,7
75 
£12,7
25 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 12: 
Timestamp 11:51 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,20
0 
£2,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£2,20
0 
£1,50
0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,5
00 
0 
£13,2
00 
£15,0
00 
£21,0
00 
£13,2
00 
£9,00
0 
£3,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£75,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,60
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,10
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,20
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,50
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,50
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £2,00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,00
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,15
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,37
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,12
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£150 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,75
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£10,3
00 
£20,5
50 
£9,22
5 
£7,90
0 
£2,05
0 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£62,2
75 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) 
£1,20
0 
£5,90
0 
£6,35
0 
£10,3
25 
£11,4
25 
£12,9
75 
£12,9
25 
£12,8
75 
£12,8
25 
£12,7
75 
£12,7
25 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 13: Timestamp 11:55 
 
Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Totals 
Contribution per Developer £2,000 £2,100 £3,200 £1,800 
£1,20
0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£10,90
0 
0 
£12,00
0 
£12,60
0 
£19,20
0 
£10,80
0 
£7,20
0 
£3,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£65,40
0 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              Demolition Labour £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,000 
Demolition Transport £1,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,000 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice £1,600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Ground Works Labour £0 £1,100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,100 
Ground Works Machines £1,600 £1,600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,200 
Ground Works Materials £0 £1,250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,250 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 £2,500 £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,500 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 £1,500 £3,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,500 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,000 
General Building Labour £2,000 £2,000 £2,000 £2,000 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Roof Labour £0 £0 £2,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,000 
Roof Timber £0 £0 £1,150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,150 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 £3,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,000 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 £1,500 £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,250 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 £2,750 £1,375 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,125 
Plumbing and Electricals 
Consumables £0 £0 £100 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£150 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,750 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,250 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,250 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,00
0 
£10,30
0 
£20,55
0 £9,225 
£7,90
0 
£2,05
0 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£62,27
5 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £2,300 £950 £2,525 
£1,82
5 
£3,37
5 
£3,32
5 
£3,27
5 
£3,22
5 
£3,17
5 
£3,12
5 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 14: 
Timestamp 12:03 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,10
0 
£3,20
0 
£1,80
0 
£1,2
00 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£10,9
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,6
00 
£19,2
00 
£10,8
00 
£7,2
00 
£3,6
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£65,4
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,00
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,60
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,10
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,20
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,50
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,50
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £3,00 £3,00 £3,00 £3,0 £3,0 £1,0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£18,0
0 0 0 0 00 00 00 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,00
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,15
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £850 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,40
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,37
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,12
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £63 £6 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£169 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,7
50 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,80
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £313 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£913 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,2
50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,2
50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£13,3
00 
£21,5
50 
£10,3
38 
£8,9
56 
£3,4
13 
£1,0
50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£70,8
06 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £700 
£3,05
0 
£2,58
8 
£4,3
44 
£4,1
56 
£5,2
06 
£5,2
56 
£5,3
06 
£5,3
56 
£5,4
06 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 15: 
Timestamp 12:06 
 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,00
0 
£2,10
0 
£3,20
0 
£1,80
0 
£1,2
00 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£10,9
00 
0 
£12,0
00 
£12,6
00 
£19,2
00 
£10,8
00 
£7,2
00 
£3,6
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£65,4
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,00
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,60
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,10
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,20
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,50
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,50
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
General Building Labour £2,00 £3,00 £3,00 £3,00 £3,0 £3,0 £1,0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£18,0
0 0 0 0 00 00 00 00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,00
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,15
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £850 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,40
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,37
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,12
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £63 £6 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£169 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,7
50 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,80
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £313 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£913 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,2
50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,2
50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£13,3
00 
£21,5
50 
£10,3
38 
£8,9
56 
£3,4
13 
£1,0
50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£70,8
06 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) £0 £700 
£3,05
0 
£2,58
8 
£4,3
44 
£4,1
56 
£5,2
06 
£5,2
56 
£5,3
06 
£5,3
56 
£5,4
06 
   
  
Company 1 Cash flow 16: 
Timestamp 12:07 
 Jan Feb Mar April May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
Total
s 
Contribution per Developer 
£2,50
0 
£2,10
0 
£3,20
0 
£1,80
0 
£1,2
00 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£11,4
00 
0 
£15,0
00 
£12,6
00 
£19,2
00 
£10,8
00 
£7,2
00 
£3,6
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£68,4
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,00
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,60
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,10
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,20
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,50
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,50
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
General Building Labour 
£2,00
0 
£3,00
0 
£3,00
0 
£3,00
0 
£3,0
00 
£3,0
00 
£1,0
00 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£18,0
00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,00
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,15
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £850 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,40
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,37
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,12
5 
Plumbing and Electricals Consumables £0 £0 £100 £63 £6 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£169 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,7
50 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,80
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £313 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£913 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,2
50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,2
50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£13,3
00 
£21,5
50 
£10,3
38 
£8,9
56 
£3,4
13 
£1,0
50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£70,8
06 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) 
£3,00
0 
£2,30
0 £50 £413 
£1,3
44 
£1,1
56 
£2,2
06 
£2,2
56 
£2,3
06 
£2,3
56 
£2,4
06 
   
  
Company 1 List Risk with results of random risk impacts 
Risks Mitigation Risk Impact Impact Mitigated Impacted P&L 
   Cost Cost   
    Internal damage from fire is 
severe enough to require 
strengthening of internal structure 
before structured demolition can 
be carried out 200 1000 
Extra demolition labour costs 
0 1 0 1000 5 
Contaminant (such as Asbestos) 
finds its way into skips of 
otherwise inert material taken off 
site causing the load to be 
rejected with consequential 
additional costs in transport and 
envronmental fees 200 1200 
Demolition transport and 
environmental fees 
0 0 0 0 6 
Specialists miss some sources of 
contamination leading to 
additional labour costs through 
delays while evaluation takes 
place during demolition 200 300 
Demolition labour cost increases 
1 1 200 300 1.5 
Transport of waste materials 
takes longer than expected 
delaying work and causing 
additional labour costs clearing 
site 100 700 
Demolition labour cost increases 
0 1 0 700 7 
Misdirection of ground work staff 
leads to unnecessary work 
increasing the labour costs on 
ground work 200 900 
Ground work labour, machine and 
materials costs are all increased 
0 0 0 0 4.5 
Groundworks fill with water and 
delays are incurred 50 20 
Ground work labour and machine 
costs are increased 1 0 50 0 0.4 
Walls are incorrectly placed or 
sized (not to drawing) causing 
losses of time and materials 200 100 
Increased bricklayer labour and 
material costs 
1 0 200 0 0.5 
Poor management of general 
labour leads to inefficient working 
practice and consequential 
additional labour costs 200 100 
Increased general labour costs 
1 1 200 100 0.5 
Roof is set out wrong to drawing 
impacting time and materials 200 100 
Increased roof labour and 
materials 1 0 200 0 0.5 
Plumbers or Electricians don't 
turn up when expected causing 
extra costs for additional labour to 
complete the task in time 200 900 
General labour costs 
0 1 0 900 4.5 
Pipes misplaced and do not align 
with faucet leading to rework 40 100 
Additional plumbing costs 
1 1 40 100 2.5 
Electrical rework required after 
test falls after decoration with 
consequential rework costs on the 
decoration and electrical labour 200 1400 
Electrical and decorator labour 
0 0 0 0 7 
Delivered Plumbing fittings are 
not fit for purpose and have to be 
sent back leading to delays 50 100 
Plumber labour increases 
1 1 50 100 2 
Damage is caused to room 
decoration by moving in 
furnishings 50 100 
Increased labour and materials 
cost on decoration 
1 0 50 0 2 
Internal furnishings do not match 
colour scheme of room leading to 
repainting 100 500 
Decoration and material costs 
increase 
0 1 0 500 5 
A rare plant is found in the 
grounds which delays 
groundworks while a licence is 
obtained NA 2200 
Risk to be added in the event that 
initial risk identification is poor 
0 0 0 0 #VALUE! 
A legal claim is made for access 
over the grounds which will 
reduce the value of the property NA 3500 
Risk to be added in the event that 
initial risk identification is poor 
0 0 0 0 #VALUE! 
The utilities that service the plot 
are found to be unsatisfactory. 
Charges and delays are incurred NA 3200 
Risk to be added in the event that 
initial risk identification is poor 
0 0 0 0 #VALUE! 
for them to be renewed 
A critical delivery of materials is 
delayed and additional costs are 
incurred to resource supply NA 1800 
Risk to be added in the event that 
initial risk identification is poor 
0 0 0 0 #VALUE! 
 
  
 0 0 0 0 
  
  
 0 0 0 0 
  
  
 0 0 0 0 
  
  
 0 0 
    
  
 0 0 990 3700 
  
  
Company 1: Questions posed to the group after the simulation was run 
Questions to ask the simulation group with responses in italic 
 
(1) What would identify as being different in terms of characteristics between the risk that contamination was found 
over say the risk that inappropriate plumbing materials may be supplied to site? 
 
Contamination - Its out there. It’s a standing risk. Limit to mitigation. It’s a lottery 
Plumbing – Should be carried by someone else 
 
(2) Mitigation 
a. How would you mitigate the risk of contamination and when would you carry out that mitigation?  
Carry out surveys. Drill a number of boreholes. Do some desk research. {Account given of a client who 
purchased a site without a survey that turned out to be contaminated} 
b. How about the plumbing mis-delivery how might you mitigate that? 
Material control on site. Labour costs is half the cost though. Take control of the purchase yourself. Pass risk 
to subcontractor  
(3) Where you consciously separating out risks into classes as you worked through the simulation or did you see all 
these as just a bunch of risks? 
 
Trying to get a global picture balancing the cost benefits of managing risks. Recognised three types of risk External 
which you can control to a point Internal which you can control and Acts of God. No consideration given to rate of 
information availability in terms of timing 
 
 
  
Notes Made on Company 1 
These notes came out of the post simulation discussion. 
First point was they balanced the model irrespective of risk. Then they 
looked at the risk and then rebalanced it bearing in mind the risk they 
thought they were going to take at that time and tried to get the model to 
£3k. It was an arbitrary figure that was more than all the risks and then after 
mitigation again they went for the £3k because they felt comfortable with that 
amount of contingency from experience even though they had no knowledge 
of the unforeseen risks. The group had in fact self seeded their mental 
models with this figure and then anchored to it with everyone happy at that 
amount (no arguments).  
The team investigated the model, but not in terms of where the sensitivities 
were. The big sensitivity in the model is the bank, but the team went with 
their experiences and competency looking at the programme. At one stage 
there was a big drop in the profitability, but the team did not latch onto and 
investigate that drop. However at the outset, the initial model was tweaked to 
balance out any borrowing. What had happened was the early mental model 
about „no borrowing‟ was replaced as they gained experience with the 
project and saw some of the risks. 
Over the contamination issue, what emerged was a natural order that the 
risk of contamination needed to be resolved before the site was purchased 
they called it a „standing risk‟ which recognised intuitively that the data was 
there to be had over that risk. An anecdote had been shared about a client 
who unwisely bought a site before having the survey for contamination 
carried out even though it was a brown field site and the risk was plausible.  
The team had not used the strategy of separating out the risks into different 
types based on time. To the team,. They were a bunch of risks that had to be 
managed as a bunch of risks that would come up from time to time. There 
was no linking of risk type to mitigation strategy. They did however apply a 
typing of internal, external and acts of God which is linked to mitigation 
strategies, but not through time dimension. 
A good example of experience and competency was observed around how 
the team of engineers would handle the contamination. The number and 
position of sample bore holes would be managed based on the experience 
of the engineers. They would not just use a standard formula.  
There was an interesting discussing about Risk and Reward, even though 
they had openly selected and stated they were interested in Cost and 
Benefit. As we discussed the contamination issue, they outlined some of the 
ways or realising value out of land (buy build sell. Buy build run) and the 
different attitude to risk this might generate. 
The engineers put forward, that in their experience, clients has a figure in 
their minds when developing a site as to what they expect the risks to come 
within and so long as that figure is not exceeded, they remain happy 
(evidence of shared mental models extending to client). Although engineers 
acknowledged that clients mental model may differ from their mental models. 
Indeed they suggested that this client model may even be a „non standard‟ 
The strategy for running the job was changing based on the information 
emerging. That was confirmed by the team in discussion as the way they 
worked and they said the clients change strategy too as the jobs progress. 
Team suggested that working on the fly is an advantage and an anecdote of 
the French failing to plan and work that way was shared. Term used 
„Engineering your way out of a situation‟ which apparently the British are 
known for? The position put by the team around this issue, summarised to 
trying to process and plan everything leads to greater delay than part 
planning and part managing on the fly, because when things go wrong, the 
process approach leads to delay and re-planning where as the on the fly 
method allows progress to continue. 
Again from the teams experience of construction an interesting point was 
made. You don‟t know what will go wrong, but you know that some things 
will go wrong. Risk and issues will arise no matter how well planned a job is. 
There is a limit to process. Plan for the unexpected. Engineers role is to 
minimise costs and keep the project moving. 
Again during the discussion, it was noted how easily the conversation flowed 
from and between risks (events that may happen) and issues (events that 
have happened) and it was clear from the discussions that the team 
members knew this difference. 
Point made that planning and trying to identify all risks up front (the French 
example again) leads to a very ridged model, which when compromised by 
the unexpected, fails. Another anecdote recalled about sub standard 
concrete and the unexpected nature of it. Used by engineering team to 
illustrate the need to react to emergent issues. 
Reaffirmation by team that they are quite happy recognising risks, but in 
many cases they wait for the risk to be realised as the problem solving 
around realised risks is sometimes the best strategy over mitigating the risk. 
A strategy used within construction engineering is that contingency is built 
into the design, so when things go wrong, there are avenues available. That 
is part of the engineer‟s experience and skill base. This contingency also 
varies depending on the client. Noted that end users involved in construction 
want to incorporate change as the project progresses where a “D&B 
customer” (Design and Build) wants minimum cost and is prepared to 
dispense with changes. This is a conscious decision at the start of a job to 
mitigate risk is to consider what type of client they are dealing with (this is 
good evidence of expectation, competency and experience all working 
together) 
Difference between engineering and simply applying the rules is this ability 
to adapt the rules. (This is getting into management of crisis). Caveat added 
by engineers that it depends on type of risk. Safety is never considered in 
this way. In safety, you have to minimise the risk. Safety is a big part of initial 
risk workshop and often that risk is transferred to the contractor (who is the 
best person for onsite safety). ALARP is used.  
Discussion around differences in distance people will go for safety. Some 
contractors put air bags around flat bed lorries for falls, others don‟t. 
 The following notes were captured as note to self voice files after the 
simulation and after the post simulation discussion about how it went. 
 
 
Note 1 
In undertaking the research there was a lot of focal attention on the cash 
flow, the project input and output costs and the profit and loss bottom line. 
Wasn‟t any focus on the intermediate figures like the cost of finance or the 
penalties which were substantial and dominated the project.  The focalisation 
caused them to miss those risks 
Note 2 
In summary the behaviour was as expected. Focussing on the risks, not 
looking at the sensitivities, trying to maximise on the cash flow and using the 
P&L as a thermometer on how well they had done. No real thought about the 
future risks?  It was very much an attitude of „what‟s the problem now‟ and 
lets solve that. And later on when we had the discussion that seemed to be 
the way. In a way they preferred things to turn into issues and then solve 
them? They are happy to resolve them as issues? They did however 
appreciate the Risk Clockspeed approach would allow them to separate out 
what risks they would have to deal with in real time. 
Note 3 
There was a proposal tabled that the rate at which they should mitigate 
should be at 85% of the project cost. When it came to looking at the 
insurance mitigation the decision was pushed over to being on a cost 
benefit. I was asked to put in a division of the cost divided by the benefit so 
they could see how many times one was over the other. They put in some 
extra cash to cover the mitigation and initially ignored the actual risk. Then, 
they realised the risk and come up with this arbitrary figure of £3k which they 
then reworked the figures  so there was £3k in the project even though they 
didn‟t really have a value on the risk. They hadn‟t looked at the risk to see if 
this was more than enough to cover it. Once we run the risks I asked if they 
had made the right decision. They said they hadn‟t that they had over 
allowed for the risk and in hindsight they would have spent less money on 
the risk mitigation, they realised the sum of the risks was less than they had 
put away even if they had all impacted. They then readjusted the model back 
to try and retain the £3k so there was a degree of anchoring going on there 
and they tried to aim for it, even though they had just said in hindsight there 
was more than they needed. After that they said it was not the right choice 
because they were under insured and that hit the cash flow. They realised 
they should have lowered the rework after the insurance of the project so 
that the project cost was not taken 
Note 4 
The cost model pushes people to look at the cost of the risk rather than the 
risks themselves. When they have identified their risks they go into the cash 
flow straight away and that caused them to modify the cash flow 
Note 5 
They did flow very easy between risks, tasks as risks and issues there was 
no perceivable difference and they accepted that they did flow highlighting 
that peoples mental models were so well attuned and so well knitted 
together that people don‟t realise that they do float from one to the other. 
Note 6 
Very interesting to note that without realising it they had built into their 
project and their ways of working they had built contingency for dealing with 
Fast Clockspeed risks. So they hadn‟t identified them but intuitively done 
some work towards management from experience because they had 
experiences from the past, they knew what to do for the future. They valued 
the idea of pulling them all out and looking at them independently. They 
valued the idea of the three section approach of identifying very slow 
Clockspeed risks and translate them, you identify your normal risks and deal 
with them in the risk register and you identify your fast Clockspeed risks and 
then you back map them to the other processes.  
 
 
Company 2 Timestamp 10.24 
 
Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov 
 
Totals 
Contribution per Developer 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
£1,00
0 
 
£11,0
00 
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
£6,00
0 
 
£66,0
00 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              
Demolition Labour 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
Demolition Transport 
£1,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,00
0 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,60
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Ground Works Labour £0 
£1,10
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,10
0 
Ground Works Machines 
£1,60
0 
£1,60
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,20
0 
Ground Works Materials £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 
£2,50
0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,50
0 
Walls consumables (Sand, 
Cement) £0 
£1,50
0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,50
0 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,00
0 
General Building Labour 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,0
00 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Roof Labour £0 £0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,00
0 
Roof Timber £0 £0 
£1,15
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,15
0 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 
£3,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 
£1,50
0 £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 
£2,75
0 
£1,37
5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,12
5 
Plumbing and Electricals 
Consumables £0 £0 £100 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£150 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,75
0 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,25
0 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,25
0 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,0
00 
£10,3
00 
£20,5
50 
£9,22
5 
£7,90
0 
£2,05
0 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£62,2
75 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) 
£6,00
0 
£10,3
00 
£24,8
50 
£28,0
75 
£29,9
75 
£26,0
25 
£20,0
75 
£14,1
25 
£8,17
5 
£2,22
5 
£3,72
5 
   
  
Company 2 Timestamp 11.02 
 
Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov 
 
Totals 
Contribution per Developer £4,000 £2,000 £1,000 £500 £500 £500 £500 £500 £0 £0 £0 
 
£9,500 
0 
£28,00
0 
£14,00
0 £7,000 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£66,50
0 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              Demolition Labour £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,000 
Demolition Transport £1,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,000 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£750 
Demolition specialist advice £1,600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Ground Works Labour £0 £1,100 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,100 
Ground Works Machines £1,600 £1,600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,200 
Ground Works Materials £0 £1,250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,250 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£300 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 £2,500 £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,500 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 £1,500 £3,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,500 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,000 
General Building Labour £2,000 £2,000 £2,000 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 
£2,00
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,00
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Roof Labour £0 £0 £2,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,000 
Roof Timber £0 £0 £1,150 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,150 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 £3,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,000 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 £1,500 £750 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,250 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 £2,750 £1,37 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,125 
5 
Plumbing and Electricals 
Consumables £0 £0 £100 £50 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£150 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,750 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£600 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,250 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,250 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,00
0 
£10,30
0 
£20,55
0 
£9,22
5 
£7,90
0 
£2,05
0 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£62,27
5 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) 
£16,00
0 
£19,70
0 £6,150 £425 
£3,97
5 
£2,52
5 £925 
£4,37
5 
£4,32
5 
£4,27
5 
£4,22
5 
   
  
Company 2 Timestamp 11:25 
 
Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov 
 
Totals 
Contribution per Developer £4,000 £2,000 £1,000 £500 £500 £500 £500 £500 £0 £0 £0 
 
£9,500 
0 
£28,00
0 
£14,00
0 £7,000 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£66,50
0 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              Demolition Labour £5,000 £510 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,510 
Demolition Transport £1,000 £710 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,710 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £510 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,260 
Demolition specialist advice £1,600 £240 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,840 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Ground Works Labour £0 £1,100 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,110 
Ground Works Machines £1,600 £1,600 £160 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,360 
Ground Works Materials £0 £1,250 £210 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,460 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £210 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£510 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 £2,500 £5,000 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,510 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 £1,500 £3,000 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,510 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,010 
General Building Labour £2,000 £2,001 £2,002 
£2,00
2 
£2,00
2 
£2,00
2 £1 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,01
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Roof Labour £0 £0 £2,000 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,010 
Roof Timber £0 £0 £1,150 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,160 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 £3,000 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,010 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 £1,500 £855 £105 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,460 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 £2,750 £1,38 £5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,135 
0 
Plumbing and Electricals 
Consumables £0 £0 £100 £55 £5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£160 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £40 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,790 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£610 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,260 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,260 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,00
0 
£12,27
1 
£21,14
2 
£9,39
2 
£8,02
7 
£2,12
2 £51 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£65,20
5 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) 
£16,00
0 
£17,72
9 £3,587 
£2,30
5 
£6,83
2 
£5,45
4 
£2,00
5 
£1,44
5 
£1,39
5 
£1,34
5 
£1,29
5 
   
  
Company 2 Timestamp 11:45 
 
Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug 
Sep
t Oct Nov 
 
Totals 
Contribution per Developer £4,000 £2,000 £1,000 £500 £500 £500 £500 £500 £0 £0 £0 
 
£9,500 
0 
£28,00
0 
£14,00
0 £7,000 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 
£3,50
0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£66,50
0 
              Council Rates £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£550 
              Demolition Labour £5,000 £940 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,940 
Demolition Transport £1,000 £1,010 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,010 
Demolition Environment fees £750 £570 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,320 
Demolition specialist advice £1,600 £240 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,840 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Ground Works Labour £0 £1,100 £30 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,130 
Ground Works Machines £1,600 £1,600 £170 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,370 
Ground Works Materials £0 £1,250 £210 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,460 
Ground Works Disposal £0 £300 £210 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£510 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Walls Materials (Bricks, Insulation, 
Blocks) £0 £2,500 £5,000 £60 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£7,560 
Walls consumables (Sand, Cement) £0 £1,500 £3,000 £35 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,535 
Bricklayer Labour £0 £0 £0 
£5,00
0 £110 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£5,110 
General Building Labour £2,000 £2,001 £2,002 
£2,00
2 
£2,00
2 
£2,00
2 £1 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£12,01
0 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Roof Labour £0 £0 £2,000 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,010 
Roof Timber £0 £0 £1,150 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,160 
Roof Tiles £0 £0 £3,000 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£3,010 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  Plumbing and Electricals Labour £0 £0 £1,500 £855 £105 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,460 
Plumbing and Electricals Materials £0 £0 £2,750 
£1,38
0 £5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£4,135 
Plumbing and Electricals 
Consumables £0 £0 £100 £55 £5 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£160 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,75
0 £40 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,790 
Materials for Decorating £0 £0 £0 £0 £600 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£610 
 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
  
Labour for Furnishings £0 £0 £0 £0 
£1,25
0 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£1,260 
Materials for Furnishing £0 £0 £0 £0 
£2,25
0 £10 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
 
£2,260 
              
Monthly Expenditure 
£12,00
0 
£13,06
1 
£21,17
2 
£9,46
7 
£8,12
7 
£2,12
2 £51 £50 £50 £50 £50 
 
£66,20
0 
Balance (Funds - expenditure) 
£16,00
0 
£16,93
9 £2,767 
£3,20
0 
£7,82
7 
£6,44
9 
£3,00
0 £450 
£40
0 
£35
0 
£30
0 
   
  
Company 2 Risk List 
 
  
Main   
 
Mitgation 
Risks Mitigation Risk Impact Mitigation Impact Mitigated Impacted P&L 
 Cost Cost Method   
  Internal damage from fire is 
severe enough to require 
strengthening of internal structure 
before structured demolition can 
be carried out 200 400 Do nothing 
Extra demolition labour costs 
1 1 200 
Contaminant (such as Asbestos) 
finds its way into skips of 
otherwise inert material taken off 
site causing the load to be 
rejected with consequential 
additional costs in transport and 
envronmental fees 200 300 Do nothing 
Demolition transport and 
environmental fees 
1 1 200 
Specialists miss some sources of 
contamination leading to 
additional labour costs through 
delays while evaluation takes 
place during demolition 200 300 Do nothing 
Demolition labour cost increases 
1 0 200 
Transport of waste materials takes 
longer than expected delaying 
work and causing additional 
labour costs clearing site 100 30 Do nothing 
Demolition labour cost increases 
1 1 100 
Misdirection of ground work staff 
leads to unnecessary work 
increasing the labour costs on 
ground work 200 20 Do nothing 
Ground work labour, machine and 
materials costs are all increased 
1 0 200 
Groundworks fill with water and 
delays are incurred 50 20 Do nothing 
Ground work labour and machine 
costs are increased 1 1 50 
Walls are incorrectly placed or 
sized (not to drawing) causing 
losses of time and materials 200 100 Do nothing 
Increased bricklayer labour and 
material costs 
1 1 200 
Poor management of general 
labour leads to inefficient working 
practice and consequential 
additional labour costs 200 100 Do nothing 
Increased general labour costs 
1 0 200 
Roof is set out wrong to drawing 
impacting time and materials 200 100 Do nothing 
Increased roof labour and 
materials 1 0 200 
Plumbers or Electricians don't turn 
up when expected causing extra 
costs for additional labour to 
complete the task in time 200 100 Do nothing 
General labour costs 
1 0 200 
Pipes misplaced and do not align 
with faucet leading to rework 40 100 Do nothing 
Additional plumbing costs 
1 0 40 
Electrical rework required after 
test falls after decoration with 
consequential rework costs on the 
decoration and electrical labour 200 100 Do nothing 
Electrical and decorator labour 
1 0 200 
Delivered Plumbing fittings are not 
fit for purpose and have to be sent 
back leading to delays 50 100 Do nothing 
Plumber labour increases 
1 0 50 
Damage is caused to room 
decoration by moving in 
furnishings 50 100 Do nothing 
Increased labour and materials 
cost on decoration 
1 0 50 
Internal furnishings do not match 
colour scheme of room leading to 
repainting 100 100 Do nothing 
Decoration and material costs 
increase 
1 0 100 
A rare plant is found in the 
grounds which delays 
groundworks while a licence is 
obtained NA 2200 Do nothing 
Risk to be added in the event that 
initial risk identification is poor 
0 0 0 
A legal claim is made for access 
over the grounds which will 
reduce the value of the property NA 3500 Do nothing 
Risk to be added in the event that 
initial risk identification is poor 
0 0 0 
The utilities that service the plot 
are found to be unsatisfactory. 
Charges and delays are incurred NA 3200 Do nothing 
Risk to be added in the event that 
initial risk identification is poor 
0 0 0 
for them to be renewed 
A critical delivery of materials is 
delayed and additional costs are 
incurred to resource supply NA 1800 Do nothing 
Risk to be added in the event that 
initial risk identification is poor 
0 0 0 
 
   
 0 0 0 
 
   
 0 0 0 
 2190 
  
 0 0 0 
 
   
 0 0 
  
   
 0 0 2190 
 
  
Questions and discussion 
(1) What would identify as being different in terms of characteristics between the risk that contamination was found 
over say the risk that inappropriate plumbing materials may be supplied to site? 
 
Plumbing problem is cheap and easy to solve whereas contamination is expensive and needs to be resolved up front. 
 
(2) Mitigation 
a. How would you mitigate the risk of contamination and when would you carry out that mitigation?  
 
Should be done before the site is purchased so it stops being a risk into the project. 
 
b. How about the plumbing mis-delivery how might you mitigate that? 
 
Make that a builder risk. Identify other suppliers. 
 
(3) Where you consciously separating out risks into classes as you worked through the simulation or did you see all 
these as just a bunch of risks? 
 
Bunch of risks characterised by likelihood and big cost items 
Notes for Company 2 Simulation 
Approach again was to ignore risk at first.  
Concern over achieving a balanced end but not worried about losses 
accumulating in the middle. 
As with company 1, aim was to build in a contingency of £4k this time 
(remarkably similar figure?) at the outset of the simulation. 
As with company 1, it was possible to see that the exchanges taking place 
between the engineers was constructing the shared mental model they 
would use. Again, it was the senior staff who set out the basic tenants of the 
model 
Experiences and expectations of small builders shared between team 
members 
Junior staff testing ideas. Differences in risk appetite showing. 
Very interesting point about testing risks. Mental model controlling 
judgement about probability even though dice were to be rolled. So Mental 
Model being used even when it did not apply. 
Again no recognition of time qualification of risks 
Lots of plumbers, so cross that bridge attitude. Builders risk anyway. Lot of 
talk about risk transfer. 
Discussion about solving the problem rather than address the risk. Not 
challenged. 
 
 
  
 
Appendix D: Interview Transcripts 
 
The following pages contain the transcripts of the interviews carried out to 
validate the Risk Clockspeed Models 
Interview Set 1: Financial Advisor 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role in X as a Y, would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
Certainly. Normally interview a client and gain information from them by doing a fact find 
which explains where they are at that moment in time and we will look at their data in 
respect to their assets and liabilities and ask the client to highlight what kind of things they 
are looking for and recommend appropriate solutions to their financial problems. 
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
Go to and from appointments. 
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
Yes 
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
Well without citing cases which of course I can’t do, to disclose client names. So because 
every solution is individual and every set of circumstances are also individual, it’s very 
difficult to generalise and dangerous to generalise. [Yes, any subtleties that when you come 
to explain you find difficult to explain to people. Because you are an expert?].  No, not really. 
I am a great believer in explaining everything to people so they get chapter and verse. In 
terms which are easy to understand so that it’s common parlance I try to avoid technical 
terms and express what it actually means to them 
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
You are often making judgements and things because the best thing you can do is get to 
understand your client the best you can and that goes beyond questions on a form you get 
to understand their objectives and the range, what desires they have in life, what kind of 
people they are, their attitude to risk and all those things together kind of fill the blanks 
where you don’t have the correct stuff and data there. So those are guidelines to how you 
formulate the position. 
(6) How do you fill in for missing information if it occurs? 
See response to 5. 
(7) In practice, how frequently do you act based on indirect information?  
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Ehrm, I would say about 20% of the time because to validate that question there are 
industry meetings that go to understanding developments in the market, so that can sway in 
terms of solutions for clients because what the client wants and thinks he wants and what is 
actually available from the market, can be changing with time.  
(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
I try and get all the information up front if possible. If a client declines to answer a question, 
there is nothing you can do about that, they have the right to do that. All you can do is go 
back and seek clarification from the client 
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
Probably something like fund selection? You can look at past history, you can look at risk to 
the client, you can look at attitude to risk, you can look at personal desires for example 
someone who likes a green approach to things, like someone who likes certain holdings over 
another one. But at the end of the day it is a very difficult choice because you look at these 
things there are no finite guarantees peoples past histories don’t go into the future. So yeah 
fund searching because you are looking after other people’s money and you have a financial 
responsibility for it and you want the best thing. 
(10) Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
You can be surprised, you talk to some people and I would never try and prejudge anybody, 
you don’t know them, sometimes you do know them, but there are some types of clients 
that as you actually get down to the financial details its normally a financial sign of what they 
have got to invest, that sometimes can be a pleasant surprise or shock. Or they are dealing 
with something very personal and you try and help them out and give them solutions.  
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good Y? 
Learning to listen and being able to interpret what a client wants and actually what he 
needs. You’ve got to know the market to actually give them a solution. 
(12)What do you think your (Customer, Client) thinks makes a good Y? 
Profit! 
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry who you or your (customers, clients) didn’t 
or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
Some people are technically very good at what they do and they are not fair with clients, 
they put their own needs before the clients, which is why I joined the industry because I felt 
if you could be honest you could get a good living from it because the industry does have 
some charlatans in it people who are solely their for their own gain and not their clients 
(14)You have practiced as a Y for some years now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) Y? 
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Basically I think people start out, they are very keen and they try to appointments, trying to 
earn as much money as possible. I would sooner have clients who are happy than a volume 
of clients. Equally some people will go into classes of products that are very high risk, for 
their clients, not for them, and they don’t know the implications, they haven’t got the life 
experience or the actual experience to see the ramifications of the proposal a particular 
reference is things like pension transfers and company schemes can be done and may be in 
the best interest of the client but must be assessed very very carefully  and they sometimes 
move into them because they want to be successful but at a cost. 
(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y could 
outperform you? 
Yes, people qualified in different sectors that I am not qualified in then yes they can. What I 
tend to do is not be an expert in every area because I don’t think you can be and I defer 
certain things to people who are experts in that area and let people exploit niches. So what I 
try to do is be a generalist and if something comes up where I need to seek advice then I will 
seek advice because they are in the best place to give me advice. So yeah, someone new to 
the profession could be technically better qualified than me and therefore I would speak to 
them 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
Must be qualified, must be a good listener and have returning clients 
(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
Oh experience is very important, as I say, life skills having to {?} and dealing with people I do 
think it’s important to have that aspect of it and I am quite happy to concede you do need 
that kind of level of expertise gained by experience in the market place and then also the 
qualifications have to justify that state 
(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
Absolutely. We actually have to go through CPD, continuous professional development to make 
sure we stay offay with what is going on in the market and indeed a very useful exercise is we 
use a daily trainer which asks you a question deemed to be beyond the remit of what you know 
to force you to go and find out what it is, which is good way of learning and it keeps you 
surveying the market 
(19)Do you consider peer based learning through industry journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
Yes I do, again because especially if you know these people it is good to share experiences of 
what works, what doesn’t work, which is equally important, in terms of what’s 
recommended to clients, so yes I think it’s very important because it shows you make a lot 
of sense 
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Interview Set 2: Marketing Manager 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role in X as a Y, would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
Essentially in marketing you are managing the media which is split into online media so the 
judgements are kind of what kind of media, how much to spend and that’s all to do with the 
objectives you have been set, targets you’ve been set. Meeting those objectives and targets  
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
In our particular instances a lot of it’s to do with financial and making sure the money is 
there because we are a company under administration we have problems with bills so in 
order to run our campaigns we have to make sure the money is in the agencies banks so that 
is one of the areas I look at each day as the system isn’t that good at ensuring the money is 
in the bank and that is one of the pinch points so that’s almost one of my priorities  
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
You communicate the essence of what you do but everyone has their own view of what 
marketing is and that is fed back to you in terms of their product experience so whenever 
they hear you are marketing of X company they will say they have used X company and I 
think you should blah blah blah, but the more creative ones will say I have this great strap 
line you could use. 
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
The most difficult thing is people still think marketing is a propaganda machine and 
something that can’t be explained in figures so its, and people’s opinion is it’s still an airy 
fairy profession and it’s the old Lord ? quote where 50% of my advertising money is wasted 
but I don’t know which 50% and it’s really about communicating to people it’s moving, while 
it’s a science there’s also an art in it, so really to get continuity there you are using the 
science of it, but it’s the art to make sure you go where others aren’t going. So if you see a 
new media opportunity which is suitable for you, usually you can get a cost effective price to 
start with, so that’s the kind of example   
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
Less than ideal information. Because the view of the information you’ve got there collected 
from various different sources and some can be accurate, some can be inaccurate. 
Sometimes you don’t have the opportunity until after to check where the data has come 
from and how robust that data is. So a lot of the time and it’s also seeking out people’s 
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opinions as well, so you get kind of a sense check. So it’s a mixture of facts, what is sensible, 
gut instinct and checking with others.  
(6) How do you fill in for missing information if it occurs? 
(see 5). Essentially its asking as many people you can to see what answers you get out  
(7) In practice, how frequently do you act based on indirect information?  
In a way it depends where the information has come from. Fairly frequently. An example is 
we were very competitive with the other [companies] .. what you find is people move 
around the industry and you have connections so for example people who have worked at 
*Company+ and I don’t know if people are just stupid but they have an enormous amount of 
eh.. they just tend to live on Facebook and twitter so we simply follow them as friends and 
you can pick up enormous amounts of information. We knew the [Competitor] ad was going 
to come out on so and so date because this stupid girl just tweeted she had signed off a 
million and a half pounds of money. Well you know there are not very many places that 
where you would spend a million and a half so it gives you a good clue and we can react to 
that.  
(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
Usually it’s the risk of, its weighing up the risk in terms of if you took that action, if you didn’t 
take that action so its almost like the type A type B muda which is the worst scenario that 
can happen, it’s also having, I tend to be kinda low, quite low errm quite risk adverse, but I 
am always looking at what is plan A what’s plan B , whats plan C if something goes wrong. 
Does that answer the question?  
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
When you have a split of 50/50 one set telling you one thing one set telling you another. And 
its trying to work that way to the judgements and it’s also when we don’t know people so 
you are trying to find out what angle they are coming from because people normally have an 
inbuilt bias towards something. If you know the people well then you kinda know their kinda 
bias and when you don’t know the people then that’s when it becomes more difficult. 
(10) Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
In terms of making a decision? From a decision I have made or something that’s….? 
[Question Clarified]. I think you have to go back to the way people just live on Facebook and 
Twitter and how they just give out company secrets by this mechanism, this communication 
tool. I find that really really surprising 
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good Y? 
I think it does come back to the art and the science again so you’ve gotta be able to use the 
figures, you got to be a good communicator but also a good listener and I think what is 
important these days is integration with other departments because marketing can’t 
operate in isolation and I am a firm believer in, well you know lots of people talk about 
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marketing path and you can sell anything but you can only sell anything once, but its very 
important you get under the skin of the product and do your best to make sure that product 
meets the expectations of the customer and that really necessitates you working with all the 
other departments as well and an integrated fashion. Sometimes what you want to do 
clashes with what, for example we work very closely with the yield department who have 
systems in terms of putting the prices on. Very important if we want to do a campaign that 
we talk to them because there may be a good reason why we shouldn’t do a campaign at 
that time. Maybe because we have restricted [Openings] so its pointless spending a lot on a 
campaign if actually we don’t have the capacity to manage what will be delivered. So  
(12)What do you think your (Customer, Client) thinks makes a good Y? 
Giving them communication, giving them information that they want at a pertinent time so 
for example without being intrusive knowing the type of information they are interested in. 
for example we have a database of about 480,000 people, we have very small numbers who 
unsubscribe and I firmly believe that is because we are delivering information which is of use 
to them so it isn’t just prices but its information on events going on, its good places to stay, 
its information you wouldn’t get in a normal course of activity. 
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry who you or your (customers, clients) didn’t 
or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
Marketing person? [Clarified]. I have problems with people in terms of, quite often younger 
people, who come to the industry with an idea that everybody’s on Twitter, everybody’s on 
Facebook and it’s trying to get them out of the mindset that not as they are but how the 
customer is. 
(14)You have practiced as a Y for some years now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) Y? 
I think there is a lot to learn from new people coming in especially with their use of new 
media, I think it’s a very good tool used in appropriate places and there is a lot to learn from 
that respect. Essentially coming on this course {subject was a part time student} new people 
come in with a lot of academic information you could kinda almost treat as second nature or 
have forgotten so being challenged is refreshing from that point of view 
(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y could 
outperform you? 
{See above} 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
Good communication skills, the ability to work with different departments and levels and 
financial acumen. So really just being very careful with your budget    
(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
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(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
 
{Not recorded. Answered on way back to class}. Yes 
(19)Do you consider peer based learning through industry journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
{Not recorded. Answered on way back to class}. Yes 
  
Interview Set 3: Chief Engineer Defence Company 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role in X as a Y, would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
Well most of the judgements I make are based on facts from my chartered engineers and 
advice from them. And I weigh up the risks or what is in place to mitigate anything should 
there be any problem areas and I make a decision based on that information. 
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
We are looking at product safety now so I deal with a lot of things people think are product 
safety which aren’t because we stop them before they become product safety as such. An 
example of that is we put a different bolt into a unit than it’s actually disclosed to meant to 
have but because it’s an equivalent bolt it’s not a product safety issue, it’s a configuration 
control issue. It ranges from that, but that is a simplified view of it. 
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
Yes, I think it is reasonably easy, the term Chief Engineer means you are responsible for 
engineering decisions so it’s a universal description so that helps.  
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
I suppose the impact of decisions? If you are not in the marine industry then you are not 
aware that any incorrect decision can affect people’s lives. But it doesn’t take too much time 
to explain. I would hate to have to explain a lot. 
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
Hardly ever you have full information. What you normally do is if there is information 
missing that I need to make a decision, I get people to go and find out. Or we look at other 
ways of mitigating  
(6) How do you fill in for missing information if it occurs? 
See 6 
(7) In practice, how frequently do you act based on indirect information?  
How do you mean from consultancy? [Clarified] Well, I respond to any information I have at 
hand, so if I have indirect information then I will use that as part of my judgement call but, I 
won’t make it in isolation of, I will bring it into the conversation as such.  
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(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
It’s sensitive to what the call is on, if it’s relatively simple call, yes or no then you can have 
limited information to make that call on. If you are making a call on safety and could kill 
multiple people then obviously you want more information. So I guess its swings and 
roundabouts really. Some calls don’t need a great deal of information background and some 
will need a lot more. If I require more I get people to go out there and find the answers. 
Most important decisions are not single source decisions, obviously I have veto, but it’s a 
quorum as such.  
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
Obviously if you don’t have enough information it’s not a very good way to make a 
judgement call, you are flying by the seat of your pants more than anything else. As such 
that is why I wouldn’t make an uninformed judgement call on something I thought was 
important.  
(10) Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
Yes, occasionally. Not normally to a grand scale. With most decisions you look at all the 
possible eventualities but sometimes you can get a curved ball. One comes to mind, not 
particularly, when something fails to work as you anticipated. Something that normally 
works and is guaranteed to work, you know. [And one time it doesn’t+. Yes, it’s a curved ball, 
you know what ‘termers’?’ are, when you are pulling some wire and there’s a termer block 
and you know that sometimes they don’t work, but you have backups and backups and 
occasionally something doesn’t work, that gives you something of a curved ball. When you 
know it’s pretty much a sound systems as such. 
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good Y? 
Ability to listen. Ability to get your point across and most importantly being able to chair 
meetings.  
(12)What do you think your (Customer, Client) thinks makes a good Y? 
I think communications. It goes back to decisions … if you are given a choice to make a 
decision based on your facts and explain why you have made a decision in a professional 
way. Not a case of throwing poker dice or anything.  
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry who you or your (customers, clients) didn’t 
or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
Yes I have met .. before. I think what caused them not to be respected was their arrogance 
where they made decisions based upon what they thought should be right and not really 
listening to other people. The thing with communication I mean you can’t have … 
communications. 
(14)You have practiced as a Y for some years now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) Y? 
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Well I think I am continuing to grow my engineering discipline. Well I suppose someone who 
has qualified in a particular engineering discipline will have hmm? Well I am not sure they 
will have more of the up to date knowledge, but possible not enough of the experience on 
how to use it. I don’t think I fair too badly? My discipline is Safety Engineering it’s not a new 
discipline, but its certainly a newly recognised one.  
(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y could 
outperform you? 
See 15. 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
Right educational level, the right background and I will definitely be going for experience. 
(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
Before I got my degree and masters, it was very late in the day, so before then I probably 
would have said, yes fine, but I do see a difference. I see a difference between graduates and 
experienced engineers and between experienced graduates, shall we say. And I think you do 
need the academic level because the faults in many engineers these days is they can’t 
explain themselves. They can’t explain themselves verbally or written and that’s how they 
will communicate. 
(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
I think certainly there is an area about it? I mean CPD, if you are talking purely about CPD 
then yes. For an engineer, if they have a degree then I think they should go for an MSc and 
onwards obviously its what they can afford and the company can afford? I don’t think there 
is any harm at all if they can go for it? Certainly makes them seen in a different light.  
(19)Do you consider peer based learning through industry journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
Yes, yes, that’s CPD. Continuous Professional Development anything like that conferences. 
All of my guys at the moment I make sure they go to at least 2 a year and if they have any 
better ones or anything like that comes up then they go to them. Because all it takes is one 
snippage of information about a new form of technology we can use and it saves us all a long 
run 
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Interview Set 4: Management Accountant 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role in X as a Y, would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
Obviously generally finance based decisions looking at the impact of cash flow and more so 
perhaps, but also the profit. And from the personnel point of view the team I work with a lot 
of the judgements are made on relationships, be they with customers, suppliers, internal 
colleagues etc.   
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
Managing cash flow 
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
As a job title yes, most people understand an ‘Accountant’, but the essence, the actual job 
itself and the industry I work in no, most people are not familiar with that 
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
Impact of, the things that may impact on the finances of an industry. People not 
commercially aware may not be aware of. 
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
Nearly always less than ideal.  
(6) How do you fill in for missing information if it occurs? 
Guesswork perhaps, based on experience. Or I may seek further information from colleagues 
or external. 
(7) In practice, how frequently do you act based on indirect information? 
I would say at least 90% of my decisions I have to source further information.    
(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
Normally its time pressure. Time is of the essence really. And the decision has to be made 
whether I have the information or not. 
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
Lack of information. 
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(10) Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
The answer is yes, the short answer yes, frequently. [Question restated by request] . Ok, one 
today at the front of my mind. The situation arose where I was trying to ascertain a payment 
on a very large contract, the first payment which is 10% of the contract value. We need that 
payment in to obviously pay our suppliers, it’s very crucial to the cash flow of the project and 
we understood from the terms of the contract that we would be due this 10 days after 
application. It was submitted and now they are saying that there are some evidence, a 
document that won’t go and cannot go live until a certain stage in the contract which they 
need now. Under our terms and conditions when we negotiated the contract we negotiated 
that this particular document would not come live until further down into the contract, 
further down the activity line and now they are saying as per our terms and conditions it’s 
due now. That was quite a surprise.   
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good Y? 
Negotiation skills and good control of cash flow 
(12)What do you think your (Customer, Client) thinks makes a good Y? 
Same actually. 
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry who you or your (customers, clients) didn’t 
or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
When you say industry, do you mean engineering industry. [Clarified as Finance]. Finance 
industry? Obviously yes I can … it was a dismissive attitude  
(14)You have practiced as a Y for some years now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) Y? 
I have more of a feel, more experience in what can go wrong and how things pan out etc. 
Where someone who has just qualified who perhaps has not had a lot of experience in 
industry may have some theory behind a lot of what we do, but perhaps lacks the 
commercial awareness.  
(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y could 
outperform you? 
See 14 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
Chartered accountant or Qualified by Experience. Good communication skills. Team player 
but I think that may come under communication skills, they are kind of linked. And I would 
like to see some very good experience on a financial subject, financial management and 
treasury.  
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(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
I think a lot of what makes a good financial person is experience, realistically you are making 
decisions and judgements based on your previous experience and based on an awareness 
that goes far beyond the accountant’s office which has to look at the extended enterprise 
that you work in, your suppliers your customers, your competitive industry. Possibly if you 
are dealing abroad what the environment is like there, laws, trading conditions etc and you 
have got to have someone with commercial awareness far and above someone who can set 
the accounts up accurately.  
(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
No, I don’t think that is important. I think there are other ways of maintaining your skills. 
(19)Do you consider peer based learning through industry journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
Yes. 
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Interview Set 5: Senior Airline Check Pilot 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role in X as a Y, would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
It’s a checking role and that boils down to his *Pilot under test+ competency levels. Whether 
he is above all safe, whether he knows procedures, standard procedures and whether his 
attitude is correct.  
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
Monitoring. Monitoring others performance 
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
The basic overall picture yes, but then most people would understand, but the nitty gritty of 
what goes on; no.  
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
Apart from some of the technical issues more the lifestyle effects, the fact that a flying 
lifestyle is completely different to anything else and you are permanently jet lagged and you 
are having to perform most at the back end of the body clock when you are most tired and 
that’s when you need to be doing it.  
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
Depends on the scenario, I mean something obvious like a big bang and the engine stops 
that’s more obvious, but sometimes … evolving scenario you don’t have a full set of 
information you basically have got to find out things for yourself 
(6) How do you fill in for missing information if it occurs? 
Use a model called CLEAR and the first bit of CLEAR is Clarify, I can’t remember the rest but 
Clarify and basically that’s using not just your own knowledge but that of your team 
members, your crew members… have further ways to help us to help establish problems, we 
have communications with the company via satcom, we have the manuals all are resources 
you have available  
(7) In practice, how frequently do you act based on indirect information?  
All the time, but not necessarily major decisions, all the time you are deciding how to go 
about various things for example a piece of weather appears and I decide shall I go to the 
left or to the right. It may be a quick process in your mind, but it’s something you have to 
think about and process.  
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(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
Depends on the seriousness of the event I suppose? Something that’s not life threatening or 
aircraft critical you can wait and see how things fly out. Other things like we are on fire and 
we have got to land somewhere soon and we haven’t got all the information, but look there 
is an airfield there, that will do, put it down there.  So it depends on the urgency. 
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
Missed question 
(10) Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
I guess so? Because there are events you train for and practice for and those are less 
surprising because you practice for them. Also though, life isn’t like that, it’s not always 
rehearsed events unscheduled things happen. Events such as, many years ago in a different 
company we had a near miss coming out of a Spanish Airport and basically we had to react 
very quickly to the situation that presents itself otherwise you hit the other aircraft and 
that’s not something you are aware of per se. 
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good Y? 
I think fairness, objectivity, honesty. 
(12)What do you think your (Customer, Client) thinks makes a good Y? 
All the same, I think you have to assess him in his normal job role and introduce obstacles 
artificially and basically just be fair.  
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry who you or your (customers, clients) didn’t 
or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
Someone in my position I have not liked? [Clarified]. Yes, in every group there is always erm, 
one in every crowd as it were how has a bad reputation and people dislike flying with or 
doing a check with and I think sometimes people like that have an over inflated ego and 
basically they want everything to be absolutely, impossibly perfect and in doing so they 
never let the checkee relax and get on with the job, they are always interrupting and 
pressuring, loading up the person and peppering them with ‘What if’ questions. Basically 
never let them get on with the job. Putting them under pressure, basically they are going out 
to fail people rather than to assess them.  
(14)You have practiced as a Y for some years now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) Y? 
I think the only difference is experience. There are some very talented new guys coming 
through. Some guys with natural gifting and some guys who worked hard and some guys 
who have done both. The only thing that will sit between me and them are my years in the 
job. You get experience by having experiences.  
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(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y could 
outperform you? 
Only that he has done the conversion course a lot more recently than I have so in theory he 
should be up to speed on the technical aspects of the aeroplane a lot more than I did 
because he did the course. 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
Honesty, integrity and fairness. If I can add a rider, not everyone has the same view on these 
things. 
(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
How will I defend it? Ok, would you like to take your wife and kids on holiday with a brand 
new pilot and nobody else in charge? 
(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
Specifically to the job I am doing, it is important periodically to get into the books and 
refresh yourself the things that may drift back as they are not in everyday use, rather than 
taking on new challenges in terms of further study or qualifications. You know, just revisiting 
what you have already done basically.  
(19)Do you consider peer based learning through industry journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
Essential. Can I just add to that there is such a thing a ‘Bar Room Talk’ and one of the best 
places in flying to learn about it [Flying] is to go to the bar with your peers. Not within 10Hrs 
of flying of course! That is where you will hear other people’s stories and learn about flying 
from there and that is why I encourage the youngsters, on their night off, come and have a 
beer with the guys as you hear guys talking. Avoid the beers and you don’t learn. 
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Interview Set 6: Structural Engineering Principal Partner 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role in X as a Y, would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
Difficult. I am not quite sure how to answer that? Many fold and very difficult they range 
from staff matters through to financial matters 
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
Negotiating fees. 
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
No. I find it very difficult because they seem to always assume that anyone that designs or 
has any design input into a building or structure, or anything like that is an architect and they 
therefore struggle to grasp. Commonly they will say, well you are an architect and I say I am 
a Structural Engineer and they say, well you’re an architect then? That is mainly due to an 
Architect is a protected title Engineer isn’t and people are relaxed and understand the term 
Architect and struggle to understand any other role. 
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
Well it’s not really the subtleties it’s the essence of what we do full stop. As I said in answer 
to the last bit they tend to assume everything is done by Architects and they struggle to 
understand the difference between the two. So to get over the subtleties of what we do to a 
complete outsider, I wouldn’t even try. It becomes too difficult. 
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
Always making judgements with less than ideal information. 
(6) How do you fill in for missing information if it occurs? 
Experience and relying on the experience of those around me. 
(7) In practice, how frequently do you act based on indirect information?  
It depends what that is likely to be some indirect information we would not act on at all and 
other indirect information that we may for example, get a heads up that there may be a 
project is coming up then we would act we would get in touch with someone who would 
know, or better improve our chances of being included or perhaps even being awarded the 
job. 
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(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
Not really, it comes down to experience and who you are dealing with. Under the same set 
of circumstances with client A who I have known for several years and may have a good 
track record of working with the judgement I would apply to that would be different to client 
B who may be someone I really don’t know and totally unsure of my judgement would differ 
between the two 
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
Yes, with someone I am not used to working with who gives me insufficient information and 
is asking me to make a judgement, which is generally fees, how much we are going to charge 
or programme in how long is it going to take us to do a project or would we enter into a 
contract with these people and clearly the clarity in what you are trying to do is what you 
strive for but rarely get so it does come down to judgement and as I said in the last bit, my 
judgement will be coloured by who I am dealing with. 
(10) Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
Frequently and generally its financial and generally it is in response to perhaps fee bid sort 
between three companies that are being asked to bid on something, and you will 
understand the market is tough and extremely and very very difficult, and yet we all carry 
the same sort of costs, we all pay the same set of salaries but I am constantly surprised at 
the cut throat nature and the low prices that people will put in just to secure work and they 
will do it for less than it will cost them and that surprises me. 
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good Y? 
Sound commercial sense, and that is not only what we charge but the legal agreements we 
will enter into which aren’t going to expose the company to problems down the road. 
Together with making sure people work as a team and working as a team fulfil what the 
client is asking of us and what we are asking of them. 
(12)What do you think your (Customer, Client) thinks makes a good Y? 
I have honestly no idea. If I knew it will be very helpful again, people have different views 
and some are quite surprising and long held and it really depends on the background of the 
person you are dealing with and not only their working background, but also from their 
childhood.   
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry who you or your (customers, clients) didn’t 
or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
Yes I can and I am thinking of someone immediately. I don’t know of the quality they lacked, 
but they were very verbose, very overbearing been there, done it and could do it better and 
perhaps at odds with professional behaviour, were quite willing to give their opinions about 
other companies and they secured some work from us for a client who was quite long 
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standing. Initially impressing the client only the service they provided was not up to 
expectations and then they came back to us.  
(14)You have practiced as a Y for some years now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) Y? 
Well, that is many headed, someone younger and I again I will draw on experience from 
within our company. Someone who is younger is I think probably, by the very nature of the 
fact that they are much younger, are much hungrier and therefore perhaps have a lot more 
energy and are willing to use that energy in pursuing projects and all sorts of things, which 
perhaps I would have done years ago, but these days probably tend not to. On the other side 
of things, I think its experience that lets me to pick and choose what I think is worth 
following up and what is flogging a dead horse and not worth pursuing, so perhaps it’s a 
judgement if it’s not, it just means I am getting tired. 
(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y could 
outperform you? 
See 14 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
Must have a good relationship with a number of clients, ie a good fee earner. Someone who 
can manage effectively and get the best out of staff, so personal relationships in the office. 
And thirdly, have an outgoing personality such that we can go out and expand the client 
base. 
(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
How will I defend it? I really don’t think defence is necessary? Our institution, regard people 
without degrees as failed engineers and you can’t become a chartered engineer without an 
MSc and a lot of the good engineers I do know don’t have degrees and have learnt through, 
you do need some academic training clearly, and they are going through college, but most of 
their knowledge has come from the work environment and they have a gift for engineering, 
which all said and done is not an exact science. I don’t quite know how the percentages fall if 
its 50% academic and 50% aren’t or some other percentage, but there is more to our job 
than pure academics and personally I think there is no substitute for experience. 
(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
Yes, yes I do, but as I was just saying I think there is more to what I do than pure academics 
and I think it’s gone in reverse. When I came out of university I thought I was pretty good at 
maths and I had to be to pass a number of exams, but as you work your way up in the 
profession you lose, you don’t need the all the academic skills and its personal skills you 
need and more financial and legal skills you need. So to keep up to date on the academic 
side is fine if you want to be an analytical engineer, but analytical engineers don’t tend to 
run companies.  
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(19)Do you consider peer based learning through industry journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
Not immensely, clearly journals are interesting to get an idea of what is going on in industry, 
but when I meet my peers and that is generally at networking events it’s a very strange 
environment as everyone is not keen to let on to their competitors what they are and what 
they are not doing  
 
  
Interview Set 7 Junior School Deputy Head 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role in a junior school as a teacher, would you describe for me the 
nature of the judgements you are called to make? 
That’s a really hard question. 
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
Teaching PE.  Working out how to get a lot of children to a particular place out of school.  
How children behave in the play ground in an unstructured time of the day. 
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
No, not especially.  I don’t think people understand the small detail that goes into things or 
that fact that at any one time you are working with at least 32 children and that it could 
complete off at a tangent. 
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
That fact that things don’t often go exactly as you plan them to go and you need to have 
three or four different options as to where it might go in, say, like a lesson, but then it still 
might go in a completely different way, that you didn’t anticipate because of something that 
has happened to one of the children that morning, or in their family, and you have to go 
somewhere that you are completely unprepared for. 
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
I never have a full set of information.  Never-ever.  I’ll know bits and pieces.  Sometimes I 
have to go and find out other bits and pieces from other people that have been involved in 
the situation or who have spoken to someone related to it, but even then it never gives you 
a full set. How frequently do you need to find out from other sources? 
(6) How do you fill in for missing information? 
No answer captured 
(7) In practice, how frequently do act based on indirect information? 
At least twice a day. Quite frequently. 
(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
Usually based on the idea or it might become a bigger problem if I don’t chose to deal with it 
there and then, even if I don’t have all the information.  If I try to deal with the situation 
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there and then, even if I don’t have all the information, it at least opens up a dialogue; 
thinking of conflicts with parents or something a child’s done that day.  If I don’t have all the 
information about it, it is often better to open the dialogue with parents about what has 
happened so far and explain that you don’t know everything rather than not dealing with it 
that day, because that then creates a bigger problem because the child will go home with 
their version of what happened which always paints them as innocent and then you start off 
in a confrontational issue that you didn’t need to be in. 
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
When an incident has happened outside of school involving a couple of children from your 
school and you are still expected to sort it out, even though you don’t know what happened.  
You weren’t there and no other member of staff saw it.  The only two were the two children 
involved.  And also, within school, when parents (or anybody) is confrontational about it and 
is adamant they never did it.  Even if you have seen them do it. 
(10)Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
Yes, quite frequently. Two girls recently, on the way home…. a parent came in the following 
day to say that she’d been to the police, and she’d brought a crime reference number and 
everything in, because another girl had apparently beating her daughter and left marks and 
bruises on her, but the child in question who’d allegedly done this is generally… can be a bit 
awkward at times, but never to the point where she’s ever hurt anybody else.  So that was 
quite surprising.  And then finding out the way the police dealt with it as well was also really 
surprising.  
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good Y? 
Understanding people and making children feel safe so that they can take a risk and be 
wrong in something, but still learn from it. 
(12)What do you think the parents think makes a good teacher? 
Somebody who is quite hot on discipline and behaviour management. 
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry, another teacher, who you or your parents 
didn’t or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
That’s an easy question.  The inability to listen and understand what I am saying is a big turn-
off and I find it very difficult to respect people who aren’t interested in listening to my 
opinion or what I would like to say or add to a conversation.  And also people who are very 
hypocritical or have double standards about what they believe. For example, being 
extremely hot on eco’ issues; saving energy and all sorts of things to the point of making my 
life quite uncomfortable about it, but then quite frequently leaves lights and computers 
blazing, doors open when the heating’s on inside school.  That causes me to lose respect 
because if you believe in something you live by your beliefs. 
(14)You have practiced as a teacher for some years now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) teacher? 
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I think the recently qualified teacher might come off a little better in terms of original ideas, 
creativity, being encouraged to try new things and not worry if they go wrong, because I’ve 
got quite into, “I know what works and I know what doesn’t work”, so I’m more likely to stick 
with what works. 
(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) teacher 
could outperform you? 
Yes, particularly in IPT; with technology.  I use technology quite competently in my work, but 
we’ve got teachers who will make time-laps movies to show effects of science.  I couldn’t do 
that. 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
 Somebody who had very good relational skills.   
 Somebody who had a positive attitude.   
 Somebody who is able to take risks and sees problems as a challenge and an 
opportunity to do something new, rather than a brick wall that couldn’t be climbed 
over. 
 
(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
I think you could be a very good teacher without a formal degree or qualification, because I 
feel one of the skills in teaching is the ability to be reflective on your own practise and on 
someone else’s practise.  The ability to realise that you would never, ever be in a place 
where you have learned it all.  You can always look at somebody else, even with only a 
couple of month’s experience, and find a new way of presenting an idea, a new way of 
teaching a lesson or a new style of doing something.  So from that perspective, if you have 
the right personality and desire to always improve yourself and learn from other people, I 
think maybe you could be a very good teacher without a formal university qualification. 
(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
Yes. 
(19)Do you consider peer based learning through teaching journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
Yes. 
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Interview Set 8: Accountant 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role as an accountant would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
“I suppose most of the would be around specialist knowledge, so I would be involved as part 
of a team if there is a decision to be make and I’d be involved primarily on the financial side 
looking at things such as what costs and what figures should be included; how best to look 
into the future, things like the time-value of money.  That sort of thing.  So it would be very 
much around knowledge of specifics which should be included; things such as “opportunity 
costs” and that sort of thing.  Things that people who don’t work in finance may not think 
about.  That sort of thing.  They see one view of it, for example they salary.  They say we pay 
these people a certain amount.  They wouldn’t look into the facts that there are on-costs; all 
the financial costs such as National Insurance, tax, that sort of thing, that aren’t paid directly 
to those people but are costs associated with them.” 
 
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
“Reconciliation” 
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
“Everyone understands the concept of an accountant, but people who don’t work in it don’t 
really understand what you do.  They always assume I’m really good at maths, but I’m 
appalling at maths in reality.  My basis is much more around those decisions based on those 
numbers rather than the maths behind them.” 
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
“I suppose one of the issues is the debit and credit point of view for people who have not 
been involved in accountancy. Everyone thinks of them as the banking debits and credits, as 
that’s how they’ve been involved, but they are from the banks’ point of view, so it’s all in 
reverse, but people who have had bank accounts are used to that.  So everything you tell 
them just sounds wrong, so I try to use “income” and “expenditure” and that sort of thing.” 
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
“I think it’s very rare to have ideal information.” 
(6) How do you fill in for missing information if it occurs? 
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“I think, it’s going through the assumptions.  You have to make assumptions to put a case 
forward or to build up a set of figures. And every time you make an assumption you try to 
document that assumption and then look at the sensitivity around that and say, “okay, if this 
assumptions wrong, what would the effect of that be either way?”, and try to quantify it if 
that’s possible. 
(7) In practice, how frequently do you act based on indirect information?  
“Very often actually.  We do try to go back.  When you look at a set of information that is 
given to you by somebody else, you need to question yourself and try to go back to them 
and question around that number to ascertain the exact certainty or otherwise of it.” 
(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
“That would be based on how risky I think the assumption is.  I quite often say that on the 
basis that this is probably right, you could do that, but there are risks around what I’ve said 
and if this certain item proves to be incorrect then the risk is that this could happen or that 
could happen. 
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
“I suppose when there is information missing.  In accounting you generally like to get to the 
bottom of everything you’re looking at and when you’ve got a lot of numbers or a lot of 
information where you can’t back it up; the source is a bit woolly or you’re not confident in 
it, then that becomes more difficult.” 
(10)Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
“Yes I have.  I think whenever you start something, particularly with some of the project 
work I am doing now, you’ll start by basing some assumptions.  It might be on the back of 
something someone else has done, and I did have a project where someone had looked at, 
broadly, a whole section of teams and then made some broad recommendations about the 
risk of those teams falling under the Finance section or other sections and they’d made 
some judgments and one of the teams they’d looked at they said they think this team should 
come within Finance.  I was then asked to go in and look in more detail and the more I 
looked into it you could see that the finance activities were actually bundled up with other 
activities they were involved in and if you separated them what you got was duplication of 
effort and a lot more communication between those two areas in order to get a response.  
In the end we went against the original project.” 
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good accountant? 
“Obviously being methodical and very logical, so that with everything you are looking at you 
are thinking where has this information come from?  What is it telling me?  What are the 
chances of it being correct? How consistent is this with other things I am looking at?  So it is 
very much thinking through every detail.  So obviously a high level of detail as well. 
(12)What do you think your (Customer, Client) thinks makes a good accountant? 
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Often people see an accountant, within a business, as being a bit of a pain.  They are quite happy 
to take the things you give them if they approve of the outcome you came to, if they did 
something well or if everything is going ok, but if you’re saying actually there’s an issue here we 
need to address it, they seem to see you as sort of policing the business, because you really 
upset people if you tell then you can’t do something.” 
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry who you or your (customers, clients) didn’t 
or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
“I have. It’s when there’s a failure to understand something when several different people 
have offered their points of view and you feel like you’re banging your head on a wall.  You 
explain something, which seems quite simple to you and they are a person who is qualified 
in the same profession as yourself- not like if you’re talking to someone from a different area 
who would have no concept of what you are talking about – and they don’t seem to grasp it 
and they get annoyed with you” 
(14)You have practiced as an accountant for some years now. How do you think your 
performance compares to a recently qualified accountant? 
“I think my knowledge of things like financial rules, FRS and that sort of stuff is probably out 
of date and, therefore, if I was looking at something I might think there’s a regulation and I 
might have to look it up.  Whereas, newly qualified accountants should be much closer to 
that.  I think it’s all the judgement that improves the more times you go through things 
because you have more experience of particular issues and you have experience of how 
people perceive information when you’re giving management information with figures.  It’s 
knowledge around what does this person want out of it? What are they looking for in the 
dialog that goes with this?  Do they want to be reassured or are they wanting you to put it 
on the line if it is a problem?  Do they want you to say, “this is a very important problem” or 
do they want you to sweeten it a bit.” 
(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y could 
outperform you? 
“Technicalities and new techniques.  We do have to do CPD which helps, but there is always 
going to be certain areas or certain aspects of accounting that you don’t use and if you’ve 
had several roles, like say cost accounting,  you may be behind what current theory is.  There 
might be developments now that are useful that you wouldn’t even know about.” 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
 “That’s a difficult one.  I guess one of the most important things when coming onto a team 
is their personality.  I know it’s not technical at all, but how they fit in with other members of 
the team.  The other thing, I suppose, is a strong interest in how well they do.  If they have 
development issues in one area, they’re going to be looking themselves and saying I don’t 
understand this or I’m struggling in a certain area, and wanting to improve rather than be 
happy just to bumble through things.” 
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(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
“By example.  I have worked with both qualified and unqualified accountants and there is no 
correlation between someone being good at their job and which category the full in on.  I 
have worked with accountants who are fully qualified but not very good accountants.  They 
are obviously good at passing exams, but when they come to the application something falls 
down.  I have also worked with a number of accountants who are completely unqualified, 
but have worked in it for a number of years and completely understand it.” 
(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
 “I do.  I don’t like reading to learn.  I tend to have to walk around read it and say it out loud 
to myself, because I find it better to hear it, but certainly with some areas there are things 
you are only going to look at occasionally and I suppose the advantage of being qualified is 
that you will look at something and think I know there’s a regulation or I know there’s an 
issue around that area and, therefore, you can go away and dig it out.  Whereas if you don’t 
know about it you may inadvertently mislead.” 
(19)Do you consider peer based learning through industry journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
“I do.  More so with closer peers than conferences and things.  I think the problem with large 
conferences where you are meeting people who you don’t know is that people tend to put 
on a bit of a show; a little bit of acting going on there so you never…. It’s better when you 
know someone, you know how they work and therefore you can process what they’re telling 
you through what you know about them. 
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Interview Set 9: Global Relationship Manager 
Generic Form of Questions 
Questions 1 – 4 probe the nature of the role and the complexity associated with it. 
(1) In consideration of your role in X as a Y, would you describe for me the nature of the 
judgements you are called to make? 
Most of them are credit decisions, deciding whether to lend or put a credit lay-out to 
customers and the terms of those credit loans: interest rates, fees, terms of those loans; any 
covenants, conditions, what happens if there is a breach. 
(2) What would you say is a ‘common’ activity in your line of work? 
Dealing with email; who’s going to deal with those, admin’ things, get rid of those to my 
assistant, other people, where possible.  Making decisions really, talking to people about 
their lines, what they want. 
(3) Do you find it easy to communicate the essence of what you do to people outside your 
industry? 
I guess so.  I don’t talk about the ins and outs that much. 
(4) What about communicating the subtleties of what you do? What is most difficult to explain 
to people outside your industry? 
Perhaps understanding the complex nature of the decisions I have to make; the complex 
nature of my customers possibly.  It’s a quick decision, but a long process to get it approved. 
Talking about the millions that we are lending. 
Questions 5 – 10 probe the availability and use of information as part of Expectancy 
(5) When called to make your these judgement calls, do you always have a full set of factual 
information on hand or are you often called to make judgements with less than ideal 
information? 
Sometimes you have less than ideal, but then you ask for more information in order to make 
that decision.  Unless I have all the information I can’t always make the decision. 
(6) How do you fill in for missing information if it occurs? 
Phone the customer, email the customer, face-to-face.  You find it out. 
(7) In practice, how frequently do you act based on indirect information?  
In some instances it might come from accountants, dealing with a large leverage deal, when 
you don’t actually see the customer at all. You’re getting all the information from a third 
party.  This year I have quite a few deals like that.  Last year I didn’t have any. 
(8) How do you make the call between having enough information to make a definitive 
judgement and declining to make a judgement until you have more information? 
I have to submit a credit paper, answer all the questions, put it in a framework.  And if I 
don’t have enough information I’m not prepared to submit it.  It won’t get out of the office.  
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Unless I’m happy I’ve got all the information I won’t give it to my boss to submit.  It will get 
rejected, so you have to have the information. 
(9) In what circumstances do you find it hard to make a good judgement call? 
You have to have the information, so unless you have the information you don’t make the 
decision.  You just bat it back to the customer, “If you want this give me x, y and z” 
(10) Have you ever been surprised by circumstances (arising, presenting themselves)? Can you 
describe that situation for me please? 
How well customers are doing, how badly they’re doing.  You don’t get that many surprises. I 
get surprised at how cheap they may get it from other banks because a lot of the lending I 
do is multi-banked, so sometimes I’m surprised at how cheap another bank is prepared to 
lend and join the club or how expensive they might be compared with us. 
Questions 11 – 19 probes for Experience and Competency indicators 
(11)What do you consider to be important in terms of being a good Y? 
You’ve got to understand big corporates, how they make their decisions, their requirements.  
You’ve got to understand the international nature of their business, requirements around 
the world, banking requirements around the world. 
(12)What do you think your (Customer, Client) thinks makes a good Y? 
Someone who is very approachable, knowledgeable about their business, understands their 
strategy, what their names are.  
(13)Can you recall meeting someone in your industry who you or your (customers, clients) didn’t 
or wouldn’t respect? If so, what do you think they lacked? 
I can’t really think of many.  Sometimes lack of professionalism, lack of knowledge.  People 
get promoted but don’t have the knowledge, sometimes, to understand and take something 
forward. 
(14)You have practiced as a Y for some years now. How do you think your performance 
compares to a recently qualified (appointed) Y? 
Very good, high level of performance. 
(15)Are there any areas of performance where you think a recently qualified (appointed) Y could 
outperform you? 
Sometimes in a year where they get given “gifts” from other people, so their figures may 
look good.  Perhaps they have a new boss who doesn’t fully appreciate that person has been 
given some of the deals rather than hard work and finding new customers to do the deals 
and see an increase in income. It can get quite disheartened by that these days, seeing 
someone come in and perform well. 
I know all the bank’s systems, procedures, requirements, documentation.  Knowledge.  The 
bank’s systems of what the bank requires, but also of what the customer will want. 
(16)If you were recruiting for someone to work as a Y at your level, and you had just three bullet 
points on the advert, what would you require from a prospective candidate? 
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I’ve never recruited.  What would I want?  Someone who’s been in banking and understands 
corporate banking and has been involved in it for some time.  Good analysis.  Good 
communication. 
(17)When recruiting new staff, some organisations recognise the category of ‘Qualified by 
Experience’ often abbreviated to QBE. Accountancy is one such profession where this is 
quite common. How would you defend QBE as a valid category in your industry? 
To do a good job you have to know banking inside-out.  It’s very, very important.  Having 
said that, we in the banking industry will recruit Chartered Accountants into a corporate 
banking role in order to convert them to banking.  They’ve got the accountancy analysis 
skills, particularly for leverage transactions. We will recruit them because they have an 
aspect that bankers do not necessarily have.  And we train them as bankers.  But it is very 
important in a role like mine to have somebody who knows what they are talking about, 
understands figures and will understand lending. 
(18)Do you consider it important to maintain your professional skills with formal academically 
based studies? 
To understand the changing requirements within the bank, the banks requirements and 
within banking , yes.  But I don’t do anything else. 
(19)Do you consider peer based learning through industry journals, conferences etc to be 
important? 
Peers, courses, banking magazines, economic up-dates, yes.  Very important for economic 
updates and currency/foreign exchange, interest rate updates so that you are aware of what 
is going on in banking and the world really.  In the market place, yes. Economic and Global 
market place is vital.  
 
 
Comment [K246]: Experience 
Comment [K247]: Competency 
Comment [K248]: Competency 
Comment [K249]: Experience 
Comment [K250]: Competency 
Comment [K251]: Experience, 
Competency 
Comment [K252]: Competency 
Comment [K253]: Competency 
Comment [K254]: Experience 
